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PREFACE
PREFACE
As global populations increase and more people around the world rise out of poverty, the demand for 
agricultural products such as meat, rice, and palm oil will continue to rise. Increases in the efficiencies and 
productivity of food production around the world have helped to reduce the prevalence of hunger and improve 
the nutrition status of millions in recent decades. These successes, however, could be undermined by illegal 
practices that cause negative environmental or social impacts—impacts which could ultimately threaten long-
term food security. 
In recent years, it has become apparent that the most significant threat to the world’s remaining forests is 
conversion for commercial agriculture and other non-forest use. Agriculture alone accounts for over 70 
percent of all deforestation across tropical and sub-tropical countries, along with other smaller drivers, such as 
mining, infrastructure, urban expansion, and remaining activities (Hosonuma et al. 2012)—all in response to 
unprecedented demands from a growing population on forestlands for food, fuel, and fiber. In August 2014, for 
example, the Government of Indonesia announced plans to clear 14 Mha of forests by 2020 to provide more 
space for infrastructure, energy, and food supply despite ambitious emissions reduction targets (Jakarta Post 
2014). While economic development and food security is a clear priority for many of the countries with the 
world’s remaining tropical forests, inclusive and sustainable growth needs to be nested within strong social 
and environmental safeguards, a strong sense of rule of law, and clarity on the land rights of indigenous and 
local communities who have lived in, cultivated, and held customary rights to these forests for generations. As 
the world seeks affordable solutions to enhancing development and prosperity for billions, land for agriculture 
must be acquired legally, sensibly, and sustainably.
Instead, we are operating with a flawed model. It is increasingly clear that much of the land conversion for 
large-scale agricultural projects is currently being undertaken in violation of some of the producer countries’ 
most basic laws and regulations and incurring high social and environmental costs: non-compliance with 
processes related to the issuance of rights to convert forests, within permitting processes, during the clearing 
of forestland, and/or in the implementation of social safeguards. 
This study has sought to estimate for the first time the proportion of recent tropical deforestation that is the 
result of illegal clearing for commercial agriculture and how much of this was driven by overseas demand. In 
addition, the study estimates for the first time the scale of primary tropical wood products now being traded 
globally and originating from forest conversion, as opposed to selective logging.
Forest Trends has been involved in national and international policy initiatives aiming to combat the trade in 
illegally sourced wood products for close to 15 years, witnessing firsthand the exciting and dramatic changes 
that have taken place in both producer and consumer nations. Producer countries—particularly those engaging 
in Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade Voluntary Partnership Agreements (FLEGT VPAs)—are 
clarifying regulatory frameworks that improve their ability to demonstrate the legality of wood products to 
their public and discerning buyers. Demand-side measures in consumer nations have been shown to support 
the enforcement of producer countries’ own laws and regulations.
The results of this report suggest that there are tremendous opportunities to draw lessons from the significant 
initiatives that have been developed to combat the trade in illegally sourced timber while promoting the trade 
in legally sourced timber. These include the development of standards, importing trade legislation (such as 
the EU Timber Regulation or the 2008 amendments to the US Lacey Act), public procurement policies, and 
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voluntary private sector purchasing policies and investment standards. However, there has been limited analysis 
to date of how similar mechanisms could leverage credible legal compliance for land conversion, support for 
more rational and sustainable land use policies and laws, and how they could increase transparency in the 
implementation of laws and regulations benefiting both public and private interests. 
It is our hope that this report can initiate an ongoing process that will improve the understanding as well as 
a more nuanced view of the nature of deforestation, and a differentiation of the tools that can be used when 
this deforestation is rationally planned and legally implemented versus when it is unplanned and illegal. More 
research will catalyze a more thorough audit of existing information and result in more and clearer data on this 
phenomenon in the coming years. We also hope this will catalyze improved legal compliance and enforcement 
with laws and regulations that govern the conversion of forestland to other uses.
Michael Jenkins
President and CEO 
Forest Trends
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GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY
Agribusiness: Business expansion in the agriculture and rural sector and its supply chains, mainly carried out on 
a large scale by the private sector. It may involve various exogenous agents and agro-industrial chains, or other 
partnerships linked together by contracting structures.
Agro-commodities: Commercially produced agricultural commodities, including crops and livestock products. 
Agro-conversion: Used in this report to refer to conversion of tropical forests for commercial agriculture and 
timber plantations.
Commercial agriculture: This study considers deforestation for commercial agriculture to include both cattle-
ranching and monoculture timber plantations, as well as commercially grown crop plantations. This study also 
includes both small- and large-scale commercial agriculture, but excludes subsistence agriculture since this is 
non-commercial. For most of the countries examined, the majority of the commercial agriculture displacing 
forests are medium- to large-scale and industrial. In addition, in a number of countries the products of small-
scale commercial agriculture is nevertheless processed, traded, or exported by large corporations.
Community forestry: Forest operations where the local community plays a significant role in forest management 
and land use decision-making. Communities may, depending on national legislation, possess a bundle of rights 
(usually management, use, or full ownership) to land under community forestry. 
Concession: A grant of land or property by a government or some other controlling authority to another legal 
entity (usually a large company) in return for payment, services, or for a particular use, a right to undertake and 
profit from a specified activity, or a lease for a particular purpose. Sometimes concessions are allocated based 
upon a permitting and/or a competitive process such as auctions.
Conversion timber/wood: Timber generated during the conversion of natural forest areas to non-forest or 
plantation use, such as the clearance of a forest for commercial agriculture.
Corruption: The abuse of entrusted power for private gain.
Degraded land/forest: Land that has experienced long-term loss of ecosystem productivity, caused by 
disturbances from which it will have difficulty recovering. 
Environmental Impact Assessment: Formal process used to predict the environmental consequences of a 
plan, policy, program, or project, and develop a time-bound plan with specific objectives to mitigate these 
consequences.
Fraud: The act of intentionally deceiving someone in order to gain an unfair or illegal advantage (financial, 
political, or otherwise). Countries usually consider such offenses to be criminal or a violation of civil law.
Illegal: This report considers forest conversion to be illegal when it takes place in contravention of the written 
laws, policies, and regulations in the concerned country. This does not include breaches of international law or 
customary law unless those are reflected in national statutory or case law. In attempting to quantify illegality, 
this report considers deforestation and associated commodities as being associated with the illegality regardless 
of whether illegalities concerned have been identified or prosecuted by the relevant government authorities or 
have since been formally forgiven. This definition encompasses two general categories: illegalities in licensing 
and illegalities in forest clearance. 
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Land grabs: Large-scale land acquisitions that are one or more of the following: in violation of human rights, 
particularly the equal rights of women; not based on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of the affected land 
users; not based on a thorough assessment, or in disregard of, social, economic, and environmental impacts; 
not based on transparent contracts that specify clear and binding commitments about activities, employment, 
and benefit sharing, and; not based on effective democratic planning, independent oversight, and meaningful 
participation (as defined by Taylor 2012).
Legal reserve: Brazil’s requirement of property owners to keep a certain percentage of their land in forest cover 
or its native vegetation, historically in the Amazon 80 percent and in the cerrado 35 percent.
Plantation timber/wood: Timber that is established by planting and/or artificially seeding, as opposed to that 
originating from natural/primary forests. For the purposes of this report, this refers to timber/wood harvested 
for commercial purposes.
Timber products: All solid wood products, including processed products such as furniture; this definition 
excludes pulp and paper. Often referred to as “primary tropical timber products,” or originating from natural 
(non-plantation) forests in the tropics. 
Tropical deforestation: The conversion of forests to other land uses that results in the loss of tree cover to 
below 51 percent. This includes the loss of natural forests from countries either entirely within the tropics or 
in which the majority of its deforestation takes place in the tropics, often to produce agricultural commodities.
Tropical timber: Unless specifically noted, all references to tropical timber in this report refer only to timber 
of tropical wood species harvested from natural forests. Tropical wood species grown on plantations are not 
included.
Voluntary partnership agreement (VPA): A legally binding trade agreement between the European Union (EU) 
and a timber-producing country outside the EU, which is entered into voluntarily. The purpose of a VPA is to 
ensure that timber and timber products exported to the EU come from legal sources. These agreements also 
help timber-exporting countries stop illegal logging by improving regulation and governance of the forest sector.
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Background
Tropical forests continue to disappear at an alarming rate despite growing international recognition of their 
crucial role in mitigating climate change. Their loss generates nearly 50 percent more greenhouse gases than 
the global transportation sector (IPCC 2014). Yet the rate of forest loss is accelerating (Hansen et al. 2013). In 
this report we examine one central question: what is driving this loss? 
Recent studies suggest that at least half of global deforestation in the last decade has been for commercial 
agriculture to meet the rapidly surging global demand for food, fuel, and fiber. This is likely an underestimate, 
given the increasing area of forestlands being converted for agricultural commodities—mainly beef, soy, and 
palm oil—as well as tropical timber, pulp and paper, and plantation wood. The growth of commercial agriculture 
is cited as an important driver of deforestation by nearly every tropical country in official national strategies to 
reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+). 
Much of this conversion is taking place in the context of complex, contradictory, and poorly implemented 
regulations governing forested areas. This confusing regulatory environment makes “legal deforestation” difficult 
for both large and small forest enterprises to achieve, while enterprises that blatantly break the law often do so 
with impunity and may even be rewarded after the fact with acts of amnesty or retroactive changes in the law.
This report presents the first-ever assessment of the extent of illegal deforestation and forest conversion for the 
production of commercial, export-driven agriculture. This study is significant in adding new data to the global 
dialogue on tropical deforestation and trade in forest-risk commodities because it:
• introduces the concept of “illegal forest conversion” and the subsequent illegality of associated 
commodities produced on this converted land;
• uses best available data to quantify illegally sourced commodities in global trade, and concludes that 
a significant portion of global trade in relevant commodities is sourced from illegal forest conversion;
• describes what is illegal and introduces concerns not reflected in current international initiatives 
designed to reduce deforestation or to make commodity supply chains sustainable;
• argues that unless effective forest governance (including legality as a key indicator of governance) is 
established, broader efforts by governments, companies, and donors to tackle tropical deforestation 
and associated trade will continue to face tremendous challenges. Current initiatives need to better 
understand and capture the legal requirements linked to forest conversion and resulting commodities 
if they are to be effective in reducing tropical deforestation.
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Key Findings
While existing studies estimated that at least half of global deforestation in the past decade was for commercial 
agriculture, the proportion for tropical deforestation is higher. This report finds that nearly three-quarters 
(71 percent)1 of all tropical deforestation between 2000 and 2012 was caused by commercial agriculture. In 
addition, almost half (49 percent) of total tropical deforestation between 2000 and 2012 was due to illegal 
conversion for commercial agriculture. Nearly one-quarter (24 percent) was the direct result of illegal agro-
conversion for export markets. Nearly half (49 percent) of all agricultural commodity products produced on 
illegally deforested lands were destined for export markets. Nearly three-quarters (70 percent) of all soy in 
international trade, one-third (32 percent) of the beef, and all of the palm oil, originate in tropical forested 
countries. Consumer demand in overseas markets resulted in the illegal clearance of more than 200,000 square 
kilometers of tropical forest during the first 12 years of the new millennium: an average of five football fields 
every minute. In addition:
• In terms of climate change, the emissions caused by illegal conversion of tropical forest for large-scale 
commercial agriculture during 2000-2012 was an average of 1.47 gigatonnes of CO
2
 per year—the 
equivalent of one-quarter of the annual fossil fuel-based emissions of the EU (Global Carbon Project 
2012). Of this, 0.72 gigatonnes was associated with commodity exports. If the international trade in 
agro-commodities from illegal deforestation were a country, it would be the sixth largest contributor 
to climate change in the world.
• In terms of trade, the value of agro-commodities (beef, leather, soy, palm oil, tropical timber, pulp 
and paper, and plantation wood products) produced on land illegally converted from tropical forests 
is estimated at $61 billion per year. The EU, China, India, Russia, and the US are among the largest 
buyers of these commodities, and their consumer demand could also be leveraged as a force for 
positive change given the right mix of policy, trade, and investment incentives.
• Brazil and Indonesia together account for 75 percent of the global area of tropical forest estimated to 
have been illegally converted for commercial agriculture during 2000-2012. In Brazil, where cattle and 
soy have been the main drivers, at least 90 percent of Amazon deforestation for agriculture is illegal. 
In Indonesia, at least 80 percent of deforestation for commercial agriculture and timber plantations is 
illegal. While domestic consumption is growing as both economies expand, a considerable percentage 
of agricultural commodities is bound for export markets. Brazil exports most of its leather and soy and 
almost a fifth of its beef. Indonesia exports around 75 percent of both its palm oil and plantation timber 
(mostly as pulp and paper). 
• Regional differences can be noted, but widespread and high-level corruption with the issuance of 
licenses for converting forests for commercial agriculture is common across the countries studied. 
Illegalities in operations are also widespread. These include the failure to maintain mandated areas of 
forest reserves, the illegal use of fire to clear forests, the clearance of forest outside legal concession 
boundaries, lack of consultation based upon the principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), 
unfair compensation to Indigenous Peoples and other local communities in concession areas, and 
disregard of regulations meant to minimize negative impacts of conversion on local people and the 
environment. In Southeast Asia, many licenses for millions of hectares of forests slated for conversion 
1	 The	figures	cited	in	this	Executive	Summary	are	the	mid-point	results	of	sensitivity	analyses	conducted	on	data	obtained	for	this	
report,	given	the	varying	levels	of	uncertainty	of	the	data	available	for	the	variables	surveyed.	See	Section	2.2.3	for	a	detailed	
description	of	 the	 sensitivity	analyses	and	Chapter	3	 for	 the	 full	 results,	 including	 the	 ranges	produced	 from	the	sensitivity	
analyses.
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in the Mekong Basin and Papua New Guinea (PNG) were illegally issued. In PNG, a Parliamentary 
Inquiry found that 90 percent of the agro-conversion licenses issued in recent years were obtained by 
corrupt or fraudulent means. In Malaysia, recent court judgments suggest that many palm oil licenses 
may have been issued illegally in contravention of indigenous land rights. Similar concerns have been 
raised about rubber plantations in Cambodia.
• Even in tropical forest countries where export-driven commercial agriculture has not been a major 
driver of deforestation, the situation is rapidly changing, and the same illegalities seen elsewhere 
are being repeated. For example, government inspections have found two out of the three largest and 
newest oil palm plantations under development in the Congo Basin to be operating illegally. Coupled 
with projections of massive increases in global commodity demand, this analysis suggests that the 
importance of export-driven commercial agro-conversion is likely to increase even further in the very 
near future. While countries like Brazil and Indonesia have been battling illegal agro-conversion for 
many years, the problem is expanding to new countries and regions of the world. Many of these 
countries lack robust governance capacity or the legal and regulatory frameworks necessary to ensure 
conversion is carried out legally so that the remaining forests are protected. In almost all of these new 
cases, the majority of commodity production is bound for export markets. 
In summary, the evidence presented in this report indicates that the phenomenon of illegal forest clearing for 
commercial agriculture and associated exports has continued at an alarming rate since at least the start of the 
21st century. Indeed, this problem is worse than previously thought—and is likely occurring to a greater extent 
than the conservative estimates in this analysis show. While rising global incomes and demand for agricultural 
products will continue, we are currently responding with a flawed development model. It is increasingly clear 
that much of the forest land conversion for large-scale agricultural projects is in violation of some of the 
producer countries’ most basic laws and regulations and incurring high social and environmental costs. 
These illegalities will become more pronounced as producer countries encourage agricultural investments as a 
way to catalyze growth. Deforestation will increase in regions such as the Congo Basin where little commercial 
agriculture previously existed, unless we ensure that forestland converted for production is acquired legally 
and sustainably. Faced with the scale, breadth, and diversity of these illegalities, and the weak governance 
underlying them, it would be easy to despair of ever tackling these issues and to focus on other actions to 
address deforestation. This would be a mistake, as it is unlikely that those other actions will work in isolation 
and because these illegalities are not insurmountable.
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Recommendations
The private sector
Companies producing or trading relevant commodities should:
• comply with all national laws when developing new commercial agricultural and timber plantation 
projects in forested countries and when purchasing products;
• refrain from engaging in such projects in countries where it is not possible to ensure legality;
• purchase and trade only commodities that are legally produced and traceable back to their source;
• verify that relevant policies such as zero deforestation commitments are properly implemented via 
independent third-party monitoring and by publishing relevant information;
• improve existing certification schemes to ensure that these more effectively preclude commodities 
from illegal conversion;
• conduct comprehensive assessments of past illegalities by existing concessions (i.e., that examine the 
processes by which licenses were issued and that use archived satellite imagery to examine whether 
clearance began in advance of permitting);
• promote and support actions by producer country governments to tackle the problem (see 
recommendations for producer countries), including the resolution of legal uncertainties, conflicting 
regulations, and unclear tenure;
• promote actions by consumer-country governments to tackle the problem, including through demand-
side regulation; and
• adopt policies that extend beyond national laws, such as avoiding embedded deforestation entirely 
and requiring the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous Peoples and other local 
communities (as per established international standards).
Banks, investors, and financial service providers should:
• ensure that financing is only provided to relevant companies, shipments, and projects where legality 
can be demonstrated.
Certification bodies and associated roundtables should:
• develop or strengthen standards and assessment, monitoring, and compliance mechanisms to ensure 
that they can meaningfully guarantee that no certified products are associated with any of the types of 
illegalities described in this report;
• strengthen monitoring and enforcement of standards, including through independent monitoring, 
transparency of information, and appropriate procedures for handling third-party complaints. These 
mechanisms should have the capacity to conduct a clear assessment of members’ compliance with 
national laws; and
• lobby for regulatory action by consumer country governments to ensure that only legally produced 
products can be imported or sold, thereby creating a level playing field on which companies can 
compete on broader issues of sustainability.
5EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Producer country governments should
• ensure that the legal and regulatory framework governing the licensing and implementation of relevant 
developments on forestland is clear, consistent, and non-conflicting;
• improve enforcement of relevant laws and regulations by increasing necessary resources, improving 
inter-agency coordination and information sharing, increasing penalties, making best use of technology 
(such as satellite images), using anti-corruption and anti-money laundering bodies and laws, and 
putting in place systems of officially-mandated independent monitoring;
• consider commissioning a full review of the legality of all relevant licenses, to be carried out by an 
independent body;
• resolve past illegalities in a manner that is practical but which ensures transgressors do not stand 
to gain and that those affected are properly compensated. Resolve any conflicting land rights claims 
arising from regulatory conflicts or inconsistencies through clear legal frameworks;
• collate and publish all relevant information (including licenses and permits and associated maps and 
land use planning and land ownership maps) and make such publication a legal requirement;
• request the assistance of donor and consumer countries, supported by bilateral arrangements such as 
the EU FLEGT VPAs (see Box 10);
• consider implementing strict and enforceable moratoria on conversion until regulatory arrangements 
have been clarified, land rights conflicts and past illegalities resolved, and enforcement systems improved;
• draft or revise national REDD+ policies that acknowledge the importance of illegal agro-conversion as 
a driver of deforestation and outline specific steps to reduce illegalities; and
• ensure that international commitments regarding rights of local communities and Indigenous Peoples 
are fully reflected in national laws and properly implemented and enforced.
Consumer country governments should
Refocus REDD+ finance and donor assistance:
• provide technical and financial assistance for the necessary actions to be taken by producer countries 
to eradicate illegal forest clearing and resolve outstanding issues of illegality (see recommendations 
for producer countries above), including reforms to land tenure regimes to protect the legal rights of 
forest communities;
• ensure that all donor assistance on forests makes legality and improvements to forest governance a 
priority and precondition for further assistance;
• advocate for producer country REDD+ policies and programs that directly address legality and 
forest governance;
• advocate for relevant multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and UNEP to better address this 
issue in their work with producer countries;
• advocate for REDD+ monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) standards in international climate policy 
fora such as the UNFCCC that will provide oversight to further prevent illegal clearing of natural forests; 
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• require pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other nationally-governed financial instruments to 
carry out necessary due diligence and refuse to do business with companies found to have a high risk 
of being associated with illegal forest clearance;
• provide technical and financial support to civil society groups tackling these issues; and
• support further research to better understand the nature and extent of relevant illegalities.
Create new demand-side measures to curb illegal agro-conversion:
• ensure that existing demand-side measures on timber (including procurement policies, regulations 
governing all imports, and bilateral agreements such as VPAs) are revised to ensure that they encompass 
conversion timber to the maximum possible extent;
• in countries where no such timber-related demand-side measures exist, enact these as a matter of 
urgency; and
• ensure that these demand-side measures are fully implemented and enforced, with an appropriate 
proportion of attention and resources being paid to cases related to conversion and sufficiently 
dissuasive penalties. Implement policies requiring that all government purchases of relevant 
commodities are proven to have been legally and sustainably sourced and ensure that new or existing 
procurement policies include standards that are high enough to ensure that products associated with 
the kinds of illegalities documented in this report are excluded;
• consider passing legislation making it an offense to import or sell agricultural commodities produced 
on land illegally cleared of forests and/or requiring that importers carry out due diligence in order to 
minimize the risk of purchasing such products;
• establish bilateral trade agreements with important supplier countries, following the model of the EU’s 
Voluntary Partnership Agreements; and
• ensure that penalties are sufficiently high and monitoring and enforcement sufficiently robust to 
guarantee compliance with these regulations.
71. BACKGROUND  
1.1 Introduction: Why Are Illegality and Associated Trade Important?
Why focus on illegality? There are three major reasons a greater focus on illegality in commercial agro-conversion 
is important in the broader fight to tackle tropical deforestation. The first is scale. As this report demonstrates for the 
first time, at least half of all tropical deforestation is caused by commercial agro-conversion that is illegal.2 Because 
of this scale, illegality is a major driver of deforestation, resulting in some of the worst associated impacts on the 
environment and people. For example, land conflicts with indigenous and other local communities arise when land 
rights are not respected, compensation or benefit-sharing requirements ignored, and Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) of affected individuals is not obtained by land concession developers. In several countries, particularly 
those experiencing unprecedented growth in commercial agriculture such as Cambodia and Laos, land conflicts have 
become one of the most high-profile issues confronting policymakers—often catalyzing visible grassroots resistance 
movements of communities risking their lives to defend their land (Global Witness 2013b).
Secondly, tackling illegality has been shown to be one of the most effective ways to reduce overall deforestation 
in the tropics, particularly when approached holistically with other proven actions (such as statutory recognition 
of Indigenous Peoples’ and other local communities’ forest tenure rights). By far the greatest success story to-date 
in the fight against tropical deforestation has been the dramatic 70 percent decline in deforestation seen in Brazil 
since 2004. Actions by the Brazilian government to address rampant illegal conversion of forests for commercial 
agriculture were the most important drivers of this success, albeit not the only factors (see Section 4.1 and Box 4). 
Thirdly, illegality and poor governance hold back broader efforts to tackle tropical deforestation, such as private 
sector initiatives on sustainable commodities, as well as efforts by tropical forest countries to reduce legal 
deforestation. While the recent spate of “zero deforestation” commitments by large corporations involved 
in producing, trading, or consuming relevant commodities is to be applauded, such voluntary efforts cannot 
substitute for good governance (Lambin et al. 2014), and their impact will be restricted unless actions are also 
taken by governments to address illegality and governance.
The laws and regulations in many countries are often complex, conflicting, out-of-date, or riddled with gaps 
and vague language, leading to common complaints that “everything is illegal” and thus rendering efforts to 
increase enforcement impractical. This paper acknowledges the complexities of many legal and regulatory 
frameworks, particularly when they cross sectoral boundaries of agricultural, forestry, and land use policy. 
However, accepting such status quo is also unacceptable in countries where weak governance is considered a 
significant barrier to overall economic development. The public sector, civil society, and private sector actors 
2	 Only	laws	and	regulations	related	to	licensing	and	forest	clearance	were	considered—infractions	with	the	potential	for	significant	
negative	 impact.	 Infractions	 of	 less	 significant	 laws	 and	 regulations	 (such	 as	 the	 oft-cited	 truck	 driver	with	 expired	 driver’s	
license)	were	not	considered.	See	Glossary	for	complete	definition.
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all have mutual interests in clarifying and streamlining laws and regulations as a fundamental first step in 
addressing poor land use governance. Increased clarity and consistency in the application of the law is not only 
fundamental to the creation of a conducive business climate necessary to attract more responsible investment, 
but also for the efficient and fair identification and prosecution of those who violate the law.  Small- and medium-
sized enterprises often stand the most to benefit from overall improvements in their business environment 
due to governance reforms (World Bank 2005). In many developing countries, it is the small enterprises that 
are disproportionally affected by “irregular” transaction fees at every stage of operating their business, often 
representing a significant portion of their sales. A process that instigates governance reform has the potential 
to address regulatory complexities that so often create opportunities for corruption. 
This has been the approach used in the EU Forest Law, Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) process 
of developing bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with producer countries to define legality in 
the timber sector. In Indonesia, for example, the VPA development brought together multiple stakeholders 
to clarify relevant laws for inclusion in the country’s timber legality verification systems and recommend the 
elimination of many regulations that no longer served important functions and caused significant regulatory 
barriers for both industry and enforcement agencies. 
Why focus on international trade in commodities? A focus on the international trade in commodities associated 
with illegal deforestation is important for similar reasons: its scale and potential for impact. Demand-side 
actions by consumer country governments on timber and wood products taken during the last 10-15 years, for 
instance, have helped to reduce illegal logging in producer countries (see Chapter 6). And again, illegality hinders 
broader efforts, undermining voluntary efforts by international companies to source sustainable commodities. 
Likewise, undiscerning overseas demand that disregards the legality of sourcing holds back efforts by producer 
countries to make the production of these commodities both legal and sustainable. The responsibility for 
tropical deforestation does not lie with tropical forest countries alone.
It took the international community more than 20 years to learn the importance of addressing legality and good 
governance in relation to the impact of the production and trade in tropical timber on forests and the people 
dependent upon them. The fundamental lesson was that a focus on broader sustainability and an onus on 
voluntary action by international consumers would not be effective unless legality and governance was addressed 
first. There are many parallels between the timber and agriculture industries, and it is essential that efforts to 
tackle deforestation caused by commercial agriculture and associated trade integrate these lessons more quickly. 
1.2  Context: Commercial Agriculture and  
International Demand as Drivers of Deforestation
This report focuses mainly on illegalities in the conversion of tropical forests for export-driven commercial 
agriculture. However, the importance of these illegalities (in terms of the scale of deforestation and associated 
trade they represent) depends on three broader trends, which apply to both legal and illegal conversion and 
associated trade. These are:
• the growing importance of commercial agriculture as a driver of deforestation; 
• the increasing role of international demand for agro-commodities in promoting that growth; and 
• the rapidly growing proportion of tropical timber production sourced from the conversion of forests 
rather than selective logging. 
91. BACKGROUND
Before going on to examine the issue of legality, this chapter examines these three broad trends from a global 
perspective. Additional country-specific information is included in Chapter 4.
1.2.1 The Importance of Commercial Agriculture as a Driver of Tropical Deforestation
Many studies confirm that agriculture—in fact, commercial agriculture—is by far the largest proximate driver of 
deforestation in most tropical countries worldwide. Indeed, the growth of commercial agriculture is cited as an 
important driver of deforestation by nearly all tropical countries in their national REDD+ strategy documents, 
which serve as the basis for international donor programs to combat climate change (Williams and Davis 2012). 
At a global level, two studies have sought to estimate the proportion of recent global tropical deforestation due to 
agriculture. The first, published in 2012, concluded that 73 percent of tropical and subtropical deforestation during 
the decade leading up to 2010 was caused by agriculture: 40 percent due to commercial agriculture and the rest to 
local or subsistence farming (Hosonuma et al. 2012). The second study, produced for the European Commission in 
2013, concluded that 65 percent of deforestation in the tropics and subtropics between 2000 and 2008 was due 
to agricultural expansion (Cuypers et al. 2013).3 Though these figures are high, methodological issues indicate that 
it is very likely both studies significantly underestimate the recent impact of agriculture on tropical deforestation 
and that the 2012 study also underestimates the importance of commercial agriculture (see Annex D).
1.2.2 The Role of Overseas Commodity Demand
The growing importance of commercial agriculture as the greatest threat to the world’s tropical forests is closely 
linked to increasing overseas demand for the internationally traded commodities of soy, beef/leather, palm oil, 
tropical timber, pulp and paper, and plantation-grown timber (Hosonuma et al. 2012; Cuypers et al. 2013). In most 
of the tropical forest countries where these products are produced, a large majority of production is destined for 
export (see Chapter 4). The one notable exception is beef from Brazil, where the majority of production is consumed 
domestically. Seventy percent of the soy in international trade, a third of the beef, and all of the palm oil and tropical 
timber originate in tropical forest countries. The EU is the largest market for soy and palm oil exports from tropical 
forest countries, taking 29 percent and 18 percent of total exports respectively; the EU also consumes 7 percent of 
beef exports from tropical forest countries. China is the second-largest market for soy, palm oil, and beef exports 
from tropical forest countries, and the largest market for tropical timber. One-third of beef exports from the tropical 
forest countries of Latin America remain within the region. Other important buyers of these forest-risk commodities 
include South Asia (taking one-quarter of all palm oil), Southeast Asia (for soy and palm oil), Russia (the largest single 
buyer of forest-risk beef) and the Middle East (for beef).4
The importance of overseas demand for relevant commodities is set to grow even further as global population 
and wealth increases. The size of the global middle class (which consumes a disproportionate share of agro-
commodities) is set to almost triple by 2030, from 1.8 to 4.9 billion people, with most of the growth taking place 
in China (Kharas and Gertz 2010). Because most of this increased demand is expected to take place outside 
the tropics, the role of exports in driving tropical deforestation is likely to increase. For example, even if the 
rapid growth of planting in Indonesia and Malaysia were to continue, it is estimated that the world will need an 
additional 7 Mha of suitable land in the tropics to be converted to oil palm by 2020 to meet projected increases 
3	 The	report	only	included	the	proportion	of	global	deforestation	attributed	to	agriculture	over	a	longer	period	(1990	to	2008),	but	
a	breakdown	was	obtained	from	the	authors	that	allowed	the	figure	for	tropical/subtropical	deforestation	in	the	period	2000	to	
2008	to	be	determined.
4	 All	figures	calculated	from	data	for	trade	in	primary	products	(in	weight	in	kilograms)	recorded	in	UN	COMTRADE,	collated	and	
analyzed	for	Forest	Trends	by	James	Hewitt.
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in demand (Olam 2010)—as much oil palm as has been planted so far in Malaysia.5 Exports of beef from Latin 
America are expected to increase by 30 percent between 2013 and 20226 while Chinese imports of soybeans 
are expected to double between 2010 and 2020 (Thiesse 2013). The FAO projects that a further 7 Mha of land 
in Latin America will be turned into soy plantations by 2022.7 
1.2.3 Forest Clearance as a Source of Tropical Timber
This study estimates for the first time the proportion of tropical timber traded globally that originates from forest 
conversion as opposed to selective logging. In many tropical timber-producing countries, there has been a dramatic 
shift over the last ten years in how the majority of this wood is produced. In the past, almost all tropical timber was 
selectively logged from natural forests, which could in theory be sustainable. More recently, however, a growing 
proportion of production in key countries originates from the clear-felling of tropical forests, mostly to make way for 
commercial agricultural plantations. In Indonesia, for instance, forest conversion has grown from 37 percent of total 
production in 2005 to 72 percent of reported consumption in 2012 (Blundell 2014). 
Conversion timber will likely end up in trade or burned during clearing. Either of these scenarios is problematic; 
the first is a concern for those interested in sustaining forests, while the second is a concern for those combating 
climate change. This study focuses on production and trade of commodities and therefore did not attempt to 
measure trees that are burned, which in some countries may represent a significant proportion of the solid 
wood removed during forest conversion.
Most of this conversion timber is a result of forest clearance for large-scale, export-oriented agricultural 
developments. In Sarawak (the largest timber-producing state in Malaysia), comparisons of planting data and 
deforestation data suggest that around 60 percent of conversion is for oil palm and timber plantations; very 
little that is produced on such plantations remains in the country. In Indonesia, most conversion is also for oil 
palm and timber plantations, with the majority of palm oil and conversion timber exported. All conversion 
timber being produced in PNG at present comes from a handful of Special Agricultural Business Leases (SABLs) 
for oil palm and cocoa, though there are suspicions that some such leases are obtained by developers wishing 
to harvest timber but with no plans to develop the land for agricultural production (“timber grabs”) and might 
never be planted (see Section 4.4). None of these plantations are yet mature, but when they are, it is expected 
that almost 100 percent of production will be exported. 
The growing importance of forest conversion as a source of tropical wood has yet to be appreciated and 
recognized by the main international organizations tasked with monitoring tropical forests and forestry. The 
International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)’s Status of Tropical Forest Management report of 2011, 
for instance, makes almost no mention forest conversion; nor do the UN FAO’s Forestry Outlook Studies 
for the relevant countries. For PNG and the Congo Basin, where the growth of forest conversion is a recent 
phenomenon, this is perhaps understandable. For Indonesia and Malaysia, where forest conversion has been 
a major timber source for some years, it is less excusable. One probable reason for the failure to recognize the 
importance of conversion timber is the lack of official statistics. Almost no producer country publishes separate 
figures for volumes of wood originating from conversion as opposed to selective logging, and neither ITTO nor 
FAO request such a breakdown from member countries as part of their regular data submission procedures. 
Forestry departments in some countries may not even collect this data, though Indonesia has begun to do so.
5	 Malaysia	had	5.1	Mha	of	planted	oil	palm	at	the	end	of	2012.
6	 Calculated	from	production	and	export	figures	in	OECD-FAO	Agricultural	Outlook	2013	to	2022,	http://www.oecd.org/site/oecd-
faoagriculturaloutlook/
7	 Ibid.
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2.  METHODOLOGY 
2.1 Introduction: Evidence of Illegalities 
Chapters 3 and 4 of this report examine the available evidence regarding illegalities during the conversion of 
tropical forests for commercial agriculture and use that evidence to estimate the scale of the problem and 
associated trade.
Much of the information on illegality contained in Chapter 3 comes from independent research by academics 
and non-governmental organizations. Though some information comes from official sources, poor enforcement 
and weak laws mean that in many countries there are few prosecutions from which to draw information. 
Even where enforcement does occur, it is rare for information on specific cases to reach the public, and few 
governments collect relevant statistics, let alone publish them. 
Key provisos related to the information and analyses in this report are as follows:
1. In many of the countries studied there are significant gaps, contradictions, and ambiguities in forest, 
agriculture, environmental, land, and other laws and regulations. This has served to facilitate illegal 
conversion and made it harder for enforcement agencies to prosecute offenders. These complex legal 
issues are not discussed in depth in this report but there are general rules of statutory interpretation 
that can be used to resolve such contradictions.
2. This summary only considers breaches of national legislation and not countries’ international 
commitments unless these are reflected in national legislation. This is especially important in relation 
to the contravention of customary rights of indigenous and other local forest dwellers. Even where 
this does not contravene national legislation, it may contradict commitments made by signatories 
to relevant international conventions and declarations, such as ILO Convention No 169 and the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN-DRIP). However, ILO 169 has yet to be ratified by 
any tropical forest country in Asia or Africa (with the exception of the Central African Republic), and 
UN-DRIP does not take the form of hard international law; in most countries, UN-DRIP has yet to be 
reflected in local laws. Thus it is important to note that much of the forest conversion in Africa and 
Asia (where such customary rights are rarely enshrined in law) is “legal” according to national law but 
nevertheless in breach of customary law.
3. Thirdly, the analysis focuses on whether forest conversion was illegal at the time it took place. In 
some cases this conversion was “legalized” after the fact, through amnesties, prosecutions, fines, or 
retroactive amendments to legislation. This is especially important for Brazil, where a legal change in 
2012 provided an amnesty for around half of the illegal forest conversion that had occurred prior to 2008 
(see Section 4.1). This report includes all these illegal acts as their legacy remains (in terms of the impact 
on forest loss, for example), regardless of whether the state chose to legalize the activities post hoc.
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4. Finally, the analysis only considers illegalities in forest conversion that took place in the last 20-30 years and 
where commercial agriculture or timber plantations were the direct or indirect cause of that conversion.
License Issuance
• Issuance of license/permit contrary to relevant regulations
 – Issuance of license without consent of landowners 
 – In area of forest officially zoned for protection/sustainable timber production
 – Without other pre-requisite permits having been obtained
 – In contravention of other regulations (e.g., limits on total area for one company)
 – Waiving of requirement for specific license where this is not justified and/or permitted under law
 – Obtaining property rights to forested land through fraud or other illegal means
• Corruption
 – Proper procedures for issuance/auction of license ignored in exchange for bribes and/or other favors
 – Licenses issued for below true value to family or in exchange for bribes and/or other favors
Clearance
• Clearance in advance of receipt of all necessary permits (including Environmental Impact 
Assessments)
• Clearance in advance of compliance with regulations related to negotiations with/compensation for 
affected communities
• Illegal use of fire to clear land
• Failure to pay agreed compensation to local communities or individual landowners
• Failure to pay taxes on timber extracted during conversion
• Felling of protected species of tree
• Pollution of rivers and streams with logging debris
• Breaches of regulations governing road construction (designed to minimize erosion)
• Other breaches of environmental controls placed on development
• Clearance of forest in prohibited zones within license area 
 – Steep slopes
 – River buffers
 – Deep peat soils
 – In excess of maximum proportion permitted to be deforested
• Clearance of forest outside boundaries of license area
BOX 1
Typology of Illegalities in Conversion of Forests for Agriculture and Timber Plantations
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2.2 Measuring the Problem
2.2.1 Introduction 
This study estimates, for the first time, the scale of illegal conversion of tropical forests for commercial agriculture 
and associated exports of key commodities. Specifically, the study estimates:
• Illegal Agro-Conversion: The area and proportion of recent (2000 to 2012) tropical deforestation from 
the illegal conversion of tropical forests for commercial agriculture and timber plantations.
• Illegal Agro-Conversion Embodied in Exports: The area and proportion of recent (2000 to 2012) 
tropical deforestation from the illegal conversion of tropical forests for commercial agriculture and 
timber plantations and also embodied in the exports of relevant commodities.
• Trade in Commodities from Illegal Agro-Conversion: The proportion and value of exports of key 
commodities (soy, beef, palm oil, tropical timber, and pulp) in 2012 that originated from land that was 
illegally converted from tropical forest within the last 30 years.
As an intermediary step, the study also estimated the area and proportion of recent tropical deforestation due 
to the conversion of tropical forests for both legal and illegal commercial agriculture as a whole. 
2.2.2 Methodology
Illegal Agro-Conversion
To estimate the area of tropical forest lost due to illegal commercial agriculture (including timber plantations) in 
a given country, this study first multiplied the total area of measured forest loss by an estimate of the proportion 
of that deforestation during the reference period (2000 to 2012) that was due to commercial agriculture. The 
resulting figure was then multiplied by an estimate of the proportion of deforestation for commercial agriculture 
that was illegal in some way (see Figure 1); an explanation and justification for how the rate of illegality was 
calculated for each country is provided in Chapter 4. Such estimates have been produced for the 17 countries 
that comprised 77 percent of tropical forest loss from 2000 to 2012. A global estimate was generated based 
on the sum of these 17 countries, plus an estimate for the remaining “rest of the world,” which was composed 
of a conservative average for the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Estimates of illegality are based 
on the evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4; the individual country and global data are presented in Annex B. 
The principal deforestation dataset used was the data for gross loss of forest of greater than 51 percent 
canopy cover as measured by the University of Maryland through high-resolution satellite mapping 
(Hansen et al. 2013). (All the analyses in this report were also run using FAO data for net loss from 2000 
to 2010, but the results did not differ substantially (see Chapter 3). Further discussion of the different 
deforestation datasets is included in Annex A.)
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Illegal Agro-Conversion Embodied in Exports
To calculate the area of illegal agro-conversion embodied in exports, the results of the above analysis were 
further multiplied by an estimate of the proportion of relevant commodity production that was exported 
(see Figure 2). For countries where more than one major commodity is exported, the proportion of illegal 
deforestation was calculated for each commodity. 
Exports of Associated Commodities
Using a similar methodology, it is possible to estimate the quantity, value, and proportion of exports of specific 
commodities that originate from forestland that was illegally converted over the past 20 to 30 years (see Figure 
3). By this method, all commodities produced on land that was illegally cleared of forest for the purpose of 
producing that type of commodity are considered as illegal deforestation, regardless of how long ago that 
deforestation occurred (i.e., the method does not only consider the first “crop” produced after deforestation, so 
soy planted on illegally cleared former ranchland would also be considered to be the result of illegal activities). 
FIGURE 1 
Formula Used to Calculate Area of Tropical Forest Lost due to  
Illegal Conversion for Commercial Agriculture 2000-2012
X X =Gross forest loss 2000-2012  
(Mha) (A)
% of gross forest 
loss 2000-2012 
due to commercial 
agriculture (B)
% of commercial 
deforestation that 
was likely illegal (C)
 Area of forest 
loss due to illegal 
commercial 
agriculture (Mha)
FIGURE 2 
Formula Used to Calculate Area of Tropical Forest Lost due to Illegal Conversion  
for Commercial Agriculture 2000-2012 which Was Embodied in Exports
X X X =
Gross forest 
loss 2000-
2012 (Mha) 
(A) 
% due to 
commercial 
agriculture 
(B) 
% of 
commercial 
deforestation 
that was likely 
illegal (C)
% of products 
from illegal 
deforestation 
exported (D)
Area of 
forest loss 
due to illegal 
commercial 
agriculture 
embodied 
in exports 
(Mha)
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This analysis was carried out for soy, beef, leather, palm oil, tropical timber, pulp and paper, and plantation-
grown solid wood products. For all commodities except pulp and paper and plantation-grown solid wood 
products, the analysis extended to all global exports. For pulp and paper, separate estimates were produced 
for those products made from wood originating through conversion, as well as those made from plantation-
grown timber that displaced tropical forest; to produce these, estimates of the proportion of pulp and paper 
production coming from each source were produced for the two relevant countries (Indonesia and Malaysia).
These figures for the value of relevant trade are based on primary commodities at the point of export. No 
attempt has been made to calculate the value of these commodities after processing at their point of sale, but 
it can be expected that such a figure would be many multiples higher.
2.2.3  Trade in Tropical Timber
For the three largest tropical timber exporting countries (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea), 
proportions were calculated or estimated by the author based on published data. Full details are provided in the 
relevant country sections in Chapter 4. In 2012, these three countries represented two-thirds of total exports of 
primary tropical timber products (logs, sawn timber, veneer, mouldings, and plywood) from producer countries. 
Though the quantitative evidence available is much more limited than it is for the three largest countries, 
estimates have also been produced for nine other producer countries. These are conservative estimates based 
on available literature and general understanding of the situation in each country and region. Explanations for 
the estimates applied for these countries are provided in the tables at the end of the relevant country/regional 
subsections of Chapter 4. For the rest of the world, the analysis conservatively assumed that the proportion 
was half the average of the 12 specified countries. Since the estimates for the nine additional countries and for 
the rest of the world are less well founded than those for the three largest countries, a sensitivity analysis was 
conducted which examines what difference it would make to the overall global figure if it was assumed that 
none of the tropical timber from these countries originated from conversion.
FIGURE 3
Formula Used to Calculate Quantities of Specific Forest-Risk  
Commodity Exports Likely Linked to Illegal Deforestation
X X =Total weight, volume, or value  
of exports (E)
% of production 
coming from land 
for which forest was 
displaced for that 
purpose (F)
% of deforestation 
for production of 
that commodity 
that was illegal (G)
Weight, volume, 
or value of exports 
linked to illegal 
deforestation
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2.2.4 Dealing with Uncertainty: Sensitivity Analysis/Ranges
There is considerable variation among countries in the availability and quality of evidence with which to estimate 
the percentages used in the above formulae. This is especially true with regard to measures of illegality, as well 
as for measures addressing the “rest of the world” rather than individual countries. In order to capture the 
variation in certainty, the countries were divided into three categories:
For those countries for which there was sufficiently good evidence for a given variable, a single estimate was 
produced (i.e., these were GOOD-data countries with respect to the variable in question). For other countries, 
where the evidence was less strong, a range was produced for the relevant variables (MEDIUM-data countries). 
For those countries for which there was judged to be insufficient quantitative evidence with which to produce 
a single figure or range, regional averages were used (WEAK-data countries). 
In order to assess the implications of these assumptions for each of the formulas (Figures 1-3), a sensitivity 
analysis was conducted that incorporated the range in estimates for each of the formulae (Figures 1-3). Annex 
A describes how low-, mid-, and high-end estimates were developed for the WEAK-data countries (for example, 
to be conservative a value of 0 was used in the low-level sensitivity analysis run). For MEDIUM-data countries, 
the low end of the range was used for the low-run, the middle of the range was used for the mid-run, and the 
high-end of the range was used for the high-run. In all three runs, the individual point-estimate was used for 
the GOOD-data countries.
The estimates for all of the runs are provided in the tables in Annex A.
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The results of this analysis suggest that between 29 and 42 percent of overall total tropical deforestation from 
2000 to 2012 was due to commercial agriculture and timber products for export8 (see Annex A for full data). 
These figures are not directly comparable with those of Cuypers et al. (2013) (since the latter was measuring all 
agriculture-related deforestation, rather than only commercial agriculture), but nevertheless appear to show 
that exports are more important than suggested. The difference stems from variations in the methodology 
used, especially in relation to how deforestation was attributed to agriculture (see Section 1.2).
3.1 Illegal Agro-Conversion and Associated  
Exports as a Proportion of Tropical Deforestation
The results of the principal analysis suggest that just under half (49 percent) of tropical deforestation from 
2000 to 2012 was due to illegal deforestation for commercial agriculture and timber plantations. They also 
suggest that around a quarter (24 percent) of tropical deforestation was a direct result of the illegal conversion 
of forests for production of agro-commodities for export. The full results of the analysis using the principal 
deforestation dataset are provided in Annex B. 
The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that even under the most optimistic assumptions for those situations where 
the data are poor, illegal agro-conversion still represents more than one-third of all tropical deforestation, and 
one-fifth of associated exports (see Figure 4). Under the more pessimistic assumptions, illegal agro-conversion 
represents two-thirds of global tropical deforestation.
8	 Figures	obtained	by	dividing	the	total	in	Column	labelled	“area	of	agro-deforestation	exported”	with	the	total	in	Column	labelled	
A	(total	deforestation)	in	the	low-end	and	high-end	tables	(using	Hansen	2013	>	51%	canopy	cover	forest	loss	data)	in	Annex	B.
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The additional sensitivity analysis using alternative global deforestation datasets shows that the choice of 
dataset makes relatively little difference to the overall results (see Figure 5). The lowest figures are produced 
when the FAO dataset is used, but these still suggest illegal agro-conversion makes up 39 percent of tropical 
deforestation, while associated exports are 17 percent. (Full data-tables for calculations with these alternative 
deforestation datasets are available from the author separately as supporting information.)
FIGURE 4
Estimates of Proportion of Tropical Deforestation due to Agro-Conversion, Illegal Agro-
Conversion and Exported Illegal Agro-conversion (including Sensitivity Analysis)
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The analysis suggests that almost 21 Mha of tropical forest were illegally cleared in the first 12 years of the 
millennium in order to supply agro-commodities for export—or an average of over 17,000 square kilometers 
per year: around five football fields every minute. 
Based on consensus figures for the carbon dioxide emissions from tropical deforestation (Harris et al. 2012),9 
the emissions caused by illegal conversion of tropical forest for large-scale commercial agriculture during 2000 
to 2012 was an average of 1.47 gigatonnes of CO
2
 per year10—the equivalent of one-quarter of the annual fossil 
fuel-based emissions of the EU (Global Carbon Project 2012). Of this, 0.72 gigatonnes was associated with 
commodities that are exported.11 If the international trade in agro-commodities from illegal deforestation were 
a country, it would be the sixth largest contributor to climate change in the world.12
9	 There	is	consensus	that	average	annual	CO
2
	emissions	from	tropical	deforestation	from	2000	to	2005	were	3.0	±1.1	Gt	CO
2
 per 
year	(Harris	et	al.	2012.).
10	 The	consensus	figure	cited	above	(3.0	Gt)	multiplied	by	49	percent	(the	estimate	of	the	proportion	of	tropical	deforestation	due	
to	illegal	commercial	agro-conversion	using	gross	forest	loss	canopy	>	51%).
11	 The	consensus	figure	cited	above	(3.0	Gt)	multiplied	by	24	percent	(mid-point	estimate	of	the	proportion	of	tropical	deforestation	
due	to	exports	of	commodities	resulting	from	illegal	commercial	agro-conversion	using	gross	forest	loss	canopy	>	51%).
12	 Comparison	with	estimates	of	fossil	fuel	and	cement	emissions	by	all	countries	in	2012	(Global	Carbon	Project	2012).	The	five	
countries	with	emissions	greater	than	0.72	Gt	are	China,	the	US,	India,	Russia,	and	Japan.
FIGURE 5
Estimates of Proportion of Tropical Deforestation due to Agro-Conversion, Illegal Agro-
Conversion and Exported Illegal Agro-Conversion, Using Different Deforestation  
Datasets (All Figures are Mid-Points)
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Two-thirds of the illegal agro-conversion estimated to have occurred during the first 12 years of this century 
took place in Latin America, and most of the rest in Asia (based on mid-point estimates; see Figure 6). Between 
them, just two countries—Brazil and Indonesia—are responsible for between 61 and 92 percent of the estimated 
illegal agro-conversion and between 48 and 91 percent of associated exports. Very little forest is estimated to 
have been lost in recent years to illegal conversion for commercial agriculture in Africa, but as Section 4.10 
makes clear this is set to change in the near future for the Congo Basin.
TABLE 1 
Amount of Tropical Forest Estimated to Have Been Lost due to Illegal Agro-Conversion and 
Associated Exports (Total and Selected Countries)
Country Proportion of total 
gross forest loss  
(> 51% canopy cover) 
in the tropics  
2000 to 2012
% of deforestation 
due to illegal agro-
conversion
% of deforestation 
due to illegal agro-
conversion for export 
Estimated area of 
forest converted 
illegally for exported 
agro-production, 
2000 to 2012 (Mha) 
(mid-point only)
LOW 
points
MED 
points
HIGH 
points
LOW 
points
MED 
points
HIGH 
points
Brazil 35% 61% 71% 81% 18% 21% 24% 6.5
Indonesia 18% 64% 64% 64% 48% 48% 48% 7.4
Malaysia 5% 0% 38% 75% 0% 32% 65% 1.5
Paraguay 3% 0% 33% 67% 0% 27% 53% 0.7
Bolivia 3% 68% 68% 68% 38% 44% 51% 1.2
Colombia 3% 0% 32% 63% 0% 6% 13% 0.2
Cambodia 1% 36% 54% 69% 0% 39% 72% 0.4
RoW 32% SEE APPENDIX 2.7
TOTAL 36% 49% 65% 17% 24% 36% 20.6%
% of total tropical 
forest loss
24%
Total	gross	forest	loss	figures	for	2000-2012	sourced	from	Hansen	et	al.	2013.
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3.2 Trade in Commodities Associated with Illegal Agro-Conversion
The report shows that in many countries, the majority of commodities produced and exported into the global 
market are products of illegal deforestation. Based on the mid-point estimates of the analysis, 65 percent 
of Brazilian beef exports are likely linked to illegal deforestation, as are 9 percent of Argentina’s. Forty-one 
percent of Brazil’s soy exports are also estimated to originate from illegally deforested land, as are 5 percent of 
soy exports from Argentina and 30 percent of those from Paraguay. Over half (53 percent) of Indonesia’s and 
around a quarter (24 percent) of Malaysia’s palm oil exports are similarly tainted. The analysis indicates that 
60 percent of Indonesia’s and 28 percent of Malaysia’s exports of tropical timber and wood products are also 
from illegal conversion. Full results of the mid-point analysis are provided in Annex C, while data tables for the 
low-end and high-end analysis are available from the author as supporting information.
In total, global exports of products from illegal tropical deforestation are estimated to be worth $61 billion 
per year, of which $10 billion is tropical conversion wood and wood products, and the remainder is plantation 
wood, beef/leather, and crops grown on the land after conversion (see Table 2). The largest product of illegal 
deforestation is soy, representing more than one-third of the total. Though they receive much less international 
attention, exports of timber and wood products (mostly pulp and paper) from tree plantations grown on illegally 
deforested land are worth nearly half as much as the value of exports of palm oil from illegal deforestation. 
Almost three-quarters (72 percent) of the total measured value of illegal-deforestation exports originate in 
either Brazil or Indonesia.
FIGURE 6
Proportions of Estimated Area of Illegal Agro-Conversion 2000 to 2012 by Continent  
(Mid-Point, > 51% Canopy Gross Loss)
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The analysis also provides estimates of the proportion of total trade in soy, beef, leather, palm oil, and tropical 
timber exports that originate from illegal forest conversion. Based on the mid-point analysis, one-fifth of the 
soy, two-fifths of the palm oil, and nearly one-third of the tropical timber traded internationally are likely linked 
to illegal tropical deforestation, as is around 14 percent of the beef and 7 percent of the leather. Even under the 
most optimistic assumptions used in the sensitivity analysis, the results are still dramatic (see Figure 7).
FIGURE 7
Proportion of Global Exports of Different Agro-Commodities Estimated to  
Originate from Illegal Conversion of Forests
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Note:	See	text,	data	in	Annex	C,	and	supporting	information.
TABLE 2 
Estimated Value of International Trade in Commodities Linked to Illegal Tropical Deforestation, 2012
Country Proportion of total gross forest loss (> 51% canopy cover) in the tropics  
2000 to 2012
Soy $21 billion ($13–$30 billIion)
Beef & leather* $7 billion ($6–$10 billion)
Palm oil $16 billion ($10–$21 billion)
Tropical wood (primary timber products + 
pulp & paper)**
$10 billion ($4–$26 billion)
Plantation wood (inc pulp & paper)*** $7 billion ($4–$6 billion)
TOTAL $61 billion ($37–$94 billion)
Note: See	text,	data	in	Annex	C	and	supporting	information.	
*	Beef	=	$5.8	bn,	Leather	=	$1.5bn;	 
**	Pulp	&	paper	=	$6	bn,	Primary	solid	wood	products	=	$4	bn;	 
***	Pulp	&	paper	=	$6.4	bn;	Solid	wood	products	=	$0.6	bn
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3.3 Trade in Tropical Conversion Timber
The results of the analysis suggest that half (50 percent) of all tropical timber in trade now originates from 
conversion (see Table 3). Even under the most conservative assumption for those countries for which little or 
no information exists the global figure is still more than two-fifths (43 percent). 
TABLE 3 
Estimates of Tropical Conversion Timber Exports for Largest Exporters and Global Estimate
Country Total RWE* 
primary tropical 
product exports 
2012, million m3
% of exports 
from forest  
conversion 
(main estimate)
Implied 
conversion 
exports RWE 
2012, million m3
% of exports from 
forest conversion 
(low-end sensitivity 
analysis)
Implied 
conversion 
exports RWE 
2012, million m3
Malaysia 15.6 65% 10.1 65% 10.1
Indonesia 10.4 75% 7.8 75% 7.8
Papua New Guinea 3.2 30% 1.0 30% 1.0
Burma 2.6 50% 1.3 0% 0.0
Solomon Islands 2.1 15% 0.3 0% 0.0
Cameroon 1.8 5% 0.1 0% 0.0
Laos 1.6 55% 0.9 0% 0.0
Brazil 0.5 20% 0.1 0% 0.0
Gabon 1.1 10% 0.1 0% 0.0
Congo 0.9 2% 0.0 0% 0.0
Ivory Coast 0.7 4% 0.0 0% 0.0
Ghana 0.5 1% 0.0 0% 0.0
Others 3.4 14% 0.5 0% 0.0
TOTAL 44.4 22.2 18.9
% Conversion 50% 43%
*RWE	=	Roundwood	equivalent	volume
Source:	Total	RWE	primary	product	(logs,	sawn	timber,	veneer,	mouldings,	and	plywood)	exports	produced	for	Forest	Trends	by	James	
Hewitt	based	on	UN	COMTRADE	statistics	and	other	trade	data	sources.	Conversion	proportions	estimated	by	the	author	based	on	
available	information	(see	text).
Note:	A	very	small	proportion	of	primary	tropical	product	exports	documented	above	originate	from	plantations	rather	than	natural	
forest.	This	 fact	has	been	 taken	 into	account	when	considering	 the	proportion	of	 total	exports	which	are	 likely	 to	originate	 from	
conversion	of	natural	forest.
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4.   EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONVERSION  
OF TROPICAL FORESTS FOR  
EXPORT-DRIVEN AGRICULTURE
This chapter summarizes evidence relating to the illegal conversion of tropical forests for commercial 
agriculture and timber plantations, and associated exports. The evidence contained in this chapter was used 
in the construction of the national and global estimates outlined in the previous chapter, and in the summary 
discussion regarding the nature of illegalities in Section 2.1. 
The evidence is divided into sub-chapters for each of the most important individual countries and regions. For each 
country or region, the first or second sub-chapter provides detail on the importance of commercial agriculture as a 
driver of deforestation and the importance of export markets for the production of relevant commodities. Where 
such information is available, this sub-chapter also includes information on the production and export of tropical 
conversion timber. The final sub-chapter summarizes available evidence and information on the nature and scale 
of illegalities in conversion of forests for commercial agriculture and timber plantations. Percentages applied in 
the analysis in Chapter 3, along with justifications, are provided for those countries profiled.
This chapter contains information relating to illegalities in the conversion of tropical forests for commercial 
agriculture in 10 of the top 15, and 20 of the top 40 countries in the world for tropical deforestation during 
2000 to 2012. These 20 countries (chosen based on the availability of relevant evidence) were responsible for 
77 percent of total tropical deforestation during that period.13 The most extensive evidence of illegalities relates 
to Brazil and Indonesia, which between them are responsible for half of all tropical deforestation. The chapter 
also includes evidence of relevant illegalities relating to suppliers of 68 percent of total global soy exports, 90 
percent of palm oil exports, 23 percent of beef exports, and 85 percent of tropical timber exports. 
When considering the evidence of illegalities presented in this chapter, it is important to bear in mind the 
provisos outlined in Section 2.1 above. 
4.1 Brazil
4.1.1 Background
Forest loss in Brazil was responsible for a quarter of all the forests lost worldwide between 1990 and 2010 (FAO 
2010),14 and a third of all tropical forests lost between 2000 and 2012 (Hansen et al. 2013). Historically, this 
deforestation occurred along the “Arc of Deforestation” in Brazil’s Amazon frontier across the three states of 
Pará, Mato Grosso, and Rondônia (INPE 2002). Here, infrastructure development spurred the construction of new 
roads, opening up frontier forests to unplanned land conversion and increased human migration and settlement. 
13	 Calculated	from	data	in	Hansen	et	al.	2013,	using	data	for	gross	forest	loss	in	canopy	cover	>	51%.
14	 Calculated	from	forest	area	data	for	1990	and	2010	in	FAO	2010.
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Since 2004, Brazil has achieved a dramatic reduction in the deforestation rate, which had declined by 70 
percent by 2013 compared with the 1996 to 2005 average (Nepstad et al. 2014). Most of this decline has been 
attributed to government actions, including the creation of large new areas of protected areas and indigenous 
reserves, and a range of innovative policy measures designed to address illegal deforestation (Arima et al. 2014; 
Nepstad et al. 2014). Voluntary moratoria on deforestation by soy and beef producers—prompted by NGO 
campaigns, international markets, national slaughterhouses, supermarkets, and public prosecutors—have also 
played a part (see Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 regarding soy and beef). However, despite this decrease, the areas 
lost each year still represent a large proportion of the global figure, and in recent years the rate of progress has 
slowed and possibly reversed. In the cerrado (now the principal location of Brazil’s forest loss), deforestation 
has been climbing steadily since 2009, while deforestation in the Amazon also rose again in 2013 (Soares-Filho 
et al. 2014)—although well below the historic highs experienced between 1996 and 2008.15 
4.1.2 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
While many studies have stated the overwhelming importance of commercial agriculture as a driver of 
deforestation in Brazil, especially for cattle and soybean production, only a few provide hard data on the precise 
area (see Box 2) (Barona et al. 2010; Fearnside 1996; Margulis 2004). This is complicated by the fact that land 
is often cleared first for cattle production, and then planted with agricultural crops, soy in particular, and that 
some land deforested for agriculture is later abandoned and reverts to secondary forest or scrub. Though most 
research has examined these drivers in relation to the Brazilian Amazon, there is also strong evidence that 
agriculture is equally important in driving the deforestation of the Brazilian cerrado. The Government of Brazil’s 
own plan for management of the cerrado, for instance, recognizes that there has been a strong correlation 
between an increased area of soy planting and increased deforestation (Ministério do Meio Ambiente 2010). 
Based on a review of available evidence, one study concluded that in total, 98 percent of Brazilian deforestation 
during 1995 to 2005 could be attributed to cattle and soy (see Box 2 for details). Since 2006, when domestic 
soy producers declared a voluntary moratorium on deforestation in the Amazon region, the deforestation rate 
for soy in the Amazon has dropped to near zero (see Section 4.1.3). However, the soy moratorium did not apply 
to deforestation in other Brazilian forest biomes, and cattle-related deforestation has continued nationwide, 
albeit at a slower rate since the adoption of a similar voluntary moratorium for beef in 2009 (Walker et al. 2013).
15	 Deforestation	rates	in	the	Brazilian	Amazon,	online	at	obt.inpe.br/prodes/index.php.
    Fields of soy in the Brazilian Amazon © Karla Gachet / Panos / Greenpeace
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While soy and beef are by far the most important commercial agricultural products driving deforestation in 
Brazil, Brazil is also the world’s largest producer of sugarcane and has the third largest area of monoculture 
timber plantations in the world, with 6.5 Mha planted by 2012 (Indufor 2012). While most of these plantations 
were established on non-forested land, some directly replaced forest, while others may follow cattle production 
that initially led to the forest clearance (de Sà et al. 2013; Lang 2008). Most timber plantations for pulp occur in 
the southwest region of Brazil and there are very few in the Amazon region.16
Unlike many other tropical countries, the majority of the commodities associated with deforestation in Brazil are 
consumed locally. Exports are still important, however. Karstensen et al. (2013) found that 15 percent of carbon 
emissions associated with beef deforestation and 50 percent associated with soy deforestation resulted from 
products that were exported. In total, the study found that around 30 percent of total carbon emissions from 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon in the decade to 2010 were related to exports. The authors concluded 
that “in recent years, there is a positive correlation between high deforestation emissions and high proportions 
of production exported; giving additional support to the hypothesis that deforestation is increasingly connected 
to international trade.” The authors note that because global drivers contribute to Brazil’s deforestation, “they 
should also be seen as part of the solution,” and suggest that unless global agro-commodity demand is tackled 
16	 	Percentages	calculated	to	exclude	the	area	of	deforestation	in	2008	which	was	not	classified.	The	pasture	figure	is	calculated	
from	the	total	area	recorded	as	“clean	pasture,”	“regenerating	pasture,”	“pasture	with	bare	shrubs,”	and	“pasture	with	bare	soil.”
1. Based on a review of available evidence, Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) estimate that 17.1 of the 22.4 
Mha of forest lost (76 percent) in the Brazilian Amazon were lost for cattle pasture between 
1995 and 2005. A further 3.9 Mha (17 percent) were initially converted for soy production. In the 
Brazilian cerrado, at least 3.9 Mha had been lost for cattle farming and a further 3.3 Mha to soy 
production. In total, the authors estimate that 98 percent of deforestation in Brazil has been driven 
by ranching and soy plantations (Grieg-Gran et al. 2007; Figure 10, p99).
2. Morton et al. (2006) used field surveys and satellite imagery to assess the fate of large (> 25ha) 
plots of deforested land in Mato Grosso state (the most important in Brazil for deforestation) during 
2001-2004, and found that in 2002, 78 percent of the deforested area was converted to cattle 
pasture and 13 percent to cropland (a combined total of 91 percent), while in 2003 the figures were 
66 percent and 23 percent (a combined total of 89 percent).
3. The National Institute for Space Research (INPE) (2011), using satellite imagery, found that of the 
cumulative area deforested in the Brazilian “Legal Amazon” to 2007, 63 percent was being used 
as cattle pasture in 2008 and 5 percent for crops. A further 10 percent was classified as “mosaic of 
occupation” or “no data” and could also have been pasture or crops, while most of the remainder 
(21 percent) was classed as “secondary vegetation” and may have originally been cleared for 
pasture or crops (INPE 2011a).16
4. Karstensen et al. (2013) state that the share of land use in the year of deforestation in most 
Brazilian states is 34.7 percent for cropland and 65.3 percent for pastures (i.e., that 100 percent of 
initial deforestation is for agriculture), but that in subsequent years much of the cropland reverts to 
secondary forest.
BOX 2
Summaries of Studies Estimating Forest Loss due to Cattle and Agricultural Production
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through regulation at various points in the supply chain, it is likely that deforestation rates in Brazil will begin to 
climb, as was indeed the case in 2013.
As recently as the 1990s, Brazil was a net importer of beef (MercoPress 2013). By 2004, it had become the 
world’s largest exporter.17 A few years ago, Brazil was exporting more than a quarter of its beef production, 
but exports have declined steadily since 2007 as a proportion of production (Bonsall 2012), and in 2012, only 
17 percent was exported.18 In contrast to beef, however, most of Brazil’s bovine leather is exported.19 Major 
markets include the EU and China.20 In the past, the EU was the largest importer of Brazilian beef, but this 
changed in the mid-2000s and by 2013, Russia, China, and the Middle East were the biggest export markets.21 
Though Brazil only exports a minority of the beef it produces, it exports 75 percent of its soy production.22 In 
2012, the largest market for Brazilian soy exports was China, taking 48 percent of total exports; the second 
largest market was the EU, with 31 percent. One-third of Brazil’s timber plantation area is used for pulp 
production, and around two-thirds of this pulp is exported. In 2012, 46 percent of this pulp was exported to 
Europe, 26 percent to China, and 19 percent to North America (BRACELPA 2014).
There is no official data on the proportion of Brazil’s tropical timber production and exports being sourced 
from conversion of forests. Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) estimate volumes of tropical forest conversion timber in 
Brazil at between 4.7 million m3 and 14.7 million m3 in 2004, compared with total production that year of 24.5 
million m3, suggesting that it represents between 19 and 60 percent of production. However, their analysis also 
concludes that much forest clearance for agriculture involves little commercial harvesting. For this study, the 
lowest end of the implied range (19 percent) is therefore assumed for tropical wood exports. 
4.1.3 Illegalities in Conversion
Introduction 
In Brazil the most common illegalities relating to conversion of forests are fraudulent land titles and the failure 
to retain the legally required minimum percentage of natural forest on each property (known as “legal reserves” 
under Brazilian law) (see Box 3). Other regulatory breaches, such as converting forests outside legal boundaries 
(including incursions into protected areas), and the clearing of other forest conservation zones within properties 
(such as streamside buffers) are also common. While the Brazilian government has been successful in recent 
years in reducing illegal deforestation (see Box 4), the problem continues, and much of the legacy of past illegal 
deforestation has yet to be effectively addressed.
The estimate of illegality used in this study for Brazil (68 to 90 percent) is based solely on breaches of legal 
reserves, and is therefore likely an underestimate of overall levels of non-compliance, because it assumes that 
conversion that is in compliance with legal reserve requirements is legal in all other respects. Encroachments 
beyond property boundaries or breaches of other environmental protection measures within properties, 
such as failures to protect streamside buffers and steep slopes, are known to be common but could not be 
17	 UN	COMTRADE	statistics,	analyzed	for	Forest	Trends	by	James	Hewitt.
18	 Calculated	from	figures	from	USDA	Foreign	Agricultural	Service,	Livestock	&	Products	Annual	2013	for	Brazil.
19	 Calculated	 from	production	and	export	figures	 in	 FAO—World	Statistical	Compendium	 for	 raw	hides	and	 skins,	 leather	and	
leather	footwear	1993	to	2012	(2012).
20	 UN	COMTRADE	statistics,	analyzed	for	Forest	Trends	by	James	Hewitt.
21	 UN	COMTRADE	statistics,	analyzed	for	Forest	Trends	by	James	Hewitt.
22	 Calculated	from	figures	for	soy	production	and	soybean,	soy	oil,	and	soy	meal	exports	 in	USDA	Foreign	Agricultural	Service,	
Oilseeds	and	Products	Annual	2013	for	Brazil.
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considered because of a lack of quantitative data. The estimate used in the analysis also does not capture the 
extent to which deforestation that was in compliance with legal reserve limits may nevertheless have occurred 
on properties where ownership rights were obtained illegally.
On the other hand, the general proviso that the measure of illegality used in the analysis does not consider 
any post-hoc process of “legalization” (see Section 2.1) is of particular importance to Brazil, given the recent 
“amnesty” covering large areas of illegal deforestation that occurred prior to 2008 (see Box 4). In addition, the 
illegality percentage for the Brazilian Amazon applied in the analysis in this report is based on evidence that 
only extends to 2009, and it is likely that a lower proportion of deforestation since that date has been illegal. 
However, given that the years to 2009 account for 90 percent of Amazon deforestation during the reference 
period (2000 to 2012), any variation in the illegality rate since will make little difference to the overall total. 
Similarly, with regard to the commodity analysis (Section 3.2), it is especially important to bear in mind that this 
analysis considers all production and trade of relevant commodities to be associated with illegality regardless 
of when the deforestation took place, or whether it has since been ”legalized.” Though most relevant Brazilian 
commodities may still be coming from land which was illegally deforested, the proportion of “new” production 
(from land cleared only recently) that is illegal will almost certainly be lower.
1.  Ownership rights: Organized land grabbers and squatters have cleared forest areas with impunity, 
and then taken advantage of various government programs granting land titles after the fact to 
validate illegal seizures of public lands. This land-grabbing has been a key part of the process 
of forest conversion to cattle pasture. The World Bank reports that “the high profits to be 
obtained from cattle ranching are often due to the originally illegal appropriation of land which 
is camouflaged in subsequent financial returns” (Margulis 2004). Fraudulent title deeds and 
corruption are common tools in the illegal appropriation of land. The Brazilian government stated in 
2009 that clear ownership records existed for less than 4 percent of the land in private hands in the 
Brazilian Amazon (Barrioneuvo 2009). The Brazilian authorities continue to encourage illegal land-
grabbing by allowing such land to be “regularized” through payments that are below market rates. 
Efforts by the Brazilian government to address past illegalities in land titling and prevent future 
land-grabbing have been much less successful than those relating to other types of illegalities 
related to forest conversion (Barreto and da Silva 2013).
2.  Legal reserves: All properties are legally required to maintain a minimum of natural vegetation within 
each property (the “legal reserve”). This minimum has varied over time and is higher in the Brazilian 
Amazon than elsewhere in Brazil. Since 1997, the legal reserve in the Amazon has been 80 percent; 
prior to that it was 50 percent. In the cerrado, it is 35 percent. It has been estimated that 90 percent 
of forest clearance in Mato Grosso state between 2001 and 2009 was in excess of the legal reserve 
(Stickler et al. 2013; see main text for additional details).
BOX 3
Two Common Types of Illegalities Associated with Forest Clearing for Agriculture and Livestock
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General Quantitative Estimates of Illegality
One recent study (Soares-Filho et al. 2014) estimated that a cumulative area of forest larger than California 
(between 44 and 56 Mha) had been illegally cleared on private farm properties in Brazil up to 2011, in 
contravention of the Forest Code. This figure includes both breaches of legal reserves and the additional 
requirement to protect conservation forests along the banks of rivers. Earlier studies (Sparovek et al. 2010; 
Sparovek et al. 2012), using a different methodology and including breaches of other Forest Code requirements 
(such as protection of natural vegetation on steep slopes, areas of high elevation, and hilltops), came up with 
an even higher estimate of 87 Mha of natural vegetation cleared in contravention of the Forest Code.
These national-level studies used proxy data and modelling, and did not seek to directly measure the areas of 
deforestation within individual properties that were non-compliant with the Forest Code, or the proportion this 
represented of the total area deforested within such properties. These studies also did not clearly discriminate 
between forest and non-forest “natural vegetation” when considering the areas cleared illegally, or seek to 
assess levels of compliance during different time periods. 
Stickler et al. (2013) sought to overcome these limitations through a more direct analysis of Forest Code 
compliance, which examined such compliance between 1997 and 2009 in the state of Mato Grosso, which was 
responsible for 40 percent of all deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon between 1996 and 2005. Their study 
found that between 2001 and 2009, 90 percent “of this clearing was illegal” on the basis of compliance with 
the legal reserve requirement alone (see Table 4). Supplementary findings to the study using alternative forest 
cover data suggest a similar, though slightly lower, proportion of illegality (87 percent) between 2000 and 2005.
Additional evidence from Greenpeace (2009a), based on a comparison of satellite imagery with permits for 
deforestation obtained from government agencies, suggests that these findings are typical for the broader 
Brazilian Amazon, estimating that 90 percent of the deforestation from July 2006 to July 2007 was illegal. This 
represented a substantial increase compared to 2004, when a similar analysis found that only 70 percent of 
conversion was illegal (Greenpeace 2009a). 23
23	 The	analysis	excluded	the	states	of	Tocantins	and	Maranhão,	but	these	encompass	less	than	two	percent	of	the	Brazilian	Amazon	
forest.
TABLE 4 
Illegal Deforestation in Mato Grosso State due to Commercial Agriculture,  
Brazil, 1997 to 2009
Period Area of illegal deforestation % of deforestation illegal 
1997 to 2001 18,782 km2 88%
2001 to 2005 27,062 km2 90%
2005 to 2009 6,681 km2 90%
Source:	Stickler	et	al.	2013.
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The Government Response
Amendments to Brazil’s Forest Code, signed by the President in 2012, granted amnesty for violations of legal 
reserve limits prior to 2008. Previously, all areas illegally deforested were required to be fully restored. Now, 
small farms less than 400 ha are not required to conduct any restoration, while larger farms must restore only a 
portion, and can choose to do so with non-native species or through the purchase of deforestation rights from 
other compliant landowners, once the non-compliant landowner has properly registered their property with the 
State and obtained the required environmental certification. However, this 2012 amendment to the Forest Code 
is being challenged in Brazil’s Supreme Court (WWF UK 2013). It has been estimated that when combined, the 
various amendments to the Forest Code will forgive 23 to 36 Mha of illegal land clearance that took place prior to 
2008 (between 48 percent and 64 percent of the total area of such illegal clearance up to 2011) (Soares-Filho et al. 
2014). There is a risk that such a blanket amnesty could encourage future illegality, by leading to the “perception 
that illegal deforesters are unlikely to be prosecuted and may even be exonerated in future law reforms” (ibid.) or 
shift the production to smaller farms that are exempt from mandated conservation measures. This said, Stickler 
et al. (2013) conclude that whatever emerges from the Forest Code must be accompanied by an effective set of 
options for forestland owners to come into compliance, coupled with incentives that cover, at least in part, their 
opportunity costs for providing public environmental benefits.
In addition to amending the Forest Code to enable this amnesty, the Brazilian government has taken a number 
of other steps to try to tackle illegal deforestation in the Amazon (see Box 4). Some of the most important steps 
(such as the rural environmental registry, CAR, and other amendments to the Forest Code) have not yet been 
fully implemented, however, and the problem remains widespread. In November 2013, Brazil’s environment 
minister attributed a 28 percent rise in deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon over the previous year to increased 
illegal ranching and soybean production in the states of Mato Grosso and Pará, and criticized those state 
authorities for failing to effectively tackle illegal forest conversion (AFP 2013). The minister promised action 
against those responsible, which she described as “mafias” involving both land-grabbers and corrupt officials, 
and stated that there were almost 4,000 ongoing police investigations into illegal conversion (Rocha 2013).
Evidence Specific to Cattle Ranching
For the period 2008 to 2009, Greenpeace (2009a) examined 28 cattle ranches in Mato Grosso and Pará, covering 
approximately 0.5 Mha. All 28 ranches had cleared more than the legal maximum area of forest. Indeed, most 
(64 percent) had cleared more than 70 percent, and many (36 percent) had cleared more than 90 percent. 
Between them, the 28 ranches had illegally converted more than 150,000 ha, 150 percent more than the legally 
permissible area. In total, more than 70 percent of the pasture within the 28 ranches was illegally deforested.24 
The same study also documented cases of illegal forest conversion for cattle pasture in protected areas and 
indigenous lands (see Case Study 1). 
In October 2009, four of Brazil’s largest meat processing companies (JBS, Bertin—later purchased by JBS—
Marfrig, and Minerva) signed a public agreement (known as the G4 Cattle Agreement) to no longer purchase 
cattle from ranches within the Amazon biome where deforestation had occurred after the date of the agreement, 
unless those companies could prove compliance with land tenure and environmental legislation (Walker et al. 
2013). The companies also agreed to ban the purchase of cattle from ranches that deforested prior to the 
agreement, where these ranches had been accused by government agencies of invading indigenous lands, 
“embargoed” by IBAMA, or fined by state or federal authorities for invading protected areas. Such ranches 
could only be accepted as suppliers if they could prove that fines had been paid, environmental damages had 
24	 Calculated	from	data	in	Tables	4,5,7,8	and	9	in	Greenpeace	(2009a).
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Since 2004, the Brazilian government has taken a number of steps to to reduce deforestation. These 
actions have been credited as the key drivers behind the dramatic 70 percent decline in deforestation 
seen in the country in the years 2004-2012 (Nepstad et al. 2014). While the most effective government 
action during 2004-2006 was a massive increase in the area of protected forest (including indigenous 
reserves) (Soares-Filho et al. 2010), “command and control” actions specifically targeted at illegal 
deforestation have been found to have been particularly important from 2008 onwards, when the most 
substantial declines in deforestation were seen (Arima et al. 2014). Steps taken by the government that 
were specifically targeted at illegal deforestation include:
• 2004—“Plan for the Protection and Control of Deforestation in the Amazon” (PPCDAm) improved 
coordination between relevant enforcement agencies.
• 2008—The Critical Counties Program prohibited government agencies from providing loans to 
properties on Brazil’s environmental agency (IBAMA)’s list of “embargoed” properties found to 
have cleared forest illegally, while an associated resolution of the Brazilian Central Bank required 
documentation proving compliance with environmental regulations by farms in the Amazon biome 
as a condition for financing.
• 2008—The federal prosecutor’s office (MPF) in Pará took civil action against 20 ranchers and 11 
major meat packers, and recommended to major supermarkets and other buyers to halt purchases 
from them; the MPF then used the case as leverage to obtain important commitments from the 
meatpackers concerned.
• 2009—The Rural Environmental Registry (Cadastro Ambiental Rural (CAR)) went into effect in the 
states of Mato Grosso and Pará. By requiring landholders to submit their property boundaries 
to the state environmental regulatory agency (SM), it increased capacity to enforce legal reserve 
requirements (though it did not assess legality of land tenure).
• 2012—The new Forest Code required every state to establish a CAR and required individual properties to 
report their level of compliance with the legal reserve and plans for achieving compliance.
• 2012—Issuance of the Plan of Prevention, Combat and Alternatives to Illegal Settlements 
Deforestation in the Amazon (also called the Green Settlements Program), seeking to reduce illegal 
deforestation in agrarian farm settlements.
Arima et al. (2014) examined the indirect drivers that led the government to enact relevant policies and 
increase its efforts at enforcement. The authors consider that an accumulation of detailed evidence 
(including annual data series from satellite monitoring programs) of widespread and growing deforestation 
(much of it illegal) was an important factor, as was the increased support of the Brazilian public for action, 
and reforms in the Brazilian judiciary that created the Federal Prosecutor’s Office (MPF), which is able 
to act as an independent watchdog over other relevant agencies. The authors also concluded that a 
relatively well-crafted legal framework helped in tackling illegalities.
Though the actions taken thus far have been effective, there remains much that needs to be done. 
Implementation of the crucial CAR requirements remains at an early stage in much of the country. Barreto 
and da Silva (2013) highlighted three factors that continue to stimulate deforestation in Brazil: the failure 
to prevent illegal land-grabbing; as well as the failure to address fraud and money-laundering related to 
the taxes on rural properties (ITR) and rural incomes (IRR). All three factors relate to illegalities involved 
in commercial agro-conversion.
BOX 4
Actions to Address Illegal Deforestation Taken by the Brazilian Government
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been repaired, and that they were now in full legal compliance. The buyers also committed to refusing cattle from 
ranches accused by relevant government agencies of land-grabbing, until such accusations were dropped. In the 
longer term, the companies agreed that they would ensure all suppliers had the necessary environmental permits 
within two years, and would only accept suppliers who could prove they were in possession of legal land titles 
within five years. All of this was to be ensured through the establishment of supply chain tracking systems.25 
Though it was an impressive achievement, the G4 Agreement stopped well short of preventing all purchasing 
of cattle from land which was illegally deforested prior to 2009. First, though it encompassed the largest four 
companies in the industry, the voluntary deal only covered one-third of the total cattle slaughtering in the 
Amazon (Walker et al. 2013) and allowed purchases to continue if the farm was “legalized” through payment of 
fines or other measures. Such purchases could only be prevented where the illegal deforestation was detected 
by government agencies (and the relevant areas thereby “embargoed”). The agreement also did not apply to 
deforestation outside the Amazon biome, such as in Brazil’s cerrado forests.
Even for those illegalities that were captured, there is evidence of problems with implementation of the 
agreement. In June 2012, Greenpeace published a review of the effectiveness of the G4 Agreement in which it 
claimed to have evidence showing that the largest of the companies involved (JBS) was continuing to buy from 
farms deforesting illegally and occupying indigenous lands (Greenpeace 2012a). Greenpeace claimed that two 
farms that supplied JBS up to November 2011 were “embargoed” by IBAMA for illegal deforestation as late as 
December 2011, and that this demonstrated that 
the company’s supply chain system was failing 
to determine whether or not suppliers were 
engaged in illegal deforestation. Greenpeace 
also claims that JBS failed to properly monitor 
its indirect suppliers (Greenpeace 2012b). 
JBS has challenged Greenpeace’s assertions 
(Mongabay 2012b). 
Meanwhile, illegal deforestation for beef 
production has continued. In April 2013, federal 
and state authorities sued 26 slaughterhouses 
in the states of Amazonas, Mato Grosso, and 
Rondônia for buying cattle from farms involved in 
illegal deforestation. The fines issued total $280 
million. One of Brazil’s largest slaughterhouse 
firms, BR Foods (not among those which signed 
the G4 Agreement), was among those cited. 
According to the Federal Public Ministry, it had 
bought cattle from six farms in areas embargoed 
by IBAMA (Greenpeace 2013c).
25	 Minimum	Criteria	for	Industrial	Scale	Cattle	Operations	in	the	Brazilian	Amazon	Biome	(also	known	as	the	G4	Cattle	Agreement),	
October	4,	2009.	Note	that	the	agreement	was	known	as	the	G4	Agreement	as	 it	 initially	 involved	four	companies,	but	two	
subsequently	merged.
    Beef cattle in Mato Grosso, Brazil © Markus Mauthe / Greenpeace
33
4. EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONVERSION OF TROPICAL FORESTS FOR EXPORT-DRIVEN AGRICULTURE
In March 2007, the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) approved a loan to Brazilian 
company Bertín for the expansion of a slaughterhouse in Marabá, Pará. 
Prior to the investment, the IFC’s own summary of the proposed investment admitted that “numerous 
farmers in Bertín’s supply chain have no legal title to land or have fraudulent documentation” (IFC 
2006). For this reason, the loan included conditions meant to minimize the impact of the new facility on 
surrounding forests and to ensure it did not take cattle from illegally deforested land. 
However, Greenpeace researched six ranches supplying cattle to the slaughterhouse after the loan was 
approved, and found all had deforested far more than the “legal reserve” maximum of 20 percent of 
the land under their control. All had deforested at least 60 percent, and two had cleared more than 90 
percent. The slaughterhouse also sourced cattle indirectly from ranches that had been raided by IBAMA 
and found to be involved in illegal deforestation. The deforestation rate within the surrounding area was 
estimated to have increased by 40 percent since the loan was agreed. Greenpeace has also documented 
cattle from an illegal ranch inside an indigenous Indian forest reserve being supplied to a separate Bertín 
slaughterhouse in Tucuma (Greenpeace 2009a).
CASE STUDY 1
Cattle Ranching in Marabá, Pará, Brazil
FIGURE 8 
Deforestation in Excess of the “Legal Reserve” 20 Percent Limit inside Itacaiúnas Ranch, 
which was Supplying Cattle to Bertín’s Slaughterhouse in Marabá in 2008.
Source:	Greenpeace	2009a.	Areas	marked	in	red	were	deforested	in	2008.
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Evidence Specific to Soy
There is also evidence that much of the deforestation for soy production in the Amazon has also been illegal. 
For instance, an investigation in 2002 by the International Finance Corporation found that legal reserve 
requirements were not being met on soy farms covering two-thirds of the land owned by Grupo André Maggi 
(GAM), Brazil’s largest soy producer (Stickler et al. 2004). The head of GAM, Blairo Maggi, was elected governor 
of Brazil’s Mato Grosso state in 2002. Though Maggi oversaw a major reduction in deforestation in Mato Grosso 
after 2004, most existing soy plantations remained illegal (in that the land on which they were growing had 
been cleared illegally, and this had not been addressed through fines or other forms of restitution). In 2009, as 
governor, he offered an amnesty to soy farmers operating illegally in the state, giving them four years to achieve 
compliance with the Forest Code’s legal reserve limits (Perlroth 2009). 
Breaches of the legal reserve requirement are not the only documented illegalities relating to soy deforestation 
in Brazil. According to the National Land Reform Institute, for example, millions of hectares of forested public 
land were fraudulently transferred to private individuals in Mato Grosso and subsequently exploited for soy 
production. Local governments have also built roads into forested areas to serve soy expansion without the 
required Environmental Impact Assessments (Greenpeace 2006).
In 2006, the largest soy producers in Brazil signed a voluntary moratorium on forest conversion for new 
plantations. While direct deforestation for soy in the Brazilian Amazon (both legal and illegal) has been almost 
eliminated (GTS Soy Task Force 2012), the moratorium only applies to the Amazon biome, which only represents 
5 percent of the area of soy planting in Brazil. In the cerrado, which contains 60 percent of Brazil’s soy planting, 
there has been much less attention to the issue, and though information is sparse, there is evidence that 
much of the conversion of Brazil’s cerrado for soy is also illegal. Although 8 percent of the cerrado is officially 
designated for environmental protection, the Government of Brazil’s own studies have shown that more than 
4 million m3 of protected cerrado forest was destroyed between 2002 and 2008 (Ministério do Meio Ambiente 
2010). Even outside protected areas, the Forest Code requires that 35 percent of native vegetation in the 
cerrado is preserved, yet it is claimed that “few producers comply” with this requirement (ibid.). 
Evidence Specific to Timber Plantations
There is also evidence of illegalities regarding other major crops grown at the expense of forest in Brazil, though 
they have had less impact than the agro-commodities mentioned above, and have been studied far less. For 
example, Kröger (2012) interviewed activists and government officials and found the majority believed that 
pulp companies in Brazil had obtained land for plantations through illegal means, similar to the land grabbing 
that plantations and ranches have been accused of, outlined above (Kröger 2012). 
In 2008, Veracel, which is responsible for around one-tenth of Brazil’s pulp production,26 was fined $12.5 million 
by a federal court for illegal deforestation of tropical forests from 1991 to 1993, and ordered to pull up almost 
100,000 ha of eucalyptus plantation and replace it with natural forest (Federal Court in Eunápolis 2008). Veracel, 
which denies the allegations, lodged an appeal and the sentence has been suspended pending its conclusion. As 
of November 2013, the case had still not been resolved (Rainforest Alliance 2014). IBAMA has also fined Veracel 
for $136,000 (Lang 2008). Veracel is involved in numerous other disputes with local communities (who claim 
it has illegally developed on indigenous land) and other civil cases regarding environmental damage and tax 
evasion (SGS Qualifor 2012; Lerrer and Wilkinson 2012), and has been repeatedly found by Forest Stewardship 
26	 Veracel’s	website	(http://www.veracel.com.br/default.aspx?tabid=147)	states	that	the	company	produces	1	million	metric	tons	
(mt)	per	year;	industry	association	BRACELPA	gives	total	Brazilian	production	as	14	million	mt	per	year	(BRACELPA,	Brazilian	Pulp	
and	Paper	Industry,	October	2013,	http://www.bracelpa.org.br/bra2/sites/default/files/estatisticas/booklet_eng.pdf).
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Council (FSC) auditors to be in breach of health and safety regulations in its treatment of workers (SGS Qaulifor 
2012). Veracel exports nearly all of its pulp (Lang 2008).
Two other large Brazilian pulp producers have also been involved in converting natural forests for timber 
plantations, Aracruz (now part of Fibria) and Suzano, and are alleged to have planted on lands which were 
previously the subject of illegal land grabs (Kröger 2012).
4.1.4 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 5 
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Brazil
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000-2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
90% Morton et al. (2006) found that 91% of newly deforested land in Mato Grosso (the Brazilian 
state responsible for approximately 40% of national deforestation) became cattle pasture 
or cropland in 2002 and 89% in 2003. Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) estimate that 98% of 
Brazilian deforestation from1996 to 2005 could be attributed to soy and cattle. Karstensen 
et al. (2013) state that the share of land use in the year of deforestation in most Brazilian 
states is 34.7% for soy and 65.3% for pastures (i.e. that 100% of initial deforestation is for 
agriculture). While there has been a dramatic rise in the proportion of Amazon deforestation 
taking place in small lots (< 25 ha) since 2007, it is unclear whether such deforestation can 
nevertheless be classified as commercial agriculture according to the definition used in this 
report (i.e. if smallholders form enterprises or participate in outgrower schemes) (Rawling 
2014). In addition, even if the percentage of annual deforestation caused by subsistence 
had increased (which has not been shown) in recent years, this would make little difference 
to the proportion of cumulative deforestation from 2000 to 2012, which was due to 
commercial agriculture, given that most of that deforestation occurred in the early part of 
that period.
% of 2000-2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
68%–90% Stickler et al. (2013) found that 90% of agro-conversion in the Brazilian Amazon from 
2001 to 2009 was illegal due to clearance in excess of forest reserve limits. Though it is 
possible that the proportion of illegal agro-conversion for the study period 2000 to 2012 was 
lower, another study posits that a relatively small proportion of the deforestation that took 
place from 2000 to 2012 occurred during those years (INPE 2014), so a slight change in 
the illegal percentage for those years would not make much difference to the overall figure. 
The 90% figure matched that from a separate study published in 2009, which examined 
the period July 2006 to July 2007 (Greenpeace 2009a). Three-quarters of Brazilian 
deforestation over the period 2001 to 2012 was in the Brazilian Amazon (deforestation 
data sets from INPE (Amazon); UFG-LAPIG (cerrado)). There are no quantitative measures 
of the proportion of illegality in deforestation in the cerrado; for the mid-range estimate it is 
assumed that this biome had the same proportion of illegal clearing as the Amazon (based 
on WWF's assertion that "few producers comply" with laws in the cerrado too); if illegality in 
the cerrado were instead assumed to be zero, the overall proportion would decrease to 68%. 
It is assumed that the proportion of illegality prior to 2001 was the same as that during 
2001 to 2009.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000-2012 embodied 
in exports
30% Karstensen et al. (2013) found that 30% of Brazilian deforestation during 2000 to 2010 
was embodied in exports of soy and beef. It is assumed that soy and beef from illegally 
deforested land are no more or less likely to be exported than the average.
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Factor Estimate Justification
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Soy
% of area of soy in 
2012 which displaced 
forest
59%–61% In total, soy was found to have led to 7.2 Mha of deforestation in Brazil in the 10 years to 
2005 (Grieg-Gran et al. 2007), during which time the total area planted with soy increased 
by 11.1 Mha (FAOSTAT/USDA FAS). This suggests that at least 65 percent of new soy 
production during that period occurred at the direct expense of forest. Since 2005, a further 
2 Mha of soy have been planted in Brazil (FAOSTAT 2014). Given the widespread evidence 
of the success of the soy deforestation moratorium in reducing the amount of deforestation 
due to soy in the Amazon after 2006 (GTS Soy Task Force, 2012), it is assumed that the 
proportion of post-2005 planting that displaced forest has been substantially lower (between 
0% and 20%—almost all in cerrado rather than Amazon forests). For the period prior to 
1995 (during which 11.7 Mha were planted), it is assumed that the proportion displacing 
forest was the same as for the subsequent 10 years (65%). So in total the figure is (11.7 
Mha x 65%) + 7.2 Mha + (2 Mha x 0% - 20%)/25 Mha = 59% - 61%.
% of soy deforestation up 
to 2012 which was illegal
49%–69%–90% It is assumed that the proportion of illegality in conversion of forest for soy prior to 2001 was 
the same as that during 2001 to 2009. Of a total of 7.2 Mha of soy-related deforestation 
estimated to have occurred during 1996 to 2005, 3.3 Mha (46%) was in the cerrado and 
the balance in the Amazon (Grieg-Gran et al. 2007). The low range overall estimate assumes 
zero illegality in soy-related deforestation in the cerrado, while the mid-range estimate 
assumes this to be 45% (thus, for example, the total mid-range percentage is calculated as 
(54% x 90%) + (46% x 45%) = 69.3%).
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Tropical Timber
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
19% Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) estimate volumes of tropical forest conversion timber at between 
4.7 million m3 and 14.7 million m3 in 2004, compared with total production that year 
of 24.5 million m3, suggesting that it represents between 19% and 60% of production. 
However, their analysis also concludes that much forest clearance for agriculture involves 
little commercial harvesting. For this study, the lowest end of the implied range is therefore 
assumed for tropical wood exports. The same percentage found in 2004 has been assumed 
to persist over the entire reference period.
% of forest clearance 
illegal
90% 90% of Brazil's naturally grown tropical timber originates in the Amazon forests (Viana et al. 2002), 
where 90% of forest conversion during 2001-2009 was found to be illegal (Stickler et al. 2013).
Beef & Leather
% of area of cattle 
in 2012 which 
displaced forest
79% According to official government data, 45 Mha of cattle displaced forests in the Brazilian 
Amazon to 2007 (INPE 2011) to which can be added 3.9 Mha displacement in the cerrado 
between 1995 and 2005 (Grieg-Gran et al. 2007). Meanwhile, official data show a total of 
62 Mha of land in Brazil occupied by cattle up to 2010 (INPE, Projeto PRODES, 2011). 
Combined, these figures suggest that a minimum of 79% ((45 Mha + 3.9 Mha) / 62 Mha) of 
cattle pasture in Brazil displaced forest.
% of cattle deforestation 
up to 2012 which 
was illegal
73%–82%–90% Of a total of 21 Mha of cattle-related deforestation estimated to have occurred during 1996-2005, 
3.9 Mha (19%) was in the cerrado and the balance in the Amazon (Grieg-Gran et al. 2007). The 
low range overall estimate assumes zero illegality in cattle-related deforestation in the cerrado, 
while the mid-range estimate assumes this to be 45% (thus, for example, the total mid-range 
percentage is calculated as (81% x 90%) + (19% x 45%) = 81.5%).
37
4. EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONVERSION OF TROPICAL FORESTS FOR EXPORT-DRIVEN AGRICULTURE
4.2 Indonesia
4.2.1 Background
Indonesia is one of the three largest tropical forest countries in the world, with 131 Mha of forests, or 
approximately 68 percent of the country’s land area as of 2011 (Ministry of Forestry 2011). Emissions due to 
land use change have made Indonesia among the world’s top three greenhouse gas emitters, with 37 percent 
of emissions due to deforestation and 27 percent due to peat fires (National Council on Climate Change 2010).
Recent analyses of high-resolution satellite data show that Indonesia lost more than 6 Mha of natural forest 
between 2000 and 2012, with an increase in annual forest loss over this period (Margono et al. 2014). 
Deforestation was highest in 2012, the last year of the study. In that year, for the first time, a higher percentage 
of forest was lost in Indonesia than in Brazil, making Indonesia the new number one country in the world for 
tropical deforestation (though Brazil still maintains a higher rate of deforestation in all forest categories). The 
new figures contrast with the Indonesian government’s claims that deforestation has been declining; part of 
the reason for the discrepancy is that the government only measures loss in areas designated as part of the 
“forest estate” (Mongabay 2014b). 
Over the last 20 years, deforestation has been driven predominantly by the expansion of commercial agriculture, 
especially of monoculture oil palm and forest plantations. Other drivers of deforestation include logging (both 
legal and illegal), infrastructure development (including roads), aquaculture, small-scale and subsistence 
agriculture, forest fires, and, increasingly, mining (Indrarto et al. 2012).
4.2.2 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
Though there is general consensus that commercial agriculture (particularly oil palm and timber plantations) is 
the largest driver of deforestation in Indonesia, there have been relatively few attempts to put a firm figure on 
its importance (see Box 5). One complicating factor is the common (yet illegal) use of fire by oil palm and timber 
plantation developers to clear land of forest (see Box 6). These fires regularly extend well beyond the boundaries 
of the intended area, and it is often difficult to attribute the cause of the initial fire. Another complicating factor 
is that, within licensed areas, clearance of forest may occur faster than planting, leaving large areas deforested 
but not planted (Grieg-Gran et al. 2007). In some cases, the developer may have used the plantation license 
to gain access to the timber with no intention of planting (FWI/GFW 2002); in others, planting may simply be 
lagging behind clearance (Boucher et al. 2011). Because of such complicating factors, deforestation caused by 
commercial agriculture is likely to be much greater than the total area of land actually planted. Unfortunately 
the former is more difficult to measure than the latter. 
Only one of the studies in Box 5 included other types of commercial agriculture beyond the two main drivers 
(oil palm and timber or pulp plantations). Examination of FAOSTAT data for the area planted with alternative 
crops suggests that their contribution may be substantial, however. Between 2000 and 2010, only 45 percent 
of the increase in the total area of cropland (which does not include industrial timber or fiber plantations) in 
Indonesia was attributed to oil palm. The area under other crops increased by 4.7 Mha between 2000 and 2012 
(FAOSTAT 2014). If even a small proportion of this expansion was at the expense of forests, it would represent 
a significant proportion of the total of 6 Mha of forest lost during that period and add substantially to the 
contribution to deforestation of commercial agriculture (i.e., beyond that measured in the studies in Box 5 as 
being attributed solely to oil palm and timber plantations).
38
Consumer Goods and Deforestation
Most of the conversion timber from natural forests, as well as the palm oil and plantation-grown wood produced at 
the expense of natural forests in Indonesia, are destined for export. In 2011, Indonesia exported between 70 and 80 
percent of the palm oil the country produced.27 Most of the plantation-grown wood produced in Indonesia is used 
in the production of pulp and paper. This study has calculated that in 2011, Indonesia exported around half of all the 
pulp it produced and also exported around half of the paper made from the pulp that was consumed domestically. 
Combined, these figures suggest that 75 percent of plantation wood used in the manufacture of pulp is exported.28
27	 Low-end	figure	calculated	from	figures	for	palm	oil	production	and	exports	for	2012/13	in	USDA	Foreign	Agricultural	Service,	
Oilseeds:	 World	 Markets	 and	 Trade,	 November	 2013,	 Table	 11:	 Palm	 Oil:	 World	 Supply	 and	 Distribution;	 high-end	 figure	
calculated	from	FAO	data	for	production	and	exports	in	2010	(FAOSTAT).	A	World	Bank	study	from	2010	found	that	half	of	palm	
oil	production	is	exported	unprocessed,	while	around	half	of	processed	oil	is	exported	as	well,	implying	total	exports	represent	
at	least	75	percent	of	production	(World	Bank	2010).
28	 Ministry	of	 Forestry	figures	 show	6.2	million	metric	 tons	 (mt)	of	wood	pulp	production	and	2.9	million	mt	of	pulp	exports	
(Ministry	of	Forestry	2011);	Indonesia	produced	around	10	million	mt	of	paper	the	same	year	(APKI,	forthcoming),	and	exported	
4.3	million	mt	(UN	COMTRADE	data).
• Between 1982 and 2007, 36 percent of the forest in Riau Province on the island of Sumatra—the 
province with by far the greatest area of recent deforestation in Indonesia (MOF 2011)—had been 
cleared for oil palm, and 24 percent had been cleared for timber plantations (Uryu et al. 2008). A 
further 5 percent had been cleared relatively recently (and thus not yet planted with crops), but 
may also been cleared for oil palm or timber plantations. Additional forest (less than 16 percent, 
approximately) had been cleared for other industrial agriculture, such as rubber and coconut 
plantations. Thus, 81 percent of all forest loss may potentially have been the result of clearing for 
commercial agriculture. A more detailed examination by the same study of deforestation within the 
Tesso Nilo-Bukit Tigapuluh-Kampar landscape (representing 55 percent of Riau) found that between 
1990 and 2007 timber plantations contributed 46.5 percent of forest loss and oil palm plantations a 
further 34.2 percent—a combined total of 80.7 percent.
• Based on areas planted at the time of measurement, oil palm plantations were responsible 
for approximately 57 percent of deforestation between 2000 and 2010 in Indonesian Borneo 
(Kalimantan) (Carlson et al. 2013). The indirect effects are likely to have been much more extensive, 
however. An earlier study, covering just one of the four provinces of Kalimantan, found that 93 
percent of deforestation between 1989 and 2009 was due to forest fires (Carlson et al. 2012). While 
only a small proportion of this land had been planted with oil palm at the time of the study, other 
evidence suggests that up to 80 percent of fire-related deforestation in Indonesia can be attributed to 
plantation development (FWI/GFW 2002), leading to a backlog of unused land (Boucher et al. 2011).
• Examining deforestation over nearly the whole of Indonesia during 2000 to 2010, Abood et al. (2014) 
found that 30.1 percent had occurred within mapped oil palm and timber plantation concessions. The 
total included 12.8 percent in areas solely licensed for timber plantations, 11 percent in areas solely 
licensed for oil palm plantations and 6.3 percent in “mixed concessions” (usually areas licensed for oil 
palm that overlap with areas also licensed for logging or mining). The study did not seek to estimate 
the drivers of forest lost outside the boundaries of concessions; for example, as a result of illegal 
encroachment or fires started within concessions that then burn, uncontrolled, outside the concession; 
nor did the study seek to estimate the proportion of forest outside such areas lost as a result of other 
commercial agriculture. A separate study by Greenpeace (2013f), using a similar methodology, found 
that 24 percent of deforestation between 2009 and 2011 took place within oil palm concessions.
BOX 5
Studies Estimating Forest Loss in Indonesia due to Oil Palm and Timber Plantations
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According to official statistics, Indonesia exports the majority of the timber it produces. In 2010, for instance, 
the Ministry of Forestry reported total timber production of 42 million m3,29 while total wood product exports 
reported the same year (in roundwood equivalent terms) were more than 40 million m3.30 In reality, there 
is a large volume of illegal wood production that goes unreported (Blundell 2014). Indonesia consumes an 
estimated 10 million m3 of timber domestically (Klassen 2010), which (when considered alongside imports 
of 9 million m3 in 2010)31 implies that the real proportion of total wood supply (including natural forest and 
plantation wood) exported is around 80 percent.32 The proportion of natural forest conversion timber exported 
from natural forests is assumed by this study to be the same as the overall figure.
The importance of conversion timber in the legal supply is also increasing. Official figures from 2010 state that 
almost three-quarters of wood harvested that year from natural forests was from conversion (mostly from 
forests cleared for new timber plantations), up from just 6 percent eight years earlier (see Figure 9). The actual 
volume and proportion of conversion timber is almost certainly much higher, because a great deal of forest 
conversion is illegal (see Section 4.2.3) and the timber harvested is likely unrecorded in official figures (Blundell 
2014). Estimates of real (recorded and unrecorded) conversion wood production (based on the area of new 
planting of timber and oil palm and assuming a conservative average volume of salvage production per hectare) 
suggest the true figure for conversion timber may be as much as 85 percent of the timber produced from 
natural forests. These estimates also suggest that the proportion of timber coming from conversion increased 
a lot earlier than the official figures suggest. As described in Section 4.2.3, recent analysis indicates that at least 
75 percent of forest conversion in Indonesia is likely illegal; combining this with the estimate of real conversion 
production implies that at least 60 percent of all tropical wood produced in Indonesia is from illegal conversion.
29	 This	volume	is	the	equivalent	volume	in	round	wood	of	the	volume	of	processed	products	reportedly	produced	by	mills	that	use	
more	than	6,000	m3	per	year	(Ministry	of	Forestry	2011).
30	 RWE	 export	 figures	 for	 all	 wood	 products	 (including	 furniture	 and	 pulp	 and	 paper)	 calculated	 by	 James	 Hewitt,	 based	 on	
Indonesian	government	data,	available	at	http://www.globaltimber.org.uk/indonesia.htm.	
31	 RWE	import	figures	for	all	wood	products	(including	furniture	and	pulp	and	paper)	calculated	by	James	Hewitt	for	Forest	Trends,	
based	on	Indonesian	government	data.
32	 Calculated	by	comparing	domestic	consumption	with	total	wood	supply	(production	and	imports).	Total	supply	is	42	million	m3	of	domestic	
production	plus	9	million	m3	of	imports	(total	of	51	million	m3).	Domestic	consumption	is	10	million	m3,	implying	that	the	rest	of	the	total	
supply	must	be	41	million	m3	(51	minus	10)	for	export,	which	means	that	the	proportion	of	total	wood	supply	exported	is	41	million/51	
million,	or	80	percent.	It	is	assumed	that	products	manufactured	from	domestic	production	and	imports	are	equally	likely	to	be	exported.
FIGURE 9
Indonesian Natural Tropical Timber Production, 2002-2010 (Official Figures)
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Source:	Indonesian	Ministry	of	Forestry	production	statistics	(excluding	plantation-grown	wood),	analyzed	by	the	author.
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4.2.3 Illegalities in Conversion
The main types of illegality documented in relation to the conversion of forests for commercial agriculture 
(defined in this study to include timber plantations) are corruption in the issuance of relevant licenses and 
conversion of forests without (or in advance of) all required permits.
Former governors of two of the four provinces most badly affected by deforestation have been sentenced to 
long jail terms for the corrupt issuance of licenses to convert forest to oil palm and timber plantations (see 
Box 7 for more information and evidence regarding such corruption). The most common failure in properly 
issuing permits involved forestry and environmental permits (the latter known as an AMDAL in the Indonesian 
acronym). When a proposed plantation is located on forest land, Indonesian regulations require that the land 
is formally “released” from the forest estate before conversion can begin; once this is accomplished, a separate 
permit (often a clearing permit; IPK in the Indonesian acronym) that licenses the felling of commercially valuable 
trees may be required. It is very common for companies to fail to obtain either of these documents. 
Aside from these two broad categories of illegality, there are numerous documented instances of companies 
clearing forest outside concession boundaries (including in protected areas), clearing in prohibited zones within 
license areas (such as areas of deep peat or river buffers), the illegal use of fire to clear forest (see Box 6), the 
felling of protected tree species, and the conversion of more than the maximum 90 percent of natural forests 
within each concession. 
Most information that one can use to attempt to measure the overall extent of illegality comes from independent 
studies or government audits covering certain types of permits within specific districts or provinces. Most 
suggest levels of illegality of at least 70 to 80 percent (see sections on timber plantations and oil palm below). 
There are two additional sources at a more holistic level, both of which also suggest a level of illegality in excess 
of 80 percent. 
The first such national-level estimate of potential illegality comes from a comparison of volumes of timber 
officially reported as having originated from the conversion of forests for plantations with an independent 
estimate of the actual volume of timber that was likely to have been produced (using official data on areas 
planted, and assumptions regarding the volume of salvage timber produced per hectare). The study, by Forest 
Trends, estimated (based on a conservative assumption of an average of 38 m3 harvested per hectare during 
forest clearance) that 258 million m3 of conversion timber was likely to have been produced in Indonesia through 
clearance for timber and oil palm plantations between 2000 and 2010, as compared with just 46 million cubic 
meters of conversion timber officially reported as having been used in mills.33 The analysis suggests that if 
used by these mills, then at least 82 percent of timber production from conversion for oil palm and timber 
plantations in Indonesia during that period was unreported and therefore illegal (Blundell 2014). 
The second national-level estimate relates to the legal status of Indonesia’s forests and the issuance of licenses by 
the relevant government ministries for development. As of 2012, only 11 percent of Indonesia’s 131 Mha “Forest 
Zone” had been formally gazetted (Wells et al. 2012), a legally required process whereby ownership of the land is 
clarified and boundaries demarcated. This calls into question the legality of licenses issued outside the gazetted 
area (Colchester et al. 2003), which has recently been further underlined by two Constitutional Court decisions. 
In February 2012, the first of these court decisions reinforced the legal basis requiring that forestland must be 
gazetted (Wells et al. 2012), and the second decision (in May 2013) ruled that Indigenous Peoples’ customary 
forests should not be classified as “state forest” (AMAN 2013). One result of the failure to properly recognize 
indigenous and other local communities’ customary tenure has been widespread conflicts between local people 
33	 By	mills	that	use	>	6,000	m3/yr.
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and plantation developers. In 2012, Indonesia President Yudhoyono’s office received reports of 8,495 agrarian 
conflicts, of which 2,002 were “likely to erupt into violence” (Human Rights Watch 2013).
34
34	 Sources	for	published	NGO	allegations	regarding	fire	hotspots	in	oil	palm	plantations	in	Indonesia:	Aidenvironment	2009;	Atus	
2009;	BSI-CUC	2010;	EIA/Telepak	2012b;	Friends	of	the	Earth	Europe	2010a;	Greenpeace	2007;	Greenpeace	2008;	Greenpeace	
2009b;	Greenpeace	 2010;	Greenpeace	 2013b;	Greenpeace	 2013g;	Milieudefensie	 2007;	 Rainforest	 Action	Network	 2010a;	
Wakker	et	al.	2004;	Gaveau	2014.
It is illegal in Indonesia to use fire to clear forests, and yet every year, satellite data pinpoint hundreds of 
fire “hotspots” within areas of forest licensed for the development of oil palm and timber plantations. 
Examining fire hotspots that were detected in Riau between 1997 and 2007, 80 percent of the fires were 
associated with oil palm or timber plantations (Carlson et al. 2013). More than 60 percent of the land 
associated with fire in 2006 had been planted with oil palm or acacia a year later (Uryu et al. 2008). Global 
Forest Watch (2002) estimated that 80 percent of forests lost to fires nationwide during the peak period in 
1997 to 1998 could be attributed to plantation development (FWI/GFW 2002). More recently, the World 
Resources Institute (WRI) reported that the fire events in Sumatra in June 2013 were mostly occurring 
within areas licensed for conversion (Sizer 2013).
Examination of all relevant published reports of allegations of illegalities in oil palm development 
in Indonesia shows that fire hotspots have been identified within almost every Indonesian oil palm 
concession. Though locating hotspots within concessions is easy, it is very hard to prove that these fires 
were started deliberately by the company to clear forest. Indeed, a study of a sample area in Riau that 
burned in the spring of 2014 showed that most fires that occurred within concessions either started 
outside those concessions or on land occupied by local or migrant communities within the concessions 
(Gaveau 2014). In the majority of published cases, however, most hotspots were found to occur at the 
same time that forest was being cleared, with planting ensuing shortly thereafter. In a small number of 
cases, more concrete evidence has been uncovered by authorities and prosecutions brought. 
Even if fires were not started by concessionaires, this does not absolve them of legal responsibility. 
Aside from prohibiting the deliberate lighting of fires, Indonesian legislation also requires oil palm 
concessionaires to prevent fires on land under their control, and to have plans and equipment in place 
to tackle fires that do start. Proving a lack of compliance with these rules is easier, and few plantations in 
which this issue has been independently assessed have been found to comply.
BOX 6
Illegal Use of Fire to Clear Land for Oil Palm and Timber Plantations34
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A number of major cases have exposed the extent of corruption in the issuance of licenses for conversion 
of forests to oil palm and timber plantations in Indonesia. Indeed, most of the $100 million in assets 
recovered by the Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK, 
a government agency established to fight corruption) has come from the forest sector, and most of this 
has come from illegal conversion cases (U4 2011). 
• Riau (Sumatra): In March 2014, the former governor of Riau was jailed for 14 years for the illegal 
issuance of permits to nine companies, all of them suppliers to Asia Pulp & Paper (APP 2014; 
Mongabay 2014a). The head of Riau’s Pelalawan district had previously been jailed for issuing 
timber plantation licenses illegally between 2001 and 2006, including to companies owned by 
members of his family (Dermawan et al. 2011). The head of Riau’s Siak District has also been jailed 
for timber plantation-related corruption (Tempo 2012). Ten of twelve wood suppliers for one of 
the largest pulp mills (Asia Pacific Resources International Limited (APRIL)) operating in the Kampar 
Peninsula obtained their licenses from the heads of these two districts (Eyes on the Forest 2012). 
APRIL suppliers received annual cutting licenses from three Riau Forestry Agency chiefs who have 
since been jailed for corruption (ibid.). The Provincial Forestry Department Head was also jailed in 
connection to the case, which is estimated to have caused losses to the state of $131 million (U4 
2011).
• East Kalimantan: In 2007, a company was found to have illegally obtained through bribery 11 oil 
palm plantation licenses covering 147,000 ha between 1999 and 2006, then clear-felled the forest 
for timber but never planted oil palm. The company was fined $36 million, and the Governor of East 
Kalimantan and a senior provincial forestry official were jailed, along with the company’s director 
(Tempo 2008). 
• Central Sulawesi: In 2013 a prominent businesswoman was jailed for two years for paying a 
$300,000 bribe to a district chief in Central Sulawesi in exchange for an oil palm license issued in 
contravention of national legislation (Antara News 2013). The district chief was in turn jailed for 
seven and a half years (Jakarta Globe 2013).
In addition to the corrupt issuance of licenses, there has been a long history of misuse of the Indonesian 
Reforestation Fund, a subsidy program intended to support development of timber plantations, from 
which US$5.2 billion was embezzled in the mid-1990s (Barr et al. 2010). Among those convicted since is 
(former President) Suharto’s half-brother, who was found to have fraudulently claimed that his company 
had planted almost twice the area of forest that it had (Jurgens et al. 2005). Corruption and misuse of the 
Reforestation Fund remained a problem in the post-Suharto era (Barr et al. 2010).
In 2012, the KPK established an Action Plan to address the widespread corruption in the forest sector, 
and obtained a commitment from 16 government ministries/agencies to implement the Plan through the 
signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (Government of Indonesia 2013).
BOX 7
Corruption Relating to Conversion of Forests for Oil Palm and Timber Plantations
43
4. EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONVERSION OF TROPICAL FORESTS FOR EXPORT-DRIVEN AGRICULTURE
Evidence Specific to Timber Plantations
Two companies, APP and APRIL, dominate the industrial timber plantation sector in Indonesia. They jointly 
control over 75 percent of pulp production capacity (Barr 2007) and 3.5 Mha of timber plantation concessions 
(Barr 2010), and produce 80 percent of Indonesia’s paper (Barr 2008). Investigations by the Indonesian 
government and NGOs over many years have documented widespread illegalities in natural forest conversion 
for timber plantations by both companies, including:
• An Indonesian government audit report published in 2009 found that 19 pulpwood plantation licenses 
(out of an unknown number examined) had been issued illegally between 2002 and 2008; all of the 
companies subsequently supplied APP with conversion wood from the illegally licensed areas (BPK-RI 
2009, cited in Greenomics 2011). 
• In 2012, Indonesia’s Ministry of Environment told reporters it was planning to bring a civil case against 
fourteen companies in Riau for illegalities in the conversion of forests for timber plantations; six of the 
companies are reportedly linked to APP and six to APRIL. Damages in the case are estimated at $225 
billion. The case builds on evidence from a province-wide criminal police investigation that took place 
in 2007 (Mongabay 2012a).
• In September 2013, the Indonesian government announced that five pulpwood suppliers had been 
named as suspects in relation to fires that ravaged Sumatra during the summer of 2013, leading to 
a regional smog crisis that made worldwide headlines. According to local NGOs, three of the named 
pulpwood producers are suppliers to APP, while another is a supplier to APRIL (Eyes on the Forest 2013a).
• In 2013, Eyes on the Forest, a coalition of environmental NGOs, including WWF Indonesia and Friends 
of the Earth Indonesia, examined compliance with three key regulations by APP and APRIL’s suppliers 
in Riau province (where the majority of Indonesia’s pulp plantations are located) and found that: 
 – 77 percent of APP’s conversion during 1985 to 2012 was “legally questionable” in one or more 
ways, for example: within areas not zoned for conversion (35 percent), in areas of peat more than 
3 meters deep (34-44 percent), and/or in excess of the maximum 90 percent conversion allowed 
in each individual concession (4 percent) (Eyes on the Forest 2013a);
 – conversion by companies supplying APRIL was also “legally questionable:” in areas of deep peat 
(40-50 percent) and/or in forests not zoned for conversion (46 percent);35
 – a Greenpeace investigation in 2011 found that large volumes of legally protected ramin (Gonystylus 
spp.) was being processed in APP’s Indah Kiat pulp mill (Greenpeace 2012a). This followed the 
discovery the previous year of ramin fiber in paper products made in Indonesia on sale in the US 
(WRI 2010). In 2012, Indonesia’s Forestry Ministry started an official government investigation into 
Greenpeace’s findings and later confirmed that two APP group companies had supplied the mill 
with ramin logs (Greenomics Indonesia 2013);
In February 2013, APP announced a total moratorium on natural forest conversion, pledging to only develop 
non-forested areas (rather than High Conservation Value (HCV) and High Carbon Stock (HCS) areas) to ensure 
that forest peatland is protected and to implement a set of legal consultation principles to respect indigenous 
35	 Eyes	on	the	Forest’s	interactive	mapping	function,	http://maps.eyesontheforest.or.id/.	An	overall	figure	for	the	proportion	of	
conversion	found	to	be	legally	questionable	was	not	available	in	this	case.	Again,	it	should	be	noted	that	since	some	areas	were	
illegal	in	more	than	one	way,	the	individual	percentages	do	not	sum.
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and local communities’ customary rights (APP 2013). APP’s fiber supply should now be reliant on plantation 
wood grown on land it previously deforested, or on non-forested land. In contrast, APRIL continues to source 
around two-thirds of its wood fiber from logging of natural forests.36 
Evidence Specific to Oil Palm Plantations
In 2011, an Indonesian government task force announced the results of a province-wide assessment of permit 
compliance by oil palm concessions in Central Kalimantan. The task force found that 81 percent of oil palm 
plantations were operating without required Forest Relinquishment permits from the Ministry of Forestry; the 
majority of these also lacked IPKs (Greenomics 2011). A separate investigation across all of Indonesian Borneo, 
published the following year, found that two-thirds of mining and plantation companies were operating without 
required environmental impact assessments (EIA/Telapak 2012b). 
In October 2012, the Indonesian REDD+ Task Force announced that it was working with various authorities to 
pursue nine forest crime cases against oil palm plantations (Lestari Post 2012). The crimes involved converting 
forest without a conversion permit (IUP), clearing forest within moratorium areas, and land clearing through 
burning. Three oil palm concessions are also among those named as suspects in relation to the forest fire crisis 
of the summer of 2013. Two are apparent repeat offenders: one of these companies was convicted of illegally 
clearing forest using fire ten years earlier (AFP 2003),37 while another was previously alleged to have done so.38
The extent of illegality has been further confirmed by a recent in-depth study of compliance by all oil 
palm plantations in one district in Central Kalimantan commissioned by Forest Trends and Chatham House 
(Aidenvironment, forthcoming). The study collected and examined official permits and maps, and compared 
these with satellite data to assess various aspects of legal compliance. The results (which indicate apparent 
violations, though these have yet to be proven in court) show that 20 of the 35 oil palm plantations (57 percent) 
involved permits being issued improperly and/or without other required permits (such as AMDALs). Twelve of 
the 33 (36 percent) active plantations were found to have begun clearing forest before receiving all necessary 
permits, while 20 (61 percent) were also found to have cleared forest outside concession boundaries. Of the 
two oil palm concessions in the district with forest on deep peat, one had converted 85 percent while the other 
had converted 100 percent of the peat area. Two concessions also illegally overlapped with and had cleared 
forest within a National Park. Of a total of 35 plantations that were assessed against one or more of these 
aspects of legality, 32 (89 percent) were found to be associated with at least one apparent illegality, while 64 
percent were associated with two or more (AidEnvironment, forthcoming).
In addition to the general evidence above, there have been numerous individual documented case studies of 
alleged illegalities in the conversion of forest for oil palm plantations in Indonesia. Forest Trends has collated 
and analyzed all available published evidence and allegations (up to the end of 2013).39 While not exhaustive 
(see Figure 10 for a full list of sources), the collated information nevertheless includes cases associated with 100 
separate plantations, or around 10 percent of the total number of plantations in the country. In many cases, 
multiple breaches have been exposed within the same plantation. In some cases, illegalities have been exposed 
in specific concessions on multiple occasions. The most common illegalities documented are clearance without 
all required permits (50 cases), evidence of use of fire to clear forest (50 cases), and improper license issuance (48 
36	 Government	data	cited	by	Greenpeace	shows	that	60	percent	of	fiber	supply	to	APRIL’s	Riau	Andalan	Pulp	&	Paper	pulp	mill	is	
from	natural	forest	conversion	(Greenpeace	2013a).
37	 PT	Adei	Plantation	was	previously	convicted	in	2003	of	illegally	using	fire	to	clear	3,000	ha	of	land.	The	Director	of	the	company	
was	jailed,	and	a	$1.1	million	fine	was	levied	(AFP	2003).
38	 PT	Jatim	Jaya	Perkasa.	See	Wakker	et	al.	2004,	as	cited	in	Milieudefensie	2007.
39	 The	majority	of	these	cases	were	 investigated	and	exposed	by	NGOs,	but	many	cases	have	been	confirmed	by	 independent	
experts	or	have	been	uncovered	by	the	Indonesian	authorities	themselves.	
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cases) (Figure 10). Oil palm companies were found to have begun converting forests without having an approved 
Environmental Impact Assessment (AMDAL) in 26 cases, which would render irregular all subsequent licenses 
issued because these other permits are not supposed to be issued before the AMDAL is approved. It is commonly 
reported that officials sign off on permits without or in advance of the previous permit having been issued. 
40	 Sources	consulted	include	AFP	2003;	Aidenvironment	2008;	Aidenvironment	2009;	Antara	News	2013;	Atus	2009;	BBC	2010;	
BSI-CUC	2010;	Center	for	Orangutan	Protection	2010;	EIA/Telapak	2009;	EIA/Telapak	2011a;	EIA/Telapak	2011b;	EIA/Telapak	
2012a;	EIA/Telepak	2012b;	Equator	Online	2007;	Friends	of	the	Earth	et	al.	2008;	Friends	of	the	Earth	Europe	2010a;	Friends	
of	the	Earth	Europe	2010b;	Greenpeace	2007;	Greenpeace	2008;	Greenpeace	2009b;	Greenpeace	2010;	Greenpeace	2013b;	
Greenpeace	2013g;	Milieudefensie	2007;	Mongabay	2013b;	News	24	2000;	NGO	Coalition	2011;	Rainforest	Action	Network	
2010a;	TÜV	Rheinland 2011;	Wakker	2014;	Wakker	et	al.	2004.
FIGURE 10
Summary Data on Specific Named Cases of Alleged Illegalities and  
Irregularities in Oil Palm Conversion in Indonesia, 1999-2013
Use of fire to clear land/failure to control fires on land
Clearance without approved Environmental Impact Assessment
Clearance on deep peat soil
Clearance without all necessary plantation permits
Clearance in river buffers
Clearance outside boundaries (incl. in protected areas)
Improper license issuance (one or more permits issued improperly)
Clearance without Forestland Release and/or Timber Permit
No. of specific published cases
0 40 6020
Note:	Summary	analysis	of	published	cases,	based	on	NGO	reports,	independent	verification	missions,	and	press	reporting	of	cases	
prosecuted	by	government.30 
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Evidence Relating to Other Crops
Though this report focuses on oil palm and industrial timber plantations, other crops may also be important, 
including coffee, cocoa, and sugarcane. Case studies demonstrate illegalities in forest conversion for these 
crops too. For instance, WWF Indonesia (2007) found that 18 percent of Bukit Barisan Selatan National Park in 
Sumatra had been illegally degraded or deforested for growing coffee, and concluded that at least 10 percent 
of all coffee exports from that part of Sumatra were illegally produced. The coffee was documented as being 
exported to the US, Europe, and Japan. Meanwhile, the legality of numerous licenses issued recently for large-
scale food estates (for sugarcane, maize, soy, and other plantation crops including oil palm) covering more than 
2.5 Mha of mostly forested land in Merauke district of Papua province has been called into question by civil 
society and community organizations (Forest Peoples Programme 2013), including Indigenous Peoples living in 
Merauke who have taken their complaints to the United Nations.
In 2012, the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and Telapak (a national civil society organization) 
published the findings of their extensive investigations into one oil palm concession in Pulang Pisau district 
of Central Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo (EIA/Telapak 2012b). Analysis of permits and satellite images, 
field investigations and interviews with members of the local community provided evidence of a series 
of illegalities related to the concession. The investigation showed that the plantation business permit 
(IUP) for the concession had been illegally issued without the required Environmental Impact Assessment 
(AMDAL) having been approved. The investigation also showed how the company breached numerous 
regulations while clear-felling the forest between 2007 and 2010. For example, the company had cleared 
the forest within its concession without it having been formally released by the Ministry of Forestry, and 
without a legally issued timber exploitation permit. It had also begun clearing forest and planting oil palm 
before its AMDAL had been approved. The company had cleared thousands of hectares of forest on peat 
soils deeper than the maximum allowable by law, and had even cleared forest and planted oil palm up to 
2 km outside the boundaries of its concession.
Numerous fire “hotspots” that were found within the concession during the period when the forest was 
being converted also suggest that—at a minimum—the company failed to mitigate the risk of fire during 
land clearing and failed to deploy firefighting to extinguish any fires, as required by law. Members of the 
local community (which is in conflict with the company after promises of compensation were repeatedly 
broken) also alleged that the company had cut protected ramin (Gonystylus spp.) trees and even paid 
people to hunt and kill orangutans within the concession. Another company within the PT BEST group 
operating elsewhere in Central Kalimantan had previously been found to have illegally cleared 2,500 ha 
of forest within Tanjung Puting National Park.
EIA and Telapak provided a dossier of evidence to the authorities, but there was little or no meaningful 
action taken. Thus, the case also raised major concerns over both the ability and the willingness of 
relevant branches of the Indonesian government to enforce laws related to oil palm development.
CASE STUDY 2
PT Suryamas Cipta Perkasa (PT SCP; a Subsidiary of PT BEST Group) Oil Palm Plantation
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4.2.4 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 6 
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Indonesia
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
80% Uryu et al. (2008) examined Riau (the province with the greatest area of deforestation in 
the country) and found that between 1982 and 2007, 81% of deforestation appears to have 
been related to commercial agriculture. That is, 36% of forest had been cleared for oil palm 
(including smallholder commercial plantations) and 24% for timber plantations. A further 
5% had been cleared relatively recently and may also have been due to be planted for oil 
palm and/or timber plantations. Additional forest (less than 16%) had been cleared for other 
industrial agriculture, such as rubber and coconut plantations. Though other studies have 
attributed smaller proportions of total deforestation to oil palm and timber plantations, such 
studies do not assess other commercial crops and they suffer from other methodological issues 
that likely significantly understate the true proportion of deforestation attributable to oil palm 
and timber plantations (see Section 4.2.2 and Box 5 for further explanation and analysis).
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
80% Four separate sources suggest a figure between 80% and 90%. Firstly, a government audit 
found that 81% of oil palm plantations in Central Kalimantan (the province with the second 
largest area of such plantations in Indonesia—PwC Indonesia 2012) were non-compliant 
(BPK 2009, cited in Greenomics Indonesia, 2011). Secondly, a recent analysis by Forest 
Trends comparing officially reported use of conversion wood with estimates of actual 
production found that from 2000 to 2010, 82 percent of conversion wood consumption may 
not have been officially reported and would, therefore, be illegal (Blundell 2014). Thirdly, an 
analysis of compliance by oil palm plantations in one sample district in Central Kalimantan 
found 89% were associated with one or more illegalities (Aidenvironment, forthcoming—see 
report text for additional details). Finally, as of 2012, only 11% of Indonesia's 131 Mha 
“Forest Zone” had been formally gazetted as required by law (Wells et al. 2012). This 
calls into question the Ministry of Forestry's authority over the majority of the country's 
forests, and thus the legality of licenses issued for the development of oil palm and timber 
plantations in areas of ungazetted state forest (Colchester et al. 2003).
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
75% Indonesian government data show roughly similar areas planted with oil palm and timber 
plantations during the reference period (Ministry of Forestry 2011), while the evidence 
for illegality proportions for each is also similar (e.g., BPK 2009, cited in Greenomics 
Indonesia 2011, Eyes on the Forest 2013a—see Section 4.2.3). Therefore the overall export 
percentage assumes that half of the total illegal agro-conversion during the reference period 
was for oil palm and the other half for timber plantations. Proportions of palm oil production 
assumed to be exported (75%) is the mid-range of three available figures cited in Section 
1.2.3 (USDA 2013—70%; FAO 2010—80%; World Bank 2010—75%). It is assumed that 
75% of timber plantation production is also exported. This is based on evidence from pulp 
and paper (which is likely the destination of most of the conversion wood, as well as the 
plantation-grown acacia that replaces it). Analyses of official data suggest half of all pulp 
production is exported directly, while another quarter is exported after being processed into 
paper (details of the calculation are provided in the reference in Section 1.2.4 of the report). 
Thus, the final overall export percentage is calculated from the above as follows: (50% x 
75%) + (50% x 75%) = 75%.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Oil Palm
% of area of oil palm in 
2012 which displaced 
forest
69% 69% of land in Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) converted to oil palm during 1990 to 
2010 was forested (Carlson et al. 2013). The analyses herein assume that the same 
proportion applies to oil palm plantations developed before and since, as well as elsewhere 
in Indonesia. This is considered reasonable given that around a third of Indonesia's oil 
palm plantations in 2010 were found in Kalimantan (PwC Indonesia 2012), and most of 
Indonesia's oil palm planting has taken place since 1990 (Rainforest Foundation UK 2013).
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4.3 Malaysia
4.3.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
In Malaysia, most conversion of natural forests for timber plantations in the last ten years has occurred 
in Malaysian Borneo (Sabah and Sarawak). The majority of recent deforestation in Malaysia has been in the 
large state of Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo. A study published in 2011 found that Sarawak was losing its forests 
at a rate of more than 2 percent per year in the late 2000s, a rate faster than any major tropical forest nation 
during the same period.41 Analysis by the author for this report suggests that of the roughly 900,000 ha of forest 
lost in Sarawak between 2006 and 2010, 43 percent was converted to oil palm and 21 percent was converted 
to timber plantations.42
41	 Calculated	from	forest	area	data	for	2005	and	2010	in	FAO	Global	Forest	Resources	Assessment	2010.
42	 Satellite	 image	analysis	by	SarVision	 (2011)	 found	 that	865,836	ha	of	 forest	were	 lost	 in	Sarawak	 in	 the	five	years	 to	2010.	
Analysis	of	official	data	from	the	Malaysian	Palm	Oil	Board	and	the	Sarawak	Forest	Department	shows	that	376,000	ha	of	new	
oil	palm	plantations	and	184,500	ha	of	new	timber	plantations	were	planted	during	the	same	period.
Factor Estimate Justification
% of oil palm 
deforestation up to 2012 
which was illegal
80% See justification for illegality percentage in deforestation analysis above.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Tropical Timber
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
75% Official data from the Ministry of Forestry suggest that 73% of wood sourced from natural 
forests (i.e., excluding plantation-grown wood) in 2010 came from conversion. The real 
proportion originating from conversion is likely considerably higher, given that independent 
estimates suggest that a great deal of conversion wood is not captured in official statistics 
(Blundell 2014).
% of forest clearance 
illegal
80% Comparison of official conversion wood production volumes with conservative estimates of 
volumes actually harvested (based on areas converted and typical yields) suggest that over 
the period 2000-2010, if used by commercial mills (using > 6000 m3/yr), 82% of timber 
production from conversion of forests for oil palm and timber plantations went unreported 
and was therefore illegal (see report text—calculated from data presented in Blundell 2014).
Pulp & Paper
% from conversion wood 37% Two large companies, APP and APRIL, produce 80% of Indonesia's paper production (Barr 
2007). The two companies are similar in size (ibid.), and for the purposes of this study they 
are assumed to be equal (each producing 40% of total exports). The overall estimate of 
the proportion of pulp and paper exports sourced from conversion wood in 2012 assumes 
than none of APP's production is from conversion wood (based on the company's zero 
deforestation commitment), while two-thirds of APRIL’s is from conversion (Greenpeace 
2013g). For the remaining production (20%), the analysis assumes that half is from 
conversion wood and the remainder produced from plantation-grown wood. Thus, (40% x 
0%) + (40% x 66%) + (20% x 50%) = 37%.
% displacing forest 50% Grieg-Gran et al. 2007, citing FWI/GFW 2002, estimate that 50% of all pulp plantations in 
Indonesia have directly displaced natural forest.
% illegal 80% 75% of natural forest conversion for timber plantations in Riau during 1985 to 2012 was 
“legally questionable” (Eyes on the Forest 2013a). Their study did not assess compliance 
with a number of regulations known to be commonly breached (see report text), so for the 
analyses herein, the overall rate of illegality is assumed to be slightly higher, i.e., 80%.
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Oil palm plantations have been the main driver of forest conversion in Malaysia in recent decades. Initially, 
much of the expansion of oil palm took place at the expense of rubber and coconut plantations rather than 
natural forest. By the early 2000s, however, most such areas had been repurposed, and most new oil palm 
developments since have been on newly deforested land. Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) concluded that of about 
1.1 Mha deforested in Malaysia between 1995 and 2005, 70 percent was cleared to make way for oil palm 
plantations. Malaysia exports 90 percent of the palm oil it produces.43
Since 2000, conversion of forests to industrial timber plantations has been another important driver of 
deforestation. In Sarawak, timber plantation development did not begin in earnest until 2004 (Sarawak Forest 
Department 2011), so few plantations are mature and production remains low. In Sabah, most plantation 
wood is used for pulp and paper production, the vast majority of which is exported.44 Available data suggest 
that Malaysia as a whole exports at least 70 percent of the timber it produces.45 Comparison of export and 
production figures for Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo suggests that it exports nearly 100 percent of the timber it 
produces.46 As in Indonesia, the proportion of conversion wood exported is most probably similar to the total.
There are no official published figures for the volume of conversion timber produced in Malaysia (the world’s 
largest tropical wood exporter) or how much this represents of total tropical wood production in the country. 
However, analysis for this study (see Box 8) suggests that two-thirds of timber production in Sarawak (the 
state responsible for the majority of Malaysian production) in 2010 may have originated from conversion, an 
increase from a little over half compared to four years earlier. 
43	 Calculated	from	figures	for	palm	oil	production	and	exports	for	2012/13	in	USDA	Foreign	Agricultural	Service,	Oilseeds:	World	
Markets	and	Trade,	November	2013,	Table	11:	Palm	Oil:	World	Supply	and	Distribution.
44	 There	is	one	large	pulp	and	paper	producer	in	Sabah,	Sabah	Forest	Industries	(SFI).	Between	90	and	100	percent	of	its	production	
is	exported	(http://sabahforest.en.gongchang.com/about).
45	 Calculated	from	figures	for	exports	and	domestic	consumption	in	2007	in	Lawson	and	MacFaul	(2010).
46	 Sarawak	Forest	Department	(2011)	gives	log	production	as	9.6	million	m3;	official	export	figures	for	the	same	year	from	Sarawak	
Timber	Industry	Development	Corporation	(STIDC),	converted	into	round	wood	equivalent	(RWE)	using	typical	factors,	show	
exports	of	9.5	million	m3.
    Forest being cleared for oil palm within a proposed National Park, Sarawak, Malaysia © Sam Lawson / Earthsight / Global Witness
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New research has been carried out for this report in order to inform an estimate of the proportion of 
tropical timber produced and exported from Malaysia that originates from conversion of forests for 
agriculture and timber plantations, as opposed to selective logging. 
The first piece of new analysis examines the Malaysian state of Sarawak in Borneo, which is responsible 
for 60 percent of Malaysia’s production of logs from natural forests.47 The estimate of conversion wood 
production is based on satellite measurements of the area deforested, and a conservative assumption of 
an average of 38 m3 of salvage wood production per hectare from heavily degraded forest (Blundell 2014) 
(as opposed to a typical standing stock of as much as 300-400 m3/ha in virgin tropical forest). The results 
(Table 7) suggest that two-thirds of timber production in 2010 may have originated from conversion, an 
increase from a little over half compared to four years earlier.
This estimate is supported by analysis of detailed Indian customs data for shipments of logs from Malaysia 
over a one-month period in 2013 (India is the destination for about two-thirds of reported Malaysian log 
exports, 93 percent of which come from Sarawak).49 About two-thirds of the shipment records include 
information on the diameter and species of the logs concerned, and 58 percent of those records describe 
the logs as ”small” or “super small.” Based on the standard minimum cutting diameters in selective 
logging of the different species involved, it can be shown that of the logs for which diameter information 
BOX 8
Estimating Conversion Wood Production in Malaysia
TABLE 7
Estimates of Conversion Timber Production in Sarawak, Malaysia48 
Year Area deforested 
(ha)
Area planted 
with oil palm 
& timber 
plantations (ha)
Estimated timber 
production from 
conversion  
(assuming 38m3/
ha) (m3)*
Total official log 
production (m3)
Implied 
proportion of 
log production 
originating from 
conversion
2006 169,649 84,000 6,446,662 11,864,495 54%
2007 169,649 143,500 6,446,662 11,890,244 54%
2008 174,503 120,000 6,631,114 11,335,577 58%
2009 174,503 110,500 6,631,114 10,367,392 64%
2010 177,532 102,500 6,746,216 10,151,766 66%
*		The	estimate	of	timber	production	from	conversion	is	calculated	from	the	area	measured	as	deforested	in	a	given	
year,	rather	than	the	area	recorded	as	having	been	planted	with	oil	palm	and	timber	plantations;	salvage	timber	is	
produced	at	the	time	the	forest	is	destroyed,	while	planting	may	occur	some	time	later.
47	 Calculated	from	data	from	2012	Annual	Reports	for	Sabah	Forestry	Department,	Peninsular	Malaysia	Forestry	Department,	and	
Sarawak	Forestry	Department.
48 Sources:	Area	Deforested:	SarVision	2011.	(Note	that	figures	for	2006/2007	and	2008/2009	are	identical	as	they	are	averages	from	
measurements	covering	a	 two-year	period.);	Area	converted	to	oil	palm	plantations:	based	on	annual	figures	 for	planted	area	
published	by	Malaysian	Palm	Oil	Board;	Area	converted	to	timber	plantations,	and	total	official	 log	production:	Sarawak	Forest	
Department	website	(www.forestry.sarawak.gov.my)	;	Log	production	per	hectare	in	degraded	forest:	Blundell	2014.
49	 Calculated	from	figures	in	MTIB	2012.
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50	 Based	on	the	author’s	experience	carrying	out	field	research	on	logging	compliance	in	Sarawak.
is available, just over half were below the legal cutting diameter for selective logging, and therefore most 
likely, came from forest conversion (see Figure 11). Though it is possible that a small proportion of these 
logs were illegally harvested within selective logging concessions (and did not, therefore, originate from 
forest conversion), this is unlikely to be true for the vast majority of such logs.50 Including those logs for 
which diameter information was not available, the data shows that at least 32 percent, and possibly as 
much as 69 percent (if all unspecified logs were small), of the logs being imported by India from Malaysia 
originated from conversion.
BOX 8, cont.
Estimating Conversion Wood Production in Malaysia
FIGURE 11
Conversion Timber in Indian Imports of Malaysian Tropical Logs, July 21 to August 20, 2013
5%
34%
16%
46% Under selective logging cutting limit 
(non-dipterocarp)
Over selective logging cutting limit 
(dipterocarp)
Over selective logging cutting limit 
(non-dipterocarp)
Under selective logging cutting limit 
(dipterocarp)
Detailed	shipment	records	for	all	imports	of	logs	(HS4403)	into	India	from	Malaysia	between	July	21	and	August	20,	2013,	sourced	
from	www.zauba.com	and	collated	and	analyzed	by	the	author.	Records	for	60	percent	of	the	volume	involved	note	whether	the	logs	
are	”regular,”	“small,”	or	“super	small;”	these	terms	refer,	respectively,	to	logs	which	have	diameters	greater	than	60	cm,	between	45	
and	60	cm,	and	below	45	cm.	In	Sarawak,	the	minimum	cutting	diameter	is	60	cm	for	dipterocarps	and	45	cm	for	non-dipterocarps.	
Other sources:	Blundell	2014;	SarVision	2011.
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4.3.2 Illegalities in Conversion
Agricultural and timber plantations being developed in natural forest areas in Malaysia generally have the requisite 
licenses from the forestry authorities, are in compliance with land laws, and pay all due taxes on timber harvested 
during conversion. Environmental Impact Assessments are also normally obtained where this is required (though 
the requirement is sometimes circumvented via legal loopholes). Regulations on peat depth and forest fire 
prevention are also less stringent than in Indonesia, so there are fewer laws available to be broken.
However, there is a wealth of evidence to suggest that many plantations are developed in violation of 
indigenous land rights (known as Native Customary Rights (NCR) in Malaysia). There are also many cases of 
alleged corruption in the issuance of relevant licenses, although—unlike in Indonesia—no cases have actually 
been successfully prosecuted. There is also evidence to suggest that breaches of regulations during plantation 
development are common across the country.
A study commissioned by Forest Trends identified 53 separate documented case studies from the last ten years 
of alleged illegalities in forest conversion for commercial plantations in Malaysia (see Table 8). This included 
case studies from every major forested state in the country. The majority of the case studies relate to oil palm 
plantations, though there are also multiple case studies relating to rubber and industrial timber plantations. 
In East Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) all of the cases relate to corruption and/or violations of NCR in the 
issuance of plantation concessions. Most of the cases in Peninsular Malaysia relate to alleged breaches of 
environmental and planning laws in permitting and during development, though there are also cases involving 
NCR and corruption.
Native Customary Rights
Allegations of NCR breaches in the allocation of leases over forestland have been the most contentious issue 
in plantation development in Malaysia for the last 20 years. Though federal and state laws enshrine the 
rights of local people to the land on which they have traditionally depended, affected communities and non-
governmental organizations claim that these rights have been almost universally abused in the issuance of 
logging and plantation licenses. NCR conflicts are a feature in almost every new plantation project in Malaysia, 
with the situation being particularly serious in the states of Kelantan and Sarawak (Lim 2013). In the face of 
TABLE 8
Summary of Published Case Studies of Illegalities and Irregularities in  
Agro-Conversion in Malaysia
Region No. of Cases Alleged Illegalities Plantation Types
Peninsular Malaysia 13 Violation of environmental and 
planning laws; corruption; violation of 
native customary rights
Rubber, oil palm, and timber 
plantations
Sabah 4 Corruption; violation of native 
customary rights
Oil palm and timber plantations
Sarawak 36 Corruption; violation of native 
customary rights
Oil palm (35) and timber (1) 
plantations
Source:	Lim	2013.
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federal and state governments that insist that all of the leases are legal, communities have turned to the courts 
to seek redress. There are presently around 200 NCR land cases pending in the Sarawak courts alone (SACCESS 
2012), and new cases are being filed every year at a faster rate than old cases are resolved. Some unresolved 
cases are more than a decade old. Though a number of cases also relate to selective logging concessions and 
construction of roads and dams, most cases relate to plantation development. Of 139 relevant NCR cases in 
Sarawak filed between 1995 and 2009, at least half involve plantations, and most of these involve oil palm 
plantations.51
Of the four NCR cases involving oil palm and timber plantations that had been concluded by the end of 2009, all 
had ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.52 Since then, a number of additional court decisions have been made in favor 
of local communities in NCR cases involving logging and plantation companies (Yong 2010). For example, in one 
recent case involving an oil palm plantation development controlled by Ta Ann, one of Sarawak’s largest logging 
and plantation companies, the Sarawak Court of Appeal ruled that a large part of the oil palm plantation was 
NCR land and that the lease over it was illegal (Maliasikini 2013; Tawie 2013). One particularly high-profile oil 
palm-related case that ruled in favor of the community in 2010 was later overturned by a higher court, however 
(Borneo Post 2013).
Corruption
Three-quarters of the cases of alleged illegalities in agro-conversion in Malaysia documented by the author 
include allegations of corruption. Almost all of these cases relate to political patronage, cronyism, and nepotism 
in the issuance of licenses, usually at a very high level. The most serious evidence of corruption comes from 
the states of Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo (which together account for two-thirds of Malaysia’s 
remaining forests). The Chief Ministers of both states have been the subject of investigations by the Malaysian 
Anti-Corruption Commission for alleged corruption related to the issuance of logging and plantation licenses 
(Malaysiakini 2012).
In 2011, NGOs released official documents that showed 200,000 ha of land in the Sarawak had been leased for 
oil palm development to companies with family connections to the Chief Minister, in exchange for payments 
which appeared to be far below the real value (Sarawak Report 2011). The following year, an investigation by 
the NGO Global Witness supported these allegations. An undercover investigator posing as an investor seeking 
land in Sarawak for a plantation approached the relevant government authority and was offered four plots 
of land. Members of the Chief Minister’s family were “direct shareholders in or beneficial owners of three of 
these land leases, while the fourth deal was, according to an intermediary, proposed on [sic] the understanding 
that Taib would receive a multimillion dollar kickback from the selling party.” Global Witness was also told by a 
senior government official and a timber industry executive that companies seeking plantation licenses needed 
to make “unofficial payments” to the Chief Minister. The Chief Minister and other individuals investigated have 
vigorously denied the allegations made by Global Witness (Global Witness 2013a).
Other Illegalities and Irregularities
Malaysia’s National Auditor General, reviewing the performance of State Forestry Departments in 2008, noted 
that many of Peninsular Malaysia’s forest reserves had been encroached by oil palm and rubber plantations. 
Concerns were raised by the Auditor General about the extent to which regulations had been properly followed 
when the licenses for these plantations were issued. In one forest reserve in Johor state, for instance, the 
Forestry Department had issued licenses in excess of the maximum permitted size and in areas of intact forest 
51	 	Analysis	by	the	author	of	list	of	cases	in	Appendix	1	of	Yong	(2010).
52	 	Analysis	by	the	author	of	list	of	cases	in	Appendix	1	of	Yong	(2010).
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(Wakker 2010). A joint government and donor study found that the procedures followed for de-gazetting 
protected areas for conversion were “clearly not according to legal principles” (ibid.).
In addition to problems related to license issuance, the Auditor General also found many cases where conversion 
for plantation development had taken place without required Environmental Impact Assessments; either the 
requirement had simply not been followed, or it had been circumvented in a legally questionable manner. Field 
investigations also uncovered a number of cases where illegal clearance had taken place in river buffers and on 
steep slopes, and where clearance had extended beyond licensed boundaries (ibid.). 
The relative paucity of information on compliance with environmental and other regulations during forest 
conversion in Sarawak and Sabah is due to a lack of interest in documenting such matters amongst NGOs 
and local communities, and cannot be taken to imply that compliance is good. NGOs, local communities, 
and activists in Sarawak and Sabah are focused on the overarching legality of the concessions themselves, in 
terms of customary rights and corruption, and view compliance issues during conversion as being secondary 
if (as they allege) the concession was illegally issued and therefore its entire operations are illegal. The state 
governments, on the other hand, do not provide any information on their own monitoring and assessments of 
compliance. On the few occasions where such issues have been investigated, apparent illegalities have been 
documented. Illegal clearance on steep slopes was recorded in one industrial timber plantation in Sarawak 
in 2009 (Norwegian Council on Ethics 2010), while illegal clearance of steep slopes and along river banks 
was documented in an oil palm concession in the same state in 2011 (Global Witness 2012). Given the well-
documented close and allegedly corrupt relationships between the major oil palm and timber plantation 
companies in Sarawak and senior officials in government, it is unlikely that there is significant enforcement of 
regulations. This interpretation is supported by the much more extensive independent information available 
related to compliance by some of the same companies with regulations governing selective logging (Norwegian 
Council on Ethics 2012a; 2012b).
4.3.3 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 9 
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Malaysia
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000-2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
87% Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) found that 70% of Malaysian forest loss 1995-2005 was due to oil 
palm and an additional approximately 17% due to pulp plantations, making a total of 87%. It 
is assumed that the proportion of deforestation attributable to these two drivers was the same 
in 2000-2012. Deforestation for other commercial plantation crops is not considered, as oil 
palm has largely displaced rubber, cacao, and other formerly cultivated plantation crops.
% of 2000-2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–43.4%–86.7% No suitable quantitative data exist on which to base estimates, though plentiful qualitative 
data demonstrate that problem is widespread, especially in Sarawak (Lim 2013), which 
was the location of 57% of oil palm planting in 2000 to 2012 (Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
2013). The mid-point of the range assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average 
of Indonesia, Cambodia, and PNG; high-end analysis assumes it is equal to the average for 
these three countries.
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Factor Estimate Justification
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000-2012 embodied 
in exports
86% Assume 78% of illegal agro-deforestation is for oil palm. This is based on proportion of total 
deforestation attributed to oil palm for 1995 to 2005 by Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) (70%), 
which concluded that pulp plantations, infrastructure, and urban development represented 
the other drivers; assuming that the latter two represented 10% of remaining deforestation, 
then this suggests that oil palm was 78% of agro-deforestation (70% x 90%). Ninety 
percent of Malaysian palm oil production in 2012 was exported (USDA FAS 2013) and 
this is assumed to have remained the same over the reference period. Remainder of agro-
conversion is for timber and other plantations, with 70% exported (rough estimate, based on 
the fact that the sole pulp producer in Sabah exports 90%-100% of production (see Section 
4.3.2), and conservatively assuming slightly lower percentages for other plantation wood and 
other agro-conversion crops). The final overall export percentage is calculated from the above 
as follows: (78% x 90%) + (12% x 70%) = 86%.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Oil Palm
% of area of oil palm 
in 2012 which 
displaced forest
55% Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) estimated the total new oil palm planting during 1995-2005 was 
1.46 Mha, of which 0.76 Mha (52%) was at the expense of forest, with the remainder due 
to conversion of rubber, cocoa, coconut, and other agricultural plantations. It is assumed 
that the same proportion applied to planting prior to 1995 (2.54 Mha). From 2006 to 
2012, a further 1.03 Mha of oil palm was planted (calculated from Malaysian Palm Oil 
Board data). During that latter period, the reduction in area planted with other crops 
(rubber, cocoa, coconut) slowed (FAOSTAT), such that a lower proportion of new oil palm 
planting can be attributed to conversion of these plantations as during the previous ten years 
(during 1995-2005, FAOSTAT data show 36% of oil palm expansion could be attributed 
to reductions in these three crops; in the 2006-2012 period the FAOSTAT data show that 
the proportion was only 14%). It is assumed that the proportion of oil palm planting during 
2006-2012 that occurred at the expense of forest was therefore higher, at 70%. Overall 
therefore, the percentage is ((2.54 Mha x 52%) + 0.76 Mha + (1.03 Mha x 70%)) / 5.08 
Mha = 55%.
% of oil palm 
deforestation up to 
2012 which was illegal
0%-43.4%–86.7% No suitable quantitative data exist on which to base estimates, though plentiful qualitative 
data demonstrate that problem is widespread, especially in Sarawak (Lim 2013), which 
was the location of 57% of oil palm planting in 2000-2012 (Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
2013). The mid-point of the range assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of 
Indonesia, Cambodia, and PNG; the high-end analysis assumes it is equal to the average of 
the three countries.
Tropical Timber
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
65% The area of forest cleared and typical salvage volumes in heavily degraded forest suggest 
that 66% of log production in the Malaysian state of Sarawak in 2010 was likely from 
conversion (see text). Sarawak is reponsible for 59% of Malaysia's total natural forest 
tropical log production (calculated from production data in 2012 Annual Reports from forest 
departments of Sarawak, Sabah, and Peninsular Malaysia). 
% of forest 
clearance illegal
0%–43.4%–86.7% See justification for deforestation analysis, above.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Pulp & Paper
% from conversion wood 30%–90% Malaysia's largest, and only integrated, pulp and paper producer is Sabah Forest Industries 
(Roda and Rathi 2005; Avantha Group, undated). As of 2005, 90% of its log input was of 
tropical hardwoods, and only 10% of plantation-grown acacia (Roda and Rathi 2005). As an 
overall net importer of paper, some of the country's exports may be produced from imported 
paper (although the largest supplier is Indonesia, another high risk country) (UN COMTRADE 
2013). Thus the proportion assumed here is estimated to range from a possible low of 30% 
to a high of 90%.
% displacing forest 0%–55%–82.5% No suitable quantitative data on which to base estimates. Mid-point estimate assumes that 
the same proportion applies as applies to oil palm plantations (55%—see above). High end 
assumes 150% of that percentage (i.e., 82.5%).
% illegal 0%–43.4%–86.7% See justification for deforestation analysis, above.
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4.4 Papua New Guinea
4.4.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
Until at least 2002, most deforestation in Papua New Guinea (PNG) was due to subsistence rather than 
commercial industrial agriculture (Shearman et al. 2008). However, this is likely to have changed in the last few 
years. Since 2003 (and mostly since 2007), 5 Mha (16 percent of the accessible commercial forest area in the 
country) of PNG’s forests have been licensed for conversion for large-scale agricultural plantations, mostly oil 
palm but also cocoa and other crops (Greenpeace 2012d). If even a small percentage of this area is converted 
as planned, it will easily outstrip the past rate of mostly subsistence-driven deforestation (of around 140,000 
ha/year).53
In PNG, 30 percent of log exports in 2012 originated from forest conversion, up from just 1 percent five 
years earlier (see Figure 12). Equivalent figures for log production are not available, but given that around 90 
percent of log production in PNG is exported unprocessed, then the proportions must be similar. This increase 
in conversion has stemmed from the growth of Special-purpose Agricultural Business Leases (SABLs) and 
associated Forest Clearance Authorities (FCAs), mostly for oil palm. All of the tropical timber being produced 
from agro-conversion in PNG is exported, as is all of the country’s palm oil production.
53	 Calculated	using	FAO	data	for	2005	to	2010.
FIGURE 12
Papua New Guinea Log Exports from Selective Harvesting and Conversion, 2005 to 2012
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Source:	 SGS	 log	 export	monitoring	 annual	 reports,	 analyzed	by	 the	 author.	 The	 SGS	 log	monitoring	 reports	 break	 down	 annual	
exports	based	on	the	concession	or	license	of	harvest.	Exports	classified	as	“conversion”	above	originated	from	SABL-licensed	areas	
issued	Forest	Clearance	Authorities	by	the	PNG	Forest	Authority.
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4.4.2 Illegalities in Conversion
The principal type of illegality documented in PNG is the illegal issuance of licenses to convert forests for 
commercial agriculture plantations. Numerous protests by local landowners and a series of exposés by NGOs 
led the government to institute a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry in 2012 to investigate the large number 
of SABLs that had been issued for the conversion of millions of hectares of the country’s forests into large-scale 
agricultural plantations. The results of the inquiry were tabled in Parliament in September 2013. Of 42 SABLs 
examined, only four had proper landowner consent and viable agricultural projects. The remainder—more 
than 90 percent—was obtained through fraudulent or corrupt means (Pacific News Agency 2013; Numapo 
2013; Mirou 2013). The findings confirmed suspicions published in a peer-reviewed academic study, which 
assessed the plausibility of 36 oil palm plantation projects issued under SABLs covering almost 1 Mha, and 
found that only five were likely to actually be planted, while the rest were most likely simply covers for obtaining 
valuable timber (Nelson et al. 2014). In June 2014, the Prime Minister announced that the government would 
cancel all illegal SABLs recommended to be revoked by the Commission of Inquiry, and would also set up a 
Ministerial Committee to examine the legality of those SABLs not already assessed by the Commission (PNG 
Prime Minister’s Media Unit Office 2014). The following month, the Department of Lands and Planning issued 
a public notice demanding the submission of 29 SABL licenses for cancellation (The National (PNG) 2014), 
including most (but not all) of those recommended for cancellation by the Commission.
The principal illegality in relation to the SABLs is that they were issued without obtaining the legally required 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of customary landowners. However, numerous other breaches 
of procedures and regulations by various government agencies have been documented. The Parliamentary 
Inquiry Commissioners found that legal requirements governing license issuance were “deliberately breached 
and proper processes either by-passed or simply ignored” (Numapo 2013). Analysis by Greenpeace shows that 
130,000 ha of the SABLs even overlap 
with protected areas, while some of those 
that had already begun clear felling did 
so without the required Environmental 
Permit (Greenpeace 2012d). 
There is little published information 
relating to compliance with regulations 
governing the process of forest clearance 
(such as protection of river buffers or 
steep slopes) in PNG. The Commission 
of Inquiry did not seek to address such 
matters.
    Logs from land conversion for palm oil being loaded on a ship bound for China, 
Pomio, Papua New Guinea © Paul Hilton / Greenpeace
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54	 Estimated	by	the	author.	Assuming	a	very	conservative	estimate	of	100	m3	of	merchantable	timber	per	hectare,	the	project	
could	potentially	produce	200	million	m3	of	logs.	Current	global	tropical	timber	exports	(primary	products)	are	approximately	44	
million	m3	in	roundwood	equivalent	(trade	data	as	analyzed	by	James	Hewitt	for	Forest	Trends).
By far the largest controversial Special Agricultural Business Lease (SABL) issued over forestland in PNG 
was in relation to a project implemented by Independent Timber & Stevedoring (PNG) Ltd (IT&S). It is 
also one of the most egregious in terms of documented illegalities and irregularities. Initially a project 
to build a road, encompassing just 2,400 ha of forest, the project ballooned in size to cover more than 2 
Mha (Mousseau 2013). Had it gone ahead in full, the project would have been the largest tropical logging 
project in the world, and could potentially have doubled global tropical timber production and exports.54
The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry uncovered numerous irregularities relating to the issuance of the 
IT&S SABLs. The legally required consultation with local landowners was found to have been inadequate, 
and the leases based on counterfeit land registration. One landowner representative told the Inquiry that 
the signature under his name on one of the official documents was not his. The land investigation and 
Environmental Impact Assessment were not performed as required by law. The company also did not hold 
the Forest Industry Participant Certificate needed to apply for a Timber Permit or Forest Clearance Authority. 
The Inquiry heard how IT&S had hijacked the approval process, including preparing official documents that 
should have been prepared by the government. The Provisional Lands Officer who approved the leases 
claimed that he had been misled by IT&S about what he was signing (Mousseau 2013; Mirou 2013).
The Inquiry concluded that the company had “conducted unlawful and unethical actions,” while there 
was also evidence of malpractice by various officials (ibid.). In July 2014, three SABL licenses covering 
1.25 Mha of the IT&S project were among those that were ordered to be cancelled, following the 
recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry (The National (PNG) 2014).
CASE STUDY 3
Independent Timber & Stevedoring (PNG) Ltd, Papua New Guinea
     Local people protesting a SABL license issued for forest conversion  
for commercial agriculture in Papua New Guinea, 2011 © Paul Hilton / Greenpeace
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4.4.3 Percentages Used in Analysis 
4.5 Latin America: The Southern Cone (Argentina and Paraguay)
4.5.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
In Argentina as in Brazil, commercial soy and beef farming are the primary drivers of deforestation, 
as acknowledged by the Argentine government (Secretaria de Ambiente y Desarollo Sustenable de 
la Nación (SAyDS) 2010). Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) concluded that about 50 percent of the 2.2 Mha of 
forest lost between 1996 and 2005 can be attributed to soy and 50 percent to cattle grazing. While 
earlier deforestation was driven by sugar, tobacco, and tree plantations (Bertonatti and Corueca 
2000), conversion for industrial soybean plantations has been the main driver of deforestation in 
Paraguay since the late 1990s (Dros 2004). The other main driver of deforestation is cattle ranching 
(Grieg-Gran et al. 2007). In the eastern region of Paraguay, the push to expand soy production has resulted in 
near total deforestation of the native forests, with less than 5 percent still standing (World Bank 2003). The 
Government of Paraguay has estimated that 40 percent of forest loss in the east was due to cattle ranching, 
and the rest due to soy production (Republic of Paraguay 2008). 
TABLE 10 
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Papua New Guinea
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
10% Shearman et al. (2008), examining the period 1972 to 2002, found that commercial 
agriculture was only a minor driver of deforestation. Given the massive expansion of 
agricultural conversion licenses (see text), it is likely this may have changed, especially since 
2007. For this study, a conservative overall average of 10% is assumed for the 2000 to 2012 
reference period.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
90% A 2013 Parliamentary Inquiry found that 90% of the leases issued for clearing forest for 
agriculture during the previous decade were illegally issued (Pacific News Agency 2013; 
Numapo 2013; Mirou 2013). 
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
100% All commercial agro-conversion is export-oriented. 100% of palm oil production is exported 
(Indexmundi.com production and export data 2011), as is 99.9% of coffee production 
(Bourke and Allen 2009).
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Tropical Timber
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
30% Log export monitoring reports (SGS PNG 2012) analyzed by the author (see text).
% of forest clearance 
illegal
90% See justification for deforestation analysis, above.
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Almost all of the soy produced in Argentina and Paraguay is exported, and the European Union is the largest 
destination for exports from both countries (see Table 11). Argentina typically exports between 10 and 20 
percent of beef production, though in 2006 only 6 percent was exported due to trade restrictions stemming 
from an outbreak of foot and mouth disease.55 The EU was the largest destination for Argentine beef exports in 
2012, followed by Chile, China, and Israel.56 Paraguay exported 60 percent of its beef production in 2012,57 with 
70 percent of exports destined for Russia and the rest mostly to other Latin American countries.58 There is no 
information available on the proportion of the timber that is produced during conversion of forests for agriculture 
in either country, nor how much is exported, nor the proportion this represents of overall timber production. 
4.5.2 Illegalities in Conversion
The Argentine government has accepted that forest law enforcement mechanisms in the country have “been 
totally inadequate” (SAyDS 2010). In an attempt to gain better control of the situation, a new National Forest 
Law was passed at the end of 2007, which placed a moratorium on all new deforestation until each province 
had implemented a participatory forest land use plan. The law gave each province a maximum of one year in 
which to produce its plan; as of March 2014, only 14 of 23 provinces had done so (SAyDS 2013). This means that 
all deforestation that took place in the remaining provinces during the five years from 2008 to 2012 was illegal. 
One of the provinces most badly affected by soy-driven deforestation in the last ten years is Salta in Argentina’s Chaco 
region. While the Forest Law was being prepared, the then-governor of Salta rushed through approvals for hundreds 
of thousands of hectares of forest conversion. A new governor elected at the end of 2007 described the situation up 
to that point has having been a “festival” of illegal forest clearance authorizations. In late 2008, Argentina’s National 
Supreme Court ruled that the province had breached national legislation by continuing to allow deforestation during 
the moratorium and demanded a halt to forest clearance in four of the province’s departments (Seghezzo et al. 2011). 
Clearance continued, however; NGO investigations later found that more than 50,000 ha of forest were cleared in 
violation of the Court order. Though the provincial government finally passed the required forest zoning map into law 
in July 2009, official data show that in the two subsequent years, one-third of all the deforestation in the province 
occurred in areas of forest zoned in the map as protected. A recent Greenpeace (2013d) investigation uncovered a 
number of other systematic breaches of regulation and a total failure to monitor compliance with the law.
55	 Calculated	from	figures	(in	carcass	weight	equivalent)	from	USDA	Foreign	Agricultural	Service,	Livestock	&	Products	Annuals	for	
Argentina	for	2006	to	2013.
56	 Based	on	weight,	calculated	from	customs	data	for	2012	reported	to	UN	COMTRADE.	Hong	Kong	is	included	as	part	of	China.
57	 Calculated	from	figures	(in	carcass	weight	equivalent)	from	USDA	Foreign	Agricultural	Service,	Livestock	&	Products	Annual	2013	
Paraguay.
58	 Based	on	weight,	calculated	from	customs	data	for	2012	reported	to	UN	COMTRADE.	Hong	Kong	is	included	as	part	of	China.
TABLE 11
Soy Production in and Exports from Argentina and Paraguay, 2012
Country Soy production  
(tonnes, million) 
% of soy exported Main destinations 
Argentina 48.5 92% EU 26%, China 18%, SE Asia 22%
Paraguay 8.4 94% EU 46%, Latin America 20%
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Illegal deforestation for soy is common in Paraguay, where soy production is by far the largest recent driver of 
deforestation (Dros 2004). A 2004 total ban on forest conversion in the eastern part of the country (where only 
5 percent of the original forest remains) has been regularly violated, especially in districts along the border with 
Brazil, with land being converted for pasture or agriculture (Portal Paraguayo de Noticias (PPN) 2009). WWF 
Paraguay (2013) recently published satellite images showing more than 12,000 ha were illegally deforested 
between 2010 and 2013 for a single ranch in the Department of San Pedro. In Teixeira, illegal deforestation is 
now occurring in protected areas, nature reserves, and parks in both the Upper Parana Atlantic Forest (on the 
Brazilian border) and the Chaco biosphere reserve in the north of the country (America Economia 2013). 
Soy expansion elsewhere has displaced livestock producers into the forests of the Chaco, where illegal conversion 
is widespread (ibid.). In 2012, Paraguayan authorities confirmed that a cattle-ranch owned by a major Spanish 
conglomerate had been found to have illegally cleared forest. NGOs claim the forest concerned is inhabited 
by a group of un-contacted Ayoreos Indigenous Peoples (Survival International 2012). In 2013, NGOs alleged 
that satellite images showed another company illegally clearing for cattle pasture in the area, and called for a 
boycott of Paraguayan beef exports (Lainformacion.com 2013). According to local WWF officials, compliance 
with environmental laws in Paraguay is “poor or non-existent” (America Economia 2013).
4.5.3 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 12 
Commodity Analysis—Argentina
Factor Estimate Justification
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Soy
% of area of soy in 2012 
which displaced forest
9% Between 1995 and 2005, one-fifth of all soy expansion of Argentina took place in the northern, 
forested states, of which 40% (1,135,595 ha) was at the expense of forests (Grieg-Gran et al. 
2007; Table 4, p.77). Thus, at least 8% of all new soy planted in Argentina during this period 
was on plantations that caused deforestation. (The study also found that the proportion of 
planting in the forested north was increasing (to 30% between 2000 and 2005), suggesting that 
more than 12% of new soy planned across the entire country may be at the expense of forests). 
% of soy deforestation up 
to 2012 which was illegal
30%–75% 
(mid 52.5%)
The only quantitative data is from Salta province (the province with the greatest area of 
deforestation, where soy is the principal driver (Seghezzo et al. 2011)). In that province, 
official data show that from July 2009 to June 2011, 30% of all deforestation occurred 
in areas zoned as protected in the legally approved forest zoning map (calculated in 
Greenpeace 2013d, pages 7-8). This figure only assesses one form of illegality and 
one small time period, however. In addition, between December 2007 and July 2009, 
all deforestation in Salta was illegal, because federal law in December 2007 placed a 
moratorium on conversion until an approved forest land use plan had been produced, and 
Salta did not produce one until July 2009 (see text). Nine provinces had still not produced 
such a plan by March 2013 (SAyDS 2013), making all deforestation in those provinces 
since 2008 illegal. Salta's governor has admitted that up to the end of 2007, there was a 
"festival" of illegal forest clearance authorizations in the province.
Beef & Leather
% of area of cattle 
in 2012 which displaced 
forest
17% As of 2002, 62% of Argentina's cattle stock was in the Pampas, 14% in semi-arid regions, 2% in 
Patagonia and 22% in the Chaco region (Grieg-Gran et al. 2007). Of these regions, only the Chaco 
was originally forested. For this study, it is assumed that 75% of the cattle from the Chaco are 
being reared on land that displaced forest (given that the whole region was originally forested).
% of cattle deforestation up 
to 2012 which was illegal
30%–75% 
(mid 52.5%)
See justification for soy, above.
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TABLE 13 
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Paraguay
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
79% Of the 2.5 Mha of deforestation, 58% was in East Paraguay (where 40% was driven by 
livestock and 60% by soy) and 42% in the Chaco (where cattle ranching is the most important 
driver of deforestation, fire the third, and advance of agriculture the sixth) (Republic of 
Paraguay 2008). Assigning percentages to the first, third, and sixth most important drivers 
following Hosonuma et al. (2012) suggests that 50% of Chaco deforestation was due to one 
of these three, giving an overall estimate that (100% x 58%) + (50% x 42%) = 79% due to 
commercial agriculture. On the other hand, Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) found that during 2000-
2005, 11% of deforestation was due to cattle-ranching, and also concluded that of an average 
of 179,000 ha of deforestation per year during that time, 124,000 ha was due to soy (69%).
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–42.3%–84.5% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Brazil and Bolivia; 
high-end assumes it is equal to their average. The mid-point is supported by the fact that 
according to local WWF officials, compliance with environmental laws in Paraguay is "poor or 
non-existent" (America Economia, 2013), and also by plentiful anecdotal data on illegalities 
in conversion of forests (see text).
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
80% 60% of beef and 94% of soy were exported in 2012 (USDA FAS 2013); it is assumed that 
these proportions have remained static over the course of the reference period. A 60/40 split 
in illegal agro-deforestation is assumed between soy and beef, based on the proportions of 
total deforestation attributed to each by the Paraguayan government (Republic of Paraguay 
2008), and in the absence of evidence suggesting that deforestation for each commodity 
is more or less likely to be illegal. The final overall export percentage is calculated from the 
above as follows: (60% x 40%) + (94% x 60%) = 80%.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Soy
% of area of soy 
in 2012 which 
displaced forest
71% Grieg-Gran et al. (2007) concluded that 100% of soy expansion between 1996 and 2000 
involved direct or indirect forest clearance, while 80% of soy expansion during 2001-2005 
involved such clearance (based on a very substantial reduction in 2005, as a result of the 
zero deforestation law implemented for the east of the country the previous year). In total, 
the authors estimate that 736,000 ha of soy planting from1996 to 2005 involved forest 
clearance. 960,000 ha of soy were already planted prior to 1996, and for this analysis it 
is assumed that the same proportion of this involved deforestation as in the subsequent 
four years (i.e., 100%). From 2006 to 2012, a further 1.03 Mha of soy expansion occurred 
(FAOSTAT). It is conservatively assumed that a lower proportion (40% of this new planting 
occurred at the expense of forest (the mid-point between the previous rate of 80% and zero); 
while the existence of the zero deforestation law does imply a substantially lower proportion 
than previously recorded, the high deforestation figures for Paraguay (Hansen et al. 2013) 
post-2005 and the evidence of poor compliance with the ban (see text) argue against a 
higher proportion than that assumed. In total, these assumptions give a figure of (960,000 
ha x 100%) + 760,000 ha + (1.03 Mha x 40%) / 3 Mha = 71%.
% of soy deforestation up 
to 2012 which was illegal
0%–42.3%–84.5% See justification in deforestation analysis, above.
Beef & Leather
% of area of cattle 
in 2012 which 
displaced forest
0%–48%–79% Mid-point is average of those countries from the same region (Brazil and Argentina) for 
which point estimates were possible. High-end is the highest estimated figure for a country 
from the same region.
% of cattle deforestation 
up to 2012 which 
was illegal
0%–42.3%–84.5% See justification in deforestation analysis, above.
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4.6 Latin America: The Andean States
4.6.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
According to the Peruvian government, small-scale agriculture and cattle ranching is responsible for 75 percent 
of deforestation, while medium-to-large-scale agriculture is the second most important driver (Ministerio del 
Ambiente 2013). All of the latter and perhaps three-quarters of the former is commercial in nature.59 Recent 
projections suggest that expansion of oil palm monoculture is fast-becoming the main driver of deforestation 
in the Peruvian Amazon (Dourojeanni et al. 2010). Ninety percent of the 5 Mha of Peruvian land with potential 
for oil palm is forested (Burneo 2011). 
Soy has been the main driver of deforestation in Bolivia since the late 1990s, along with industrial wheat, 
sorghum, and sunflower production (Matthews et al. 2010). Around 75 percent of all deforestation in Bolivia 
takes place in the department of Santa Cruz, and is driven by large-scale agro-conversion for soy and other 
crops (Plurinational State of Bolivia 2008). In Colombia, 75 percent of deforestation is due to expansion of 
the agricultural frontier; more than a third of forest cleared between 2000 and 2005 was converted to cattle 
pasture alone (Government of Colombia 2011). In 2008, it was estimated that 2.2 Mha of Colombian forest had 
been lost during the previous 15 years to make way for cocaine production (Mongabay 2008).
The proportion of production of the relevant commodities exported from the three countries varies. Three-
quarters of Bolivia’s soy production is exported.60 Colombia typically exports between 10 and 20 percent of 
its beef, though in 2012 the proportion was just 2 percent as a result of trade restrictions stemming from 
outbreaks of foot and mouth disease.61 Thus far, it appears that most palm oil production in Peru is being 
consumed domestically. There is no information available on the proportion of the timber that is produced 
during conversion of forests for agriculture and that is exported from the three countries, nor for the proportion 
this represents of overall timber production. None of the three countries feature in the top 12 global exporters 
of tropical timber, and they have therefore not been specifically assessed in this paper in relation to legal and 
illegal conversion wood production and trade.
4.6.2 Illegalities in Conversion
In Peru, while oil palm development is only just starting in earnest, there is already a growing body of evidence 
that much of this development is illegal. Companies have been illegally authorized to develop oil palm 
plantations in areas of primary forest zoned for sustainable selective timber harvesting. Companies are also 
alleged to have abused small-scale permits for subsistence agriculture by getting local people to clear forest 
and apply for such permits, then buying up and combining these permits to create an oil palm plantation. There 
have also reportedly been cases of companies clear-felling forests and planting oil palm without any permits at 
all (Urrunaga 2013).
By far the largest current oil palm grower in Peru is the conglomerate Grupo Romero, which has three large oil 
palm estates in San Martin and Loreto provinces in the Peruvian Amazon. Allegations of illegalities involving two 
of these estates have been made by a legal advisor to the regional government of San Martin, who is reported 
to have claimed that the subsidiary operating one of the estates, Palmas del Shanusi, had “not respected the 
59	 A	regional	study	of	Latin	America	published	in	2011	found	that	75	percent	of	small-scale	agriculture	is	commercial	(Berdegué	
and	Fuentealba	2011).
60	 Calculated	from	figures	for	soy	production	and	soybean,	soy	oil,	and	soy	meal	exports	 in	USDA	Foreign	Agricultural	Service,	
Oilseeds	and	Products	Annuals	2013	for	Bolivia.
61	 Figures	calculated	based	on	UN	COMTRADE	data	and	Government	of	Colombia	official,	published	production	data.
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30 percent forest coverage provided by the Law” and had constructed roads and a private airport “without the 
authorization of the competent authorities” and without an adequately approved environmental impact study. 
He also claimed that the owner of a second Grupo Romero estate, Palmas del Oriente, had failed to comply 
with the terms of its Environmental Impact Assessment, and logged the forest in less than five months instead 
of doing it gradually over three years (CEPES 2010).
Governance has been described as “virtually non-existent” in the Bolivian Amazon, where deforestation and 
agro-conversion are concentrated; corruption is also said to be rampant (Mongabay 2013a). This has led to 
widespread illegal conversion, even within National Parks (Bolivian Thoughts 2011).62 Bolivia’s environmental 
police lack the advanced tools for detecting illegal deforestation available in neighboring Brazil, and are also 
severely understaffed and underfunded (ibid.). According to the Regulatory Agency for the Social Control of 
Forests and Lands, 3.3 Mha of forest were illegally deforested in Bolivia between 1996 and 2009 (Urioste 2013), 
or an average of 0.25 Mha/year. Recently published satellite image analysis, on the other hand, shows that 
Bolivia’s total average annual forest loss between 2000 and 2012 was around the same figure.63 This suggests 
that almost all deforestation in Bolivia in the last 10 to 15 years has been illegal. Given that soy and cattle 
ranching are considered to have been responsible for the vast majority of deforestation in the country during 
this period, this also implies that almost all deforestation for these purposes during the last decade has been 
illegal. In light of this, the Bolivian government—under pressure from the agribusiness lobby—recently passed 
a land use law that will enable landowners who illegally deforested land prior to 2011 to pay nominal fines in 
order to legalize their farms (Mongabay 2013a).
There is little information on the nature and extent of illegality in conversion of tropical forests for commercial 
agriculture in Colombia. However, given the poor general forest governance situation (it has been estimated 
that 42 percent of Colombian timber production is illegal) (World Bank 2006), it is likely that the country suffers 
similar problems as those documented elsewhere in Latin America. All of the deforestation for coca production 
is illegal.
62	 Analysis	for	this	study	of	recent	global	high-resolution	deforestation	maps	appears	to	confirm	large	scale	illegal	conversion	in	this	
protected	area.
63	 Calculated	from	total	deforestation	in	square	kilometres	over	the	12	year	period	given	in	Hansen	et	al.	2013,	Table	S2.
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4.6.3 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 14 
Deforestation Analysis—Peru
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
66% Small-scale agriculture and cattle ranching are responsible for 75% of deforestation, 
but medium-to-large-scale agriculture is the second most important driver (Ministerio 
del Ambiente 2013). For this analysis, medium-to-large-scale agriculture (all of which is 
commercial) is assumed to represent 10% of total deforestation, and it is also assumed 
that 75% of small-scale agriculture is also commercial (based on an analysis of smallholder 
farming in Latin America as a whole, which found that 100 Mha out of a total of 400 Mha 
could be classified as subsistence (Berdegue and Fuentealba 2011)). This results in an 
overall estimate of (75% x 75%) + 10% = 66%.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–42.3%–84.5% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Brazil and Bolivia; high-
end assumes it is equal to their average. Mid-point is supported by evidence of compliance 
issues relating to two out of three oil palm developments controlled by the largest oil palm 
grower in Peru (Urrunaga 2013; CEPES 2010).
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
0%–49%–74% Mid-point is average of the four other countries in Latin America for which specific estimates 
were produced. High-end is 150% of that average.
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TABLE 15
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Bolivia
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
75% Agriculture (mainly large-scale for soy and other industrial crops) is responsible for 75% of 
total deforestation (Plurinational State of Bolivia 2008).
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
90% According to the Regulatory Agency for the Social Control of Forests and Lands, 3.3 Mha 
of forest were illegally deforested in Bolivia between 1996 and 2009 (Urioste 2013), or an 
average of 0.25 Mha/year. Recently published satellite image analysis shows that Bolivia's 
total average annual forest loss between 2000 and 2012 was around the same figure 
(Hansen et al. 2013). Together, these suggest that almost all deforestation in Bolivia in the 
last 10 to 15 years has been illegal. Given that soy and cattle ranching are considered to 
have been responsible for the vast majority of deforestation in the country during this period, 
this would also imply that almost all deforestation for these purposes during the last decade 
has been illegal.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
56%–75% R-PIN (Plurinational State of Bolivia 2008) states that 75% of deforestation is for soy 
and other industrial crops; Hecht (2005) reports wheat and sunflower as the other main 
industrial plantation crops; FAOSTAT (2012) data for areas planted with these three crops 
show 75% of the total area is soy. Seventy-five percent of soy is exported (USDA FAS 
2013). Low-end assumes 0% of wheat and sunflower is exported, giving overall total export 
percentage of 75% x 75% = 56%. High-end assumes the proportion of these other crops 
exported is the same as for soy, resulting in an overall estimate of 75%.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Soy
% of area of soy in 
2012 which displaced 
forest
45%–100% FAOSTAT data show that soy represented 34% of the total area of crops in Bolivia in 2012, 
while Urioste (2013) shows that almost all of this is in Santa Cruz. R-PIN (Plurinational 
State of Bolivia 2008) states that 75% of total deforestation is said to be attributed to 
crops. Analysis of Hansen et al. (2013) data gives 1.97 Mha loss in Sta Cruz from 2001 
to 2012. This results in an estimate of 1.97 Mha x 75% x 34% = 0.5 Mha of soy having 
displaced forests. This compares with the total planted area of soy of 1.1 Mha in 2012 
(FAOSTAT), and total growth of the planted area of soy of 0.47 Mha between 2000 and 
2012 (ibid.). If it is assumed that the same percentage of soy planted prior to 2000 
displaced forest, then this implies that 100% of soy displaces forest (as 0.5 Mha > 0.47 
Mha), whereas if it is assumed that none of the soy planted prior to 2000 displaced forest, it 
implies that 45% (0.5/1.1 Mha) displaced forest.
% of soy deforestation up 
to 2012 which was illegal
90% See justification for illegality percentage in deforestation analysis, above.
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4.7 Mekong Basin
4.7.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
In Cambodia, a government report acknowledged that the main reason for the recent dramatic decline in forest 
cover is the conversion of forestland to large-scale agricultural plantations under controversial Economic Land 
Concessions (ELCs) (Government of Cambodia 2011). By the end of 2012, 2.6 Mha of land had been handed 
out. Of the proportion of this area for which information is available (1.5 Mha), official government data show 
that 1.2 Mha (80 percent) is slated for rubber plantations (Vannarin and Lewis 2013). In neighboring Laos, 
conversion of forests for agricultural plantations is also acknowledged as the primary driver of deforestation. 
Permits covering at least 1.1 Mha—5 percent of the country’s land area—have been issued so far. More than 
a third of the allocated area is forested (Schönweger et al. 2012), and rubber plantations are estimated to 
account for 34 percent of this land (Global Witness 2013b). In Vietnam, too, the growth of industrial export 
crops such as coffee, rubber, and cashew is now the principal driver of deforestation; conversion of natural 
forests into monoculture timber plantations is also an important driver (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2011). In 
the Central Highlands, coffee plantations accounted for the conversion of 500,000 ha between 1990 and 2000, 
and 79 percent of new rubber plantations from 2007 to 2012, were converted from natural forestland (To and 
Tran 2014). In Myanmar, agro-conversion is considered to be the major cause of deforestation (Conservation 
International, undated), and this is increasingly driven by large-scale, export-oriented agribusiness. Notably, 
there has been a recent surge in foreign interest in agricultural investments; as of July 2013, Forest Trends 
TABLE 16
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Columbia
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
75% In Colombia, 75% of deforestation is due to expansion of the agricultural frontier; more 
than a third of forest cleared between 2000 and 2005 was converted to cattle pasture alone 
(Government of Colombia 2011).
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–42.3%–84.5% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Brazil & Bolivia; high-
end assumes it is equal to their average.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
20% Assume 70% of illegal agro-deforestation is for beef (based on proportions of overall agro-
deforestation during 2000-2010 attributed to cattle (Nepstad et al. 2013, Table 3.4)), with 
an average of 15% exported (USDA FAS reports 2000 to 2013), and the remainder for palm 
oil and sugar, with 30% exported (rough average between 25% of palm oil exported and 
37% of sugar; proportions calculated from production and export data ( FAOSTAT 2013)). So 
the overall figure is (70% x 15%) + (30% x 30%) = 20%.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Leather
% of area of cattle 
in 2012 which 
displaced forest
0%–48%–79% Mid-point is average of those countries from the same region (Brazil and Argentina) for 
which point estimates were possible. High-end is the highest estimated figure for a country 
from the same region.
% of cattle deforestation 
up to 2012 which 
was illegal
0%–42.3%–84.5% See justification in deforestation analysis, above.
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reported that leases covering 1.4 Mha had been issued since March 2012 (Woods 2013).64 The main hotspots for 
new agricultural plantation developments are also two of the most heavily forested parts of the country: Kachin 
State (a target for biofuel crop and rubber plantations) and Tanintharyi Region (mostly palm oil and rubber 
investments) (ibid.). The conversion of forest to agriculture is also considered the major cause of deforestation 
in Thailand (Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation 2013), though there has been little 
detailed analysis of the extent to which this is due to large-scale commercial agriculture or associated with 
exports.
4.7.2 Illegalities in Conversion
The principal relevant illegality documented in the Mekong Basin has been the illegal issuance of licenses to 
convert forests for large-scale industrial timber and other plantations, though there have also been many 
documented cases of breaches of regulations during plantation development, especially the commencement 
of clearance without required Social and Environmental Impact Assessments (SEIAs).
The available evidence—including UN reports and government statements, as well as press and NGO reports—
demonstrates that most, if not all, of the deforestation taking place in Cambodia under the controversial 
Economic Land Concessions (ELCs) is illegal in some way. Though the regulatory framework is confusing 
and conflicting, existing laws make clear that areas of intact forest are not permitted to be converted, yet 
the government has issued ELCs covering 2.6 Mha (Global Witness 2013b), including most of the country’s 
remaining forest estate. Numerous laws and regulations are alleged to have been breached in the issuance of 
these concessions. 
Many concessions have even been issued that encompass national parks and wildlife sanctuaries, including 
70 percent of the concessions given out during 2012 (ibid.). Many ELCs cover a total area far in excess of the 
maximum 10,000 ha per company defined in regulations. Comparing the list of ELCs with over 10,000 ha with 
the overall area allocated to ELCs suggests that between 35 and 50 percent of all ELCs allocated are above 
the maximum.65 ELCs have also been issued on officially declared community forest areas, and without legally 
required public consultations (Subedi 2012). Of the 117 concessions listed on a government website in 2012, 
only three were recorded as having conducted the SEIAs required before an ELC is ever allocated, and all of 
these were carried out after the concession was issued (ibid.). The Cambodian Ministry of Environment has 
publicly stated that only about 5 percent of major development projects (including ELCs and others) between 
2004 and 2011 had conducted the required EIAs (Lewis and Narim 2012). 
Illegalities during clearance and development are also common. Many concessionaires have commenced 
activity before the signature of contracts. A number of concessions have blocked paths, roads, and streams 
used by villagers in contravention of regulations, and companies have also been allowed to retain concessions 
despite failing to begin developing them within the maximum permitted period (Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia 2007). Newspaper reports and NGO investigations regularly 
cite instances of companies logging outside their concession boundaries. Companies have also felled protected 
rosewood and resin trees, and there have been violent responses to the many protests by local communities 
against illegal agro-conversion. One of the largest companies involved in developing rubber plantations on ELCs 
in Cambodia has publicly admitted in official filings that some of its projects are illegal (see Case Study 4).
64	 Figure	in	acres	converted	to	hectares.
65	 List	of	ELCs	issued	to	companies	in	excess	of	10,000ha	limit	provided	by	Licardho,	December	2011.	Forest	Trends,	unpublished.
69
4. EVIDENCE OF ILLEGAL CONVERSION OF TROPICAL FORESTS FOR EXPORT-DRIVEN AGRICULTURE
An investigation by the Global Witness, published in May 2013 (Global Witness 2013b), provides evidence 
of a range of illegalities relating to ELCs issued to the Vietnamese company Hoang Anh Gai Lai (HAGL) 
in Cambodia. The report notes that the company has been issued with ELCs covering almost 50,000 
ha, five times the maximum allowed under Cambodian law to be issued to one company. In addition, 
official documents show that 28,000 ha of these concessions were issued for areas of forest inside a 
Wildlife Sanctuary and National Park, in contravention of legislation. Global Witness was also unable 
to find any evidence of the company having conducted Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) for 
any of its ELCs, as required. It also found that the company had illegally cleared intact forest (in breach 
of its concession contract), and harvested rosewood and other protected timber species. The company 
had also “overlooked legal requirements for consultations with local people” affected by its concessions. 
Incredibly, the company admitted to operating illegally in an official public filing relating to a market 
listing. Its submission stated that “certain of our existing projects are being developed without necessary 
government approvals [sic]” and that “operation of certain projects are not fully in compliance with 
applicable laws and regulations.” Villagers protesting the activities of the company on their land had been 
fired on with live rounds by military police, according to eyewitnesses. HAGL denied the Global Witness 
allegations and claimed that the public admission of illegality was due to a translation error.
In June 2013, shortly after the Global Witness report was published, HAGL committed to implement a four-
month freeze on all clearing and planting on its concessions, and to discuss with and address the issues 
faced by local people. However, subsequent investigations in July and August 2013 by Global Witness 
showed that HAGL had failed to abide by its promises (Global Witness 2013c). In April 2014 HAGL again 
declared that it had suspended forest clearing at three of its seven rubber plantations in Cambodia, this 
time following a request from the IFC (Peter and Pheap 2014). The IFC, which has been helping fund the 
developments, took action in response to a formal complaint filed by local communities alleging that HAGL 
had breached IFC lending safeguards, including (among other things) by breaking Cambodian laws. IFC has 
since begun a dispute resolution process between the company and the local community (Compliance 
Advisor Ombudsman 2014).
CASE STUDY 4
Hoang Anh Gai Lai (HAGL) Rubber Plantation, Cambodia
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Neighboring Laos has also seen a vast area of forested land licensed for agricultural plantations in recent years, 
and these leases have also allegedly involved numerous breaches of regulations. At least 1.1 Mha have been 
licensed, with rubber plantations estimated to account for around one-third of this area. Local laws state that 
only degraded forests may be allocated, yet many plantation licenses have been issued for areas of intact forest. 
As in Cambodia, some concessions have even been issued that overlap with National Parks. Most concessions 
have been issued in contravention of a 2007 ban on individual concessions greater than 100 ha. Meanwhile, 
regulations requiring prior consultations with affected communities and actions to minimize environmental risk 
are also being ignored (Global Witness 2013b).
Many of the companies involved in developing new rubber plantations of dubious legality in Cambodia and 
Laos are registered in Vietnam, where illegalities in rubber plantation development are also reported to be 
common. To and Tran (2014) documented many instances of abuse and concluded that “conversion of forest to 
rubber plantations takes place on a massive scale with little control or even without control at all.” There is little 
information available related to illegalities in the conversion of forests elsewhere in the Mekong Basin, though 
there are known to be substantial problems with broader forest governance. In Myanmar, for instance, a recent 
study found that 72 percent of log exports between 2000 and 2013 had been illegal (EIA 2014).
TABLE 17
Deforestation Analysis—Cambodia
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
40%–80% The "main" driver of deforestation is large-scale agricultural plantations under controversial 
ELCs (Government of Cambodia 2011). For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that a 
single "main" driver represents 40%-80% of the total.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
90% Of 117 concessions listed on a government website in 2012, only three were recorded 
as having had impact assessments completed, and all of these were carried out after the 
concession was issued (Subedi 2012).
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
0%–72%–100% Mid-point is the average of the ten other countries for which specific estimates were 
produced. High-end is 150% of that figure.
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4.7.4 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 18
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Laos
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
73% For 2012 to 2020, approximately 51% of deforestation is projected to be driven by large 
concessions (including timber and rubber) and a further 22% by smallholder cash crop 
production (Lao PDR Department of Forestry 2010). This study assumes that these projections 
reflect trends from the previous 12 years.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–43.4%–86.7% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Indonesia, Cambodia 
and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
0%–72%–100% Mid-point is the average of the ten other countries for which specific estimates were 
produced. High-end is 150% of that figure.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Tropical Timber
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
0%–55%–75% Mid-point is based on the average of five equivalent countries in the region for which point 
estimates exist; high point is calculated as 150% of the mid-point.
% of forest clearance 
illegal
0%–43.4%–86.7% See justification in deforestation analysis, above.
    Deforestation for a rubber plantation in Laos © Rhett A. Butler / mongabay.com
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TABLE 19
Deforestation and Commodity Analysis—Myanmar
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
33% There are no published quantifications, but agro-conversion is considered to be one of three 
main drivers of deforestation (Conservation International, Myanmar Deforestation guide, 
undated), while it is also estimated that as much as half of all commercial timber production 
may be coming from such conversion (Woods and Canby 2011). For the purposes of this study, 
it is assumed (following Hosonuma et al. 2012) that each main driver represents one-third of 
total deforestation.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–43.4%–86.7% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Indonesia, Cambodia 
and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
10% Most agro-conversion areas are not yet planted or not yet mature, but UN COMTRADE 
data suggest that exports are estimated to be a maximum of 10% of total illegal agro-
deforestation.
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
Tropical Timber
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
50% It has been estimated that as much as half of all commercial timber production may be 
coming from such conversion (Woods and Canby 2011).
% of forest clearance 
illegal
0%–43.4%–86.7% See justification in deforestation analysis, above. For tropical timber, the mid-point estimate 
is further supported by the poor general governance situation within the country, the fact 
that most forest land conversion for commercial agriculture is taking place in areas of ethnic 
conflict (Woods 2013), and recent evidence of widespread corruption and criminality in the 
logging sector, with 72% of log exports during 2000 to 2013 likely illegal (EIA 2014).
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4.8 West Africa
4.8.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
Cocoa production has been a primary driver of deforestation in West Africa, where nearly all production is destined 
for export (Brack 2013). In Ghana, for example, cocoa has been the major driver of land use change in the country’s 
high forest zone for over a century, and new full-sun varieties have accelerated the pace of deforestation. In 
total, agriculture is estimated to be responsible for half of all deforestation (Forestry Commission Ghana 2010). In 
neighboring Côte d’Ivoire (the world’s largest cocoa producer), agricultural expansion, especially for cash crops of 
cocoa, rubber, and palm oil, is acknowledged by the government to be the most important driver of deforestation 
(MINESUDD 2013). Agricultural expansion (including pasture) is the dominant driver of deforestation in Nigeria, 
though most is for subsistence needs (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2014).
There is no official data on the proportion of tropical timber production and exports from Ghana or Côte d’Ivoire 
(the two significant regional exporters) that originate from forest conversion as opposed to selective harvesting. 
Ghana has published data on the number of “salvage permits” that were issued in 2012, however. Assuming 
an average of 2 m3 of timber per tree, these permits may have produced 76,000 m3 of timber during that year, 
compared with total wood demand of 4 million m3 (in 2006, the last year for which data are available) and 
Ghana’s total round wood equivalent exports of 0.5 million m3 in 2012. This suggests that conversion timber 
represents a relatively small proportion of total production and exports (less than 2 percent). In Côte d’Ivoire, 
the majority of recent exports have been of rosewood. Such high-value species are normally removed from 
accessible natural forests selectively well in advance of forest clearance. It is therefore likely that the current 
proportion of total exports originating from conversion is very low, a conclusion supported by earlier findings.66
66	 ITTO	2005,	p.	87	states	that	90%	of	production	as	of	2005	was	selective	“high-grading”	of	forests	in	the	domaine rural.
TABLE 20
Deforestation Analysis—Vietnam
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
40%–80% Industrial export crops such as coffee, rubber, and cashew are the "principal" drivers of 
deforestation, another important driver is monoculture timber plantations (Socialist Republic 
of Vietnam 2011). For the purposes of this study, it is assumed that a "principal" driver 
represents 40%-80% of the total.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–43.4%–86.7% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Indonesia, Cambodia, 
and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural deforestation 
2000 to 2012 embodied 
in exports
90% The two most important commercial crops driving deforestation are rubber and coffee 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2011). Ninety percent of natural rubber production is 
exported (Vietrade 2011); ninety-four percent of coffee is exported (IPSOS 2013).
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4.8.2 Illegalities in Conversion
Weak law enforcement and civil strife have led to widespread illegal conversion of protected forests for 
production of cocoa and coffee in Côte d’Ivoire during the last 15 years. In some cases, corrupt officials have 
been directly involved in this process (IRIN News 2013). There is also a long history of widespread illegality in 
the conversion of forest reserve areas for cocoa production in Ghana, the region’s second largest primary cocoa 
producer (England 1993). 
Breaches of regulations have also been commonly documented in other countries in the region. In recent 
years, examples have emerged of illegalities relating to development of oil palm plantations. Three large oil 
palm companies have in recent years obtained rights to 830,000 ha of land in Liberia for the development 
of plantations. Though each company has only cleared and planted a relatively small area so far, evidence or 
allegations of illegalities have already come to light for all three plantations. Malaysian palm oil giant Sime 
Darby was fined $50,000 by the Liberian Environmental Protection Agency in 2011 for breaching the terms and 
conditions of its Environmental Permit during plantation development (AllAfrica 2011). A formal complaint was 
filed with the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in October 2013 against Equatorial Palm Oil, claiming 
that the company had cleared and planted on customary land in contravention of national legislation (RSPO 
2014b). An independent assessment of the operations of the third and largest company, Golden Veroleum, 
published in March 2013, found that in multiple places the company had breached the terms of its Environmental 
Permit by converting forests along riverbanks (TFT 2013). Serious conflicts with local communities have arisen 
in all three companies’ concessions.
In Nigeria, a local NGO has claimed that portions of the land granted for development of the largest new 
oil palm plantation overlap with Cross River National Park and the Ekinta Forest Reserve, and that Nigerian 
legislation was breached in the issuance of rights over these areas, because they were never formally de-
gazetted as required (Rainforest Resource & Development Centre 2013). 
4.8.3 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 21
Commodity Analysis—Ghana
Factor Estimate Justification
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
TROPICAL TIMBER
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
0%–2% Salvage permits were issued for a total of 38,000 trees in Ghana in 2012 (Global Witness 
2013d); assuming an average of 2 m3 per tree, this would represent 76,000 m3 of timber 
volume, compared with Ghana's total round wood equivalent exports of 0.5 million m3 and 
domestic demand of 4 million m3 (in 2006). This suggests conversion timber represents only a 
very small proportion of exports (less than 2%).
% of forest 
clearance illegal
0%–42.9%–85.8% Mid-point assumes 50% of the measured average of Brazil, Bolivia, Indonesia, Cambodia, 
and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average. Mid-point is supported by previous 
studies that have estimated that 59-65% of all timber production in Ghana is illegal 
(Lawson and MacFaul 2010).
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4.9 East Africa
4.9.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
Though commercial agriculture is a less important cause of deforestation in East Africa than in most other 
tropical regions, it is becoming increasingly important. Industrial forest plantation development is an 
increasingly important driver in some parts of Mozambique, for example, as are both commercial banana and 
cotton plantations. Other commercial cash crops responsible for deforestation include tobacco and sugar cane. 
A study of drivers of deforestation from 2007 to 2010 in one sample area in Manica Province found that the 
largest driver (responsible for 46 percent of deforestation) was large-scale agriculture (Ministry for Coordination 
of Environmental Affairs 2012). Though subsistence agriculture, firewood, and charcoal remain by far the most 
important drivers of deforestation, commercial plantations for biofuel production have been an increasingly 
important threat to Tanzanian forests in recent years (United Republic of Tanzania 2010).
The Land Matrix database lists 179 contracted, ongoing, or concluded large-scale land deals for commercial 
agriculture or forestry plantations in East Africa, with an aggregated current area under contract of 4 Mha (The 
Land Matrix 2014). Southeast Asia is the only region with a greater number of such deals. The most common 
planned crops are eucalyptus, acacia, jatropha, oil palm, and sugarcane.67 Very little is known about most of 
these investments, and there is therefore no information on the proportion that may involve conversion of 
natural forest, or the proportion that is intended to be primarily export-oriented. Many of the developments 
are for the production of feedstocks for biofuel, however, for which the main driver is overseas demand. And 
of the handful of cases that have been investigated in depth, a number have involved conversion of woodlands.
67	 Only	includes	concluded	agreements	which	have	not	since	been	cancelled	or	abandoned.
TABLE 22
Commodity Analysis—Côte d’Ivoire
Factor Estimate Justification
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
TROPICAL TIMBER
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
4% Average of mid-points of other regional countries (Cameroon, Gabon, Republic of Congo, 
Ghana) for which estimates were produced.
% of forest 
clearance illegal
0%–42.9%–85.8% Mid-point assumes 50% of the measured average of Brazil, Bolivia, Indonesia, Cambodia, 
and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average.
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4.9.2 Illegalities in Conversion
Though there are no systematic studies or data, case studies from Uganda and Tanzania suggest that the kinds 
of illegalities seen in other regions are being replicated during large-scale land conversion for agricultural and 
timber plantations in East Africa.
In Uganda, the country’s first commercial oil palm plantation project has been mired in controversy. The 
development, a 40,000 ha joint venture involving (among others) the Ugandan government and international 
oil palm giant Wilmar, is located on the Kalangala islands in Lake Victoria. Around 7,500 ha have been planted 
so far. The development, which was estimated to have destroyed 3,600 ha of forest by May 2013 and is also 
converting small farmers’ land, has been accused of violating numerous local laws. The compulsory purchases 
of land for the project are alleged to be in breach of the Ugandan Constitution and the Land Acquisition Act. 
The clearance and planting that has taken place so far is also alleged to have violated environmental buffers 
and the deforestation is alleged to have caused pollution of water sources. The expansion of the project is 
also reportedly proceeding without the required EIA. Though the palm oil from the plantation development 
was originally slated for local use, when it is complete the project is expected to produce double the current 
consumption when it is complete, suggesting that a large proportion will actually be destined for export 
(FoE International 2013). It is not yet clear what implications Wilmar’s “zero deforestation” policy, issued in 
December 2013 (Wilmar 2013), will have for the completion of the project.
There have also been many controversial “land-grabs” in recent years for the planting of biofuel feed stocks 
in East Africa. In Tanzania, for example, during the global bio-fuels boom of 2005 to 2008, more than 200,000 
ha of land was leased to foreign companies for the planting of biofuel feed crops such as sugarcane and 
jatropha. Many of the projects are located within the East African Coastal Forests, an eco-region regarded 
as a globally important conservation priority (WWF Tanzania 2009). The Tanzanian government has admitted 
that these industrial plantations have become an increasingly important driver of deforestation in the country 
(United Republic of Tanzania 2010). Some of these projects have involved the conversion of natural forests in 
questionable legal circumstances (see Case Study 5).
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One of the largest planned agricultural plantation projects in Tanzania in recent years was a 34,000 to 
80,000 ha jatropha plantation to be developed by Dutch company Bioshape in an area of East African 
Coastal Forest near the town of Kilwa on the coast of southern Tanzania. In 2009, the NGO Resource 
Extraction Monitoring (REM) worked with the Tanzanian authorities to examine the legality of the 
development. By that time, Bioshape had cleared and planted a 70 ha “trial plot.” Government officials 
confirmed to REM that Bioshape had cleared the area before all required procedures had been completed 
and payments made. Local officials also told REM that Bioshape were already cutting timber outside the 
trial plot, which central government officials claimed was illegal because the full forest inventory for the 
plantation had not yet been produced. In its official report, REM also highlighted concerns raised by NGOs 
regarding the legality of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the project. Two of the three 
persons listed as authors on the EIA did not in fact contribute text, see a copy prior to publication, or 
agree to be listed as authors. The inclusion of these well-respected scientists’ names on the report may 
have influenced the decision to allow the project to go ahead. REM noted that Tanzanian law makes it 
an offense to misrepresent the authorship of EIAs. REM noted that Bioshape had the largest and busiest 
sawmill in Southern Tanzania at the time and calculated that, if the entire plantation area was developed, 
the company was likely to become the largest logging company in the country (REM/HTSPE 2009).
Allegations were also made that regulations had been breached in the manner in which the rights to 
the land were obtained from local villagers by the local government and handed over to the company. 
Though villagers signed relevant documentation, later research showed that they did not fully understand 
the implications of what was being signed. One villager claimed that when they eventually obtained a 
copy of the agreement they had signed, they found some of the key terms did not match what had been 
agreed (Oxfam 2013).
As with many other biofuel projects of the period, the Bioshape plantation never came to fruition. After 
its energy-company backers pulled out, Bioshape went bankrupt in June 2010 (Massay 2012). The villages 
affected remain barred from the land, yet never saw the benefits they were promised. With help from 
NGOs, they have brought formal complaints to the local and national authorities, demanding that the lease 
is cancelled and their land returned (Oxfam 2013).
CASE STUDY 5
Bioshape Jatropha Plantation, Tanzania
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4.9.4 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 23
Deforestation Analysis—Mozambique
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
0%–35%–53% Mid-point is average for Africa from Hosonuma et al. 2012; high-end is 150% of that average.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–42.9%–85.8% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Brazil, Bolivia, 
Indonesia, Cambodia, and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural 
deforestation 2000 to 
2012 embodied 
in exports
0%–51%–77% Mid-point is average of the ten other countries for which specific estimates were produced. 
High-end is 150% of that figure.
     Bioshape Jatropha Plantation, Kilwa, Tanzania © Resource Extraction Monitoring
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4.10 The Congo Basin
4.10.1 Forest Conversion for Commercial Agriculture and Associated Exports
Commercial Agriculture as a Driver of Deforestation
The Congo Basin has a much lower rate of deforestation than the Amazon Basin or the tropical forests of 
Southeast Asia.68 This is mainly due to the fact that large-scale industrial agricultural development has been 
much more limited to date in this region than elsewhere in the tropics. However, the last few years have 
seen the beginning of a boom in industrial oil palm development, and this threatens to dramatically increase 
deforestation rates. Three large new oil palm plantation developments have recently broken ground in Cameroon, 
Gabon and the Republic of Congo; all are converting natural forest (Rainforest Foundation UK 2013a). If they are 
developed to their full extent over the planned timescale, these three projects alone are projected to increase 
the deforestation rate in each country by between 12 and 140 percent (see Figure 13) (Rainforest Foundation 
UK 2013b). Many other large oil palm developments in the Congo Basin have been announced or are in the 
pipeline, especially in Cameroon. A number of large new rubber plantations are also now being developed in 
forested areas. As a result of these new developments, in 2013, industrial agro-conversion may already have 
become the largest driver of deforestation in the Congo Basin. 
68	 Recently	released	data	show	that	Latin	America	lost	4.3	percent	of	its	tropical	rainforests	between	2000	and	2012,	while	Asia	
lost	11	percent.	During	the	same	period,	Africa	lost	just	2.8	percent	(see	Hansen	et	al.	2013;	supporting	material,	Table	S2).
TABLE 24
Deforestation Analysis—Tanzania
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
0%–35%–53% Mid-point is average for Africa from Hosonuma et al. 2012; high-end is 150% of that average.
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–42.9%–85.8% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Brazil, Bolivia, 
Indonesia, Cambodia, and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural 
deforestation 2000 to 
2012 embodied 
in exports
0%–51%–77% Mid-point is average of the ten other countries for which specific estimates were produced. 
High-end is 150% of that figure.
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Conversion Timber Production
Until very recently, little to no conversion timber was produced in the Congo Basin. However, the proportion of 
tropical timber production originating from conversion is set to rise dramatically in the next few years as a result 
of large new oil palm developments. 
In Cameroon, clear-felling began in 2012 at the Herakles oil palm plantation (see Case Study 6). Twenty thousand 
hectares of tropical forest are due to be felled at the project site over a period of just four years (Rainforest 
Foundation UK 2013a); assuming a return of around 90 m3/ha of saleable timber from this logged but still dense 
forest, this would imply a possible total production of 1.8 million m3, compared with annual selective harvesting 
of under 2 million m3 in the rest of the country. If this timber was produced over a four year period, then this 
one project alone could result in the proportion of Cameroonian production from conversion rising from zero 
to almost 20 percent. A number of other large oil palm projects are under negotiation in Cameroon (ibid.), and 
if these come to fruition then the amount of conversion timber production could soar even further.
69	 Recent	average	annual	deforestation	calculated	from	figures	for	total	deforestation	in	each	country	2000	to	2012,	measured	
by	Hansen	et	al.	2013.	Projected	annual	deforestation	assumes	baseline	average	 from	2000	to	2012,	plus	projected	annual	
deforestation	from	the	specified	oil	palm	development.	The	projected	annual	deforestation	for	each	oil	palm	development	is	
the	total	area	of	planned	planting	(Rainforest	Foundation	UK	2013a;	Herakles	corrected	to	reflect	reduction	in	license	area	(see	
Section	2.6)),	divided	by	the	period	over	which	the	company	concerned	is	expected	to	complete	development.	Herakles	has	
stated	its	intention	to	complete	its	development	in	Cameroon	over	a	period	of	four	years,	while	Olam	has	stated	it	expects	to	
clear	and	plant	its	plantation	in	Gabon	over	six	years	(Rainforest	Foundation	UK	2013a).	It	is	assumed	that	Atama	will	be	aiming	
for	a	similar	rate	of	development	(six	years)	for	its	plantation	in	Republic	of	Congo.
FIGURE 13
Estimated Impact of Three New Oil Palm Plantations (already broken ground) on Annual 
Deforestation in the Congo Basin, from 201575
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In Gabon, international agro-commodity giant Olam also broke ground on a 300,000 ha oil palm and rubber 
development in 2012. In the first phase of the project, Olam is planning to plant 50,000 ha of oil palm over a 
period of four to five years (Olam 2013), plus 28,000 ha of rubber over six years (Olam 2012). Though Olam 
has committed to not convert high conservation value (HCV) forests, the areas chosen for development so 
far are almost entirely forested and, though not classified as HCV, nevertheless contain significant timber and 
carbon value (Rainforest Foundation UK 2013a). Olam cleared and planted around 3,000 ha for oil palm in 
2012;70 at an estimated rate of 45-90 m3/ha of saleable timber, this may have yielded 130,000-260,000 m3 of 
logs, representing 6 to 13 percent of total national production in the formal sector of 1.7 million m3 that year.71 
If clearance and planting accelerates to planned target rates, Olam could be producing as much as 0.75-1.5 
million m3 of logs per year in 2014 and 2015.72
In Republic of Congo, clearance also began in 2012 on a 180,000 ha oil palm plantation being developed in 
an area of pristine primary forest. When an official inspection team visited the first area of conversion in 
October 2012, it found the company had cleared around 120 ha and produced more than 15,000 m3 of logs 
(125 m3/ha) (DDEFS 2012). At that rate, the plantation could produce a total of more than 22 million m3 of 
tropical conversion timber—almost 15 times the country’s current annual harvest from selective logging. If 
the concession is developed on as rapid a time frame as those in Gabon and Cameroon, three-quarters of the 
country’s tropical timber production could soon be coming from conversion, as a result of just this one project. 
Recent maps of Republic of Congo from the World Resources Institute’s Global Forest Watch show additional 
new oil palm plantation licenses in forest areas, which if realized will increase conversion timber production 
even further.
70	 Olam	recorded	planting	1,370	ha	from	July	2011	to	June	2012,	and	a	further	4,448	ha	from	July	2012	to	June	2013.	Assuming	an	
even	rate	of	planting,	this	suggests	a	total	planting	of	2,909	ha	during	calendar	year	(drawn	from	data	in	Olam’s	2012	and	2013	
annual	reports,	available	at	http://olamgroup.com/investor-relations/financial-information/annual-reports).	
71	 	DGEF	data	on	OFAC	database,	accessed	July	11,	2014.
72	 	Combined	planned	planting	rates	for	oil	palm	and	rubber	are	17,166	ha/year	(50,000	ha/4	years	+	28,000	ha/6	years).	Multiplying	
by	45-90	m3	of	timber	per	hectare	gives	772,470	m3—1,544,940	m3.
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Exports
Nearly all of the industrial tropical timber production in the Congo Basin is destined for export, and the same is 
likely to be true of conversion timber produced from large-scale land conversion for agriculture (de Wasseige et 
al. 2010). None of the large new oil palm developments in the region have yet begun production, so it is unclear 
what proportion may be destined for export. One of the largest developments has stated that it expects most 
production to be exported to the EU, however (Rainforest Foundation UK 2013a).
4.10.2 Illegalities in Conversion
Though large-scale agro-conversion in the Congo Basin has barely begun, there are already numerous 
documented illegalities involving both licensing and operations. Of the three large oil palm plantations that 
have started operations so far in the Congo Basin, two have been found by government inspections to be 
clearing illegally. This is despite the fact that neither plantation has yet cleared more than a small portion of the 
forest that they plan to convert.
In Cameroon, the largest project, the Herakles oil palm plantation in the southwest, has been “dogged by 
allegations of illegality from the very start” (ibid.). Local courts, forest department inspectors and an 
independent observer have all documented breaches of regulations, while NGOs also claim that the license 
itself was illegally issued (see Case Study 6). Once the Herakles plantation is fully developed and productive, 
it will nearly double Cameroon’s palm oil production,73 and thus almost half of Cameroon’s production will be 
associated with alleged illegalities related to the project.
73	 Estimate	by	the	author.	FAO	data	show	Cameroon	produced	around	100,000	metric	tons	(mt)	of	palm	oil	in	2010.	The	Herakles	
project	(as	revised)	covers	20,000	ha,	which	at	a	typical	palm	oil	yield	of	3.5	mt/ha	could	produce	70,000	mt	each	year.
FIGURE 14
Projected Growth in the Proportion of Tropical Timber Production in Republic of Congo, 
Gabon, and Cameroon Originating from Forest Conversion, 2011 to 2014
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The largest forest conversion project in the Congo Basin is the oil palm concession issued to Malaysian company 
Atama Plantation in the Republic of Congo. The agreement covers an area of 470,000 ha, of which at least 
180,000 ha is expected to be planted. The area is almost entirely made up of primary rainforest, home to 
numerous endangered species, including chimpanzees, gorillas, and forest elephants (ibid.).
In October 2012, an inspection by the provincial forestry office of forest clearance in the first 5,000 ha zone 
of the concession uncovered numerous breaches of regulations. More than 350 trees had been cut but not 
recorded in official felling reports. Records had been illegally altered, and there was evidence that illegal logs 
are possibly being laundered into supply chains by repeated use of the same log numbers. The inspection team 
concluded that Atama was in breach of its forest clearance license and issued an official infraction notice (DDEFS 
2012). Two months later, a joint investigation by the forest service and the official Independent Observer of 
Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (OI-FLEG) uncovered further illegalities. The Observer found that 
Atama had illegally cleared forests for roads for a distance of more than 2 km outside the boundaries of the 
licensed area, and had also sub-contracted a company to carry out timber harvesting that did not have the 
proper registration. The Observer could also find no evidence of any Environmental Impact Assessment having 
been completed for the Atama oil palm plantation project, as required by law. The Observer recommended that 
the operations should be suspended and that the government should prosecute the company for breach of its 
license (ibid.).
Though it will be some years before Atama’s plantation reaches maturity and begins production and export of 
palm oil, it will represent almost 100 percent of the country’s exports. All of those exports will be from land 
cleared illegally of natural forest. Long before that, the project will result in a large percentage of log exports 
from the Republic of Congo being associated with illegal agro-conversion (see Section 1.3.2). 
No large new agro-conversion projects have yet broken ground in the Democratic Republic of Congo. However, 
questions have already been raised regarding the issuance of one new oil palm concession in Bas-Congo 
province, which has yet to begin operations. A study by the Forest Peoples Programme of the 10,000 ha 
concession contract issued to Congo Oil & Derivatives SARL in Muanda territory concluded that “it is in blatant 
violation of the Forest Code.” Among other things, the concession is located within two Forest Reserves, which 
are only supposed to be used for non-commercial purposes; it was issued for 40 years, while the law only allows 
for terms of 25 years; there is no management plan or agreement with local communities; and the researchers 
could also find no evidence of any EIA having been conducted (Forest Peoples Programme 2013).
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In 2009, the Cameroonian government issued a lease for an oil palm plantation covering 73,000 ha in 
the southwest of the country. The lease was issued to Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC), now owned 
by US company Herakles Farms. Almost the entire site is forested, and it is surrounded by a number of 
important protected areas, including globally significant Korup National Park. Surveys have confirmed 
that the area is home to populations of chimpanzees and forest elephants, among many other threatened 
species (Waltert 2013). Herakles plans to plant 60,000 ha of oil palm over a period of four years, and broke 
ground in 2011. Evidence of a whole range of breaches of regulations in the licensing and operation of the 
Herakles plantation has come to light in the years since. 
In February 2012, a local court found that the company began clear-felling forest before receiving its 
environmental permit. A forestry department inspection in April 2012 found that the company had 
breached regulations, and this was confirmed in a follow-up visit alongside the official Independent 
Observer of Forest Law Enforcement and Governance in May 2012, which found that the company 
had cleared forest which had not yet been excised from the Permanent Forest Estate, and resulted in 
the issuance of a “notification primitive” to pay $48,000 in fines and damages. In addition, local non-
governmental organization Centre pour l’Environnement et le Développement (CED) claims that the 
lease agreement itself is in breach of the law, since it did not obtain the required Presidential approval 
and exceeds the maximum of five years allowed (Rainforest Foundation UK 2013a). Herakles operations 
were briefly suspended by the Cameroonian government in May 2013, yet Greenpeace has documented 
log markings which suggest that operations continued illegally during the suspension (Greenpeace 
2013e). Greenpeace also claims to have evidence which suggests that Herakles’ employees may have 
used bribery to win support for its project (Greenpeace/Oakland Institute 2013a). In November 2013, the 
Cameroonian government issued a provisional land lease to Herakles for a reduced area of 20,000 ha; 
NGOs alleged that this confirmed that the plantation had previously been operating without all necessary 
permits (Greenpeace/Oakland Institute 2013b). In January 2014, Cameroon’s Minister of Forests issued a 
logging permit to a company called Uniprovince (controlled by Herakles via SGSOC) for 2,500 ha of land 
within the Herakles concession. 
Greenpeace has alleged that the issuance of the permit was in “flagrant violation” of Cameroon’s forestry 
legislation, becuase it was not awarded by competitive public auction as required. During early 2014, 
Uniprovince is alleged to have used this license as a cover to transport large volumes of timber that 
were felled illegally between 2010 and 2013 by SGSOC, prior to the company’s land lease being finalized. 
Greenpeace field investigations showed that these old logs were being “laundered,” with log markings 
being changed. (Greenpeace 2014).
CASE STUDY 6
Herakles Oil Palm Plantation, Cameroon
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4.10.3 Percentages Used in Analysis 
TABLE 25
Deforestation Analysis—Democratic Republic of Congo
Factor Estimate Justification
DEFORESTATION ANALYSIS
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation due to 
commercial agriculture
0% At present only a very small percentage of deforestation in DRC is driven by commercial 
agricultural development. A synthesis of a series of quantitative and qualitative studies 
published in 2012 found that subsistence agriculture, artisanal timber harvesting, fuelwood 
and charcoal, industrial logging, and mining were the most important drivers (MECNT 2012)
% of 2000 to 2012 
deforestation for 
commercial agriculture 
which was illegal
0%–42.9%–85.8% Mid-point assumes the problem is 50% of the measured average of Brazil, Bolivia, 
Indonesia, Cambodia, and PNG; high-end assumes it is equal to their average.
% of illegal commercial 
agricultural 
deforestation 2000 to 
2012 embodied 
in exports
0% UN COMTRADE shows no significant exports of relevant commodities from Angola.
     Oil Palm Nursery, Herakles Farms Plantation, Cameroon © Alex Yallop / Greenpeace
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TABLE 26
Commodity Analysis—Cameroon
TABLE 27
Commodity Analysis—Gabon
Factor Estimate Justification
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
TROPICAL TIMBER
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
5% Though this is projected to rise in the near future, only a small proportion of Cameroon's 
current tropical timber exports are assumed to originate from forest conversion, based on the 
estimated clearance and timber production at the Herakles oil palm plantation in 2012
% of forest 
clearance illegal
90%–100% The only oil palm development currently known to be converting forest in Cameroon is 
the Herakles plantation. It is alleged that all of the timber produced by this project is of 
questionable legality, since there are overarching legal issues with the license. Official 
government and independent monitor inspections have confirmed illegalities in the 
conversion of forest for the oil palm plantation and subsequent timber production (see Case 
Study 6).
Factor Estimate Justification
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
TROPICAL TIMBER
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
6%–13% 
(mid-point 10%)
Gabon's formal logging sector produced a total of 1.7 million m3 of logs in 2012 (OFAC 
2014). Olam, which is developing a large new oil palm plantation in forested land in Gabon 
(Rainforest Foundation 2013), cleared and planted a total of 4,448 ha in the year to June 
2013 (Olam 2013), and a further 1,370 ha the previous year (Olam 2012). This suggests a 
possible planting of 2,909 ha during 2012. Based on a conservative estimate of 45-90 m3 
of salvageable commercial timber per hectare, this rate of clearance could potentially have 
produced 130,000-260,000 m3 from that area, representing between 6% and 13% of total 
national log production.
% of forest 
clearance illegal
0% All of the conversion timber production and exports estimated in this analysis originate from 
the Olam oil palm plantation development. There is no evidence of illegalities in relation to 
this development, and thus it is assumed that all such production is legal.
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TABLE 28
Commodity Analysis—Republic of Congo
Factor Estimate Justification
COMMODITY ANALYSIS
TROPICAL TIMBER
% of primary 
tropical timber 
product production 
from conversion for 
commercial agriculture / 
timber plantations
2% The only major known source of conversion timber for export is the Atama oil palm plantation. 
Up to October 2012 it had produced 15,000 m3 of logs (DDEFS 2012); assuming the rate of 
production continued at the same rate for the rest of the year would suggest an annual total of 
20,000 m3. This represents approximately 2% of total roundwood equivalent exports in 2012.
% of forest 
clearance illegal
80%–100% The only major known source of conversion timber for export is the Atama oil palm 
plantation. This has been found to be operating illegally by the official independent monitor 
of forest governance (REM/CAGDF 2013; see text).
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The scale of illegality in the conversion of tropical forests for commercial agriculture and associated exports 
including conversion timber has important implications for global efforts to reduce deforestation and 
carbon emissions. At present, however, the scale of the problem is not sufficiently well understood or even 
acknowledged, and the implications rarely taken on board in relevant national and international initiatives. 
The following discussion examines the implications of this study’s findings for existing initiatives designed to 
address the broader problem of tropical deforestation, and identifies actions that producer countries, consumer 
countries, and companies involved in relevant commodity product chains might take to tackle the problem of 
illegal agro-conversion and associated trade.
5.1 How Should Illegality Be Addressed?
Faced with the scale, breadth, and diversity of the illegalities documented in this report, and the weak governance 
underlying them, it would be easy to despair of ever tackling these issues and to focus on other actions to 
address deforestation. This would be a mistake, both because it is unlikely that those other actions will work 
in isolation, and because these problems are not insurmountable. For producer countries, the key actions will 
depend on the particular circumstances. Important lessons can however be learned from the successful efforts 
in Brazil (see Section 4.1). For all of these actors, there are important lessons to be learned from efforts to tackle 
trade in illegally sourced wood. There are especially important lessons for efforts under the banner of REDD+, 
which must pay less attention to measuring carbon and building incentive structures, and more to investing in 
policies and reforms designed to improve governance (Karsenty and Ongolo 2012).
It is important to bear in mind that this report does not argue that all of the current or past illegal deforestation 
could or should be detected, prosecuted or reversed. Neither could or should all associated trade in commodities 
“linked to illegal deforestation” necessarily be halted. That said, enforcement and prevention are vital to 
establishing good governance over forest and land use.
Some previous illegal deforestation has already been forgiven by relevant legal reforms; other such deforestation 
may have taken place too long ago to be readily detected or the relevant statute of limitations for prosecution 
may have expired. However, this does not mean that efforts should only relate to future illegalities and associated 
trade. It is essential that efforts are made to address past illegalities where possible, and to block markets for the 
associated commodities until such illegalities are addressed. Deciding which past illegalities to accept, which 
to forgive, and which to address, is a matter that should ideally be decided in each affected country through 
a broad multi-stakeholder dialogue, including the private sector, civil society and affected communities. There 
are important lessons to be learned from past efforts to tackle illegal logging and associated trade in how to 
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achieve this. This is one area where the experience in Brazil should not be used as a template (see Section 4.1.3 
regarding recently enacted and wide-ranging amnesty). 
Similarly, how current and future illegalities are dealt with will also vary across and within countries. Some 
illegalities should be of higher priority than others. Not all of them should necessarily be addressed through 
greater enforcement. In some cases, the solution may be to amend the relevant laws. In deciding these matters, 
lessons can be learned from processes under the EU’s bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements, where these 
choices were made through a multi-stakeholder process, and helped identify which laws required amendment 
or clarification. Companies that have made zero deforestation commitments have an important role to play in 
encouraging and assisting in this process. They must also be willing to demand higher standards of legality from 
their suppliers, and exercise greater due diligence, if they believe this is justified. Although the clarification and 
improvement of the regulatory framework is essential, producer countries should not weaken environmental 
and social safeguards in the name of economic development. In many countries, the legal frameworks should 
in fact be strengthened to include statutory recognition of Indigenous Peoples’ and other local communities’ 
customary tenure, in line with international commitments such as the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (UN-DRIP). 
5.2   Challenges Posed by Illegality for Existing  
Strategies to Address Deforestation
5.2.1 Voluntary Efforts by the Private Sector
A number of studies have demonstrated the increasing importance of overseas demand for commodities in 
driving the conversion of tropical forests. For example, an academic study in 2013 sought to assess the extent 
to which the experience of export-driven agro deforestation in Mato Grosso state in Brazil could be expected to 
be replicated in other tropical forest countries. The study concluded that between 41 and 54 percent of tropical 
deforestation outside Brazil between 2000 and 2005 occurred in countries where export-driven agriculture was 
also an important driver. The study found evidence that export-oriented agriculture had grown in importance 
as a driver of tropical deforestation worldwide since the beginning of the 2000s (DeFries et al. 2013).
Cuypers et al. (2013) concluded that around one-quarter of “embodied deforestation” in agricultural products 
produced at the expense of forest between 1990 and 2008 was exported. This is an overall average, however, 
and given that exports of key commodities have grown as a proportion of production,74 the current proportion 
exported is most likely considerably higher. 
On the international demand-side, the main scope of activity to date on reducing tropical agro-conversion has 
been on voluntary efforts by major producers, traders, and consumers of relevant products to reduce tropical 
agro-conversion while trying to meet the growing demand for commodities to feed the world’s burgeoning 
population. These efforts have been generally driven by NGO-led consumer campaigns (Brack 2013) and fall 
under two broad categories. The first is the development of generic global standards, often under the auspices 
of multi-stakeholder roundtables, which allow for the production of different commodities to be independently 
“certified” as legal and sustainable. The second is the adoption and implementation of company-specific 
commitments to zero “embedded” deforestation by producers, traders, or buyers of relevant commodities. 
Though there is normally some element of legality assessment involved, efforts to date have focused more broadly 
74	 For	Brazilian	beef,	for	example,	studies	show	the	proportion	of	embodied	deforestation	exported	grew	between	1990	and	2008	
(see	Karstensen	et	al.	2013).
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on sustainability, defined as avoiding the clearance of High Conservation Value (HCV) or High Carbon Stock (HCS) 
forests, or eliminating deforestation altogether, and often encompass commitments related to land and human 
rights. Many of the companies that have made such commitments are members of the Consumer Goods Forum 
(CGF), a large network of consumer goods manufacturers and retailers, which has sought to drive further change 
through strategic partnerships with governments, civil society, and banks, through initiatives such as the Tropical 
Forest Alliance (see Box 9 for more information on existing private sector initiatives).
These voluntary efforts have made significant progress in recent years, especially in relation to palm oil with 
16 percent of global production now being certified (RSPO 2014) and more than half of the commodity trade 
being controlled by companies that have made zero deforestation pledges (Shankleman 2014). However, issues 
of legality pose a number of major challenges.
Firstly, there are serious concerns over whether these policies and standards can effectively prevent trade 
in products from illegal agro-conversion. There are issues with both the standards themselves and their 
implementation. The legality criteria in these voluntary policies and certification schemes do not capture all of 
the different types of common illegalities documented in this report, such as whether relevant licenses were 
legally issued. Most do not sufficiently address past illegalities. Many voluntary policies and schemes also do 
not include sufficiently well-designed and implemented systems for monitoring compliance with the aspects of 
legality. The weakness of these monitoring systems has been regularly exposed by individual cases by certified 
suppliers uncovered by third parties (Greenpeace 2013f; RSPO 2013a). 
• With regard to beef, the G4 Cattle Agreement in the Brazilian Amazon does not preclude purchases of 
cattle from areas illegally deforested prior to 2009, except where that illegal deforestation has been 
detected by the authorities. Even where detected, purchases are still permitted once fines are paid. 
There is also evidence that one of the largest parties to the agreement has failed to become compliant 
(see Section 4.1.3).
• With regard to palm oil, almost all of the area certified by the RSPO to date is made up of plantations 
that were established long before the certification process was started. RSPO certification rules 
do not require any rigorous assessment of the legality or sustainability of the forest conversion 
that took place in the past. Though more meaningful legality criteria do apply to new plantations 
established by RSPO members, the available evidence calls into question how meaningfully these may 
be applied. A comparison of RSPO data with the collation of published allegations of illegalities in 
oil palm development in Indonesia (see Section 4.2.3) indicates that of the 15 plantations that filed 
“new planting” assessment notifications by RSPO members in 2013, eight were subject to past or 
current allegations of illegality. This includes two plantations in Indonesia previously confirmed by an 
independent study to have cleared forest illegally (Wakker 2009),75 and two more plantations about 
which complaints have been filed with RSPO alleging illegal clearance outside concession boundaries 
(RSPO 2013a).76 The voluntary commitment by Wilmar, the world’s largest palm oil trader (see Box 9), 
encompasses a larger proportion of global trade than the RSPO, but only applies to oil palm plantations 
developed after the policy was implemented in December 2013 (Wilmar 2014)77—it does not require 
any checks on the legality of oil palm plantations supplying Wilmar that were planted prior to that date. 
 
75	 PT	Karya	Makmur	Bahagia	and	PT	Windu	Nabatindo	Lestari.
76	 PT	Teguh	Jayaprima	Abadi	and	PT	Prima	Mitrajaya	Mandiri	(subsidiaries	of	MP	Evans	Group	PLC).
77	 Wilmar,	“Clarification	on	media’s	misreporting	about	Wilmar’s	‘No	Deforestation,	No	Peat	&	No	Exploitation’	policy,”	undated.
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•	 With regard to pulp and paper, the zero deforestation policy of Indonesia’s largest producer, Asia Pulp 
and Paper (APP), also only applies to future activities (APP 2013) and does not address the company’s 
past transgressions, which the evidence suggests are substantial (see Section 4.2.3). Though the 
company claims it will no longer produce pulp made from tropical wood fiber, the plantation-grown 
acacia it now uses instead is grown on land that is likely to have been illegally cleared.
In theory, standards and criteria could be improved, as could monitoring and enforcement. But even if these 
were to occur for every broad initiative and individual policy, the potential of these voluntary efforts would still 
be limited by their voluntary nature which will never encompass all relevant production and trade. Most of them 
currently only capture a small minority of the commodity trade of concern. There will always be companies who 
will not sign up. And there will always be the challenge with new entrants. The largest new oil palm plantation 
in the Congo Basin, for instance, is being developed by a firm with no previous experience in the sector (see 
Section 4.10). So long as some companies are able to continue producing and trading products from illegal 
deforestation, they will be able to undercut the price on their more conscientious competitors, holding back 
both the expansion and improvement of voluntary commitments. One of the many lessons from successful 
previous efforts to tackle illegal and unsustainable timber production (see Box 10) is that voluntary certification 
struggled to achieve critical mass while having to compete on price with products that were illegally sourced.
The final challenge posed by legality for voluntary private sector actions is the weak governance in many 
producer countries. A lack of access to official government documents and unclear, and sometimes conflicting, 
laws and regulations often make it hard for companies and their employees to establish with confidence 
whether a product was produced legally or not. Ultimately, illegalities relating to commercial agriculture and 
timber plantations can only be fully addressed by governments, and voluntary efforts will be held back by having 
to compete with products that were illegally sourced. Recognizing this, companies involved in relevant sectors 
must actively promote and support the actions by both producer and consumer governments recommended 
in Chapter 6 below.
Certification schemes: Several multi-stakeholder roundtables have emerged at the national and 
international level to coordinate efforts to ensure minimum levels of sustainability in the production 
and trade of specific commodities including soy, beef, leather, and palm oil. These roundtables typically 
establish standards and criteria for certifying that production is sustainable and for tracking products 
through supply chains. The standards normally include a requirement for compliance with national laws, 
and also preclude clearance of High Conservation Value (HCV) forests, but many continue to allow for 
legal conversion of other forests. The Roundtable for Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) is the earliest and most 
developed of these commodity-specific roundtables. RSPO certifications for sustainable palm oil now 
encompass 16 percent of the world’s palm oil production (RSPO 2014). Other commodity roundtables have 
made less rapid progress: the Roundtable on Responsible Soy certified 0.5 percent of global production in 
2012 (Brack 2013). The Roundtable on Sustainable Beef is not seeking to establish any certification system. 
Aside from those established by commodity roundtables, a number of other sustainability certification 
systems have been established for relevant commodities (including soy, cocoa, and coffee). All require 
compliance with national laws, though this is not their principal focus.
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Individual company commitments: Many large multinational companies have decided to make their 
own individual commitments to address concerns over deforestation in their supply chains. This includes 
producers, traders, and buyers of relevant commodities (including soy, beef, leather, palm oil, and pulp 
and paper). Some such commitments simply aim to source certain percentages of relevant goods via the 
established certification schemes by certain dates. However, in recent years a number of major companies 
have declared policies that extend beyond the standards set out by relevant certification schemes, and 
normally seek to entirely preclude all deforestation. Among the earliest such commitments were the 
soy moratorium (2006) and the G4 Cattle Agreement (2009) in Brazil (see Section 4.1). More recently, 
a number of the largest producers, traders, and buyers of palm oil and tropical wood pulp have also 
made “zero deforestation” pledges. In addition to the standards typically encompassed by certification 
schemes, these pledges also preclude conversion of High Carbon Stock (HCS) forests and forests on peat 
soils; in some cases they also include stronger human rights requirements. One of the most impactful 
of such commitments came in December 2013, when Wilmar, the world’s largest trader of palm oil, 
announced a zero deforestation policy, which would apply to both its own production and that of its 
third-party suppliers. Coming in the wake of similar commitments by a number of large international palm 
oil buyers (including Nestlé and Unilever) and by Golden Agri Resources (one of the world’s largest palm 
oil producers) during 2010 to 2012, the Wilmar commitment means that more than half of global palm 
oil in trade now falls under such a policy (Shankleman 2014). In 2013, Indonesia’s largest pulp plantation 
developer, Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) also announced a zero deforestation commitment (APP 2013). Many 
large buyers of leather and paper products have also made zero deforestation commitments in recent 
years. How strong these zero deforestation commitments will turn out to be depends in part on the 
definition of forest. The definition of High Carbon Stock (HCS) forest remains especially open to different 
interpretations. Under the strictest interpretation, only scrubland would be excluded, but individual 
companies may choose to take a less broad approach. Another potential drawback is that not all of the 
policies require transparency and third-party monitoring.
Other partnerships: Companies are not only scrutinizing their own operations, but also teaming up with 
new partners to implement wide standards and certification at scale. In 2010, for example, the Board of 
the Consumer Goods Forum (CGF), a network of consumer goods manufacturers and retailers that counts 
many of the world’s largest buyers of forest-risk commodities among its members, announced a pledge to 
achieve zero net deforestation by 2020, by both individual company initiatives and by working collectively 
in partnership with governments and NGOs (Consumer Goods Forum 2010). In 2012, the CGF partnered 
with the US government to launch the Tropical Forest Alliance (TFA), a public-private partnership in which 
business, government, and civil society partners take voluntary actions to reduce the tropical deforestation 
associated with the sourcing of commodities. The TFA now counts a number of other governments and 
many international forest NGOs (including Forest Trends) among its members (TFA 2014). In 2014, the 
CGF also reached an agreement with eight major international banks to work together to leverage the 
financial sector to help achieve the goal of zero net deforestation through addressing production and 
trade of relevant commodities (Banking Environment Initiative 2014).
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5.2.2 International Forest Policy Initiatives
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+): Since 2007, climate policy has 
increasingly driven international efforts to protect forests for their carbon storage via a multilateral effort known 
as REDD+, by which governments or forest owners in developing countries receive payments to maintain standing 
forests and their associated carbon stocks. To this end, policy makers are seeking methods to measure forest 
carbon and establish procedures, safeguards, and monitoring systems by which such payments might occur. 
Though some donor financing has been channeled to address broader forest governance issues and illegality in 
recipient countries such as Brazil and Indonesia, REDD+ has failed to fully recognize that half of the deforestation 
it seeks to prevent is already illegal. 
Very few REDD+ national strategies and proposals for action directly acknowledge the importance of illegal 
agro-conversion as a driver of deforestation. Even fewer make clear distinctions between the mechanisms that 
can be called upon to address illegal deforestation as opposed to planned and legal deforestation. 
The official Decision on drivers of deforestation agreed by parties to the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) in November 2013 does not directly state the importance of illegal agro-conversion (UNFCCC 
2013). Prior to this Decision, the Cancun Agreement (2010) established clear safeguards for undertaking REDD+ 
activities, and mandated transparent and effective forest governance (taking into account national legislation) 
and respect for the rights of indigenous and local communities (taking into account international obligations 
and national laws) (UNFCCC 2010). However, countries have since struggled to implement these safeguards. 
Until the widespread illegality in forest conversion is meaningfully addressed, the potential impact of REDD+ is 
severely limited. There is little point in encouraging a government to reform forest policies through the promise 
of REDD+ payments until existing ones are implemented and enforced (Karsenty and Ongolo 2012). Forest 
owners, on the other hand, may struggle to fulfill promises to protect tracts of forest nominally under their 
control in the absence of meaningful governance and secure tenure. 
Degraded lands policies: Significant funds have been spent to promote policies to direct new commercial 
agriculture onto “degraded land” rather than expanding into natural forests. Efforts have included mapping 
and measuring degraded land, encouraging producer governments to pass laws limiting development on forest 
lands, and persuading companies with concessions to voluntarily “swap” natural forests for degraded lands. 
The potential effectiveness of this strategy is questionable given the widespread illegalities documented in 
this report. Companies that ignore legal requirements will likely also ignore voluntary commitments, and are 
likely to favor forested over non-forested land especially when conversion timber revenues can help offset 
their development costs of establishing commodity plantations. The most effective way to drive agricultural 
development away from forests is by limiting new land concessions to land that is already degraded. This would 
require new government regulations, which cannot be expected to work if governments are already shown to 
be unable to implement and enforce existing laws.
Financing illegal conversion through imports and development aid: The developed nations that are bankrolling 
REDD+ are also undermining their own efforts by continuing to buy billions of dollars’ worth of beef, soy, palm oil, 
and timber grown on illegally deforested land. In some cases, they are directly or indirectly financing the companies 
responsible. The Norwegian Government’s sovereign wealth fund, for example, had investments in a range of logging 
and oil palm plantation companies, many of which which were the subject of evidence or allegations of illegal agro-
conversion, until it recently blacklisted them and divested (Rainforest Foundation Norway 2013). Governments and 
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank´s International Finance Corporation also commonly provide loans 
and free services to large companies involved in relevant commodity supply chains. The World Bank’s lending to a 
94
Consumer Goods and Deforestation
large meat-processing company in Brazil (see Case Study 1), for example, demonstrates how weak safeguards can 
result in the financing of companies processing products from illegal forest conversion.
5.2.3 Applying Existing Demand-side Measures to Conversion Timber
During the clearance of forest for agriculture, it is common for the profits from the timber salvaged during 
clearing to help finance the up-front cost of clearance and planting the subsequent agricultural crop. In some 
cases, such profits may be large enough to be the principal reason for the project. If such timber can be 
prevented from reaching the market in cases of illegal conversion, it may lead the developer to abide by the 
law, shift development on to degraded land, or even render the project unviable completely.
Existing demand-side measures on illegal natural forest timber, though mostly developed with selective logging 
in mind, do encompass conversion wood but are not being used for this purpose to their full potential. This is 
partly because policy makers do not yet fully comprehend the proportion of tropical wood production in most 
countries originating from forest conversion, or the extent to which this is likely to increase. 
Bilateral VPAs between the EU and producer countries could be an important tool to capture this illegal 
conversion timber. However, Forest Trends’ research has shown that these VPAs are not efectively preventing 
illegalities related to conversion timber (Hewitt 2013). This applies to both the criteria for assessing legality, and 
the definitions by which relevant government documents must be made transparent. Though most VPAs permit 
at least one type of conversion timber, they do not mention all such permits nor address whether these permits 
have been issued legally. None of the VPAs examined relevant permits that are issued by agencies other than the 
forestry department. It is also unclear whether any of the VPA licensing systems currently under development will 
include meaningful field checks on compliance with regulations governing forest clearance or planting (such as 
legal reserves, and prohibitions on clearing using fire, on deep peat, river buffers or steep slopes). 
As a result of these deficiencies, it is unlikely that timber sourced from most kinds of illegal agro-conversion 
documented in this report would be effectively prevented from reaching markets under the EU VPAs. More 
broadly, if illegal conversion wood is able to leak into licensed supply chains, it risks undermining the credibility 
of the VPA process as a whole. Urgent efforts are needed in producer countries to ensure that VPAs capture 
conversion timber effectively. It is also unclear whether the new legislation governing the legality of timber 
import and sale in the US, EU, and Australia is addressing conversion timber as effectively as it should. Even 
where relevant illegalities are encompassed, there is a risk that implementation and enforcement of these laws 
may focus solely or disproportionately on selective logging. To date, there has not been a seizure, investigation 
or prosecution under these laws relating to conversion timber, despite all the publically available information 
on illegalities. So far, all of the cases brought under these laws have been related to selective logging. 
Legality definitions and licensing schemes established through multi-stakeholder processes for agricultural 
commodities akin to the EU’s existing FLEGT VPAs on timber could not only help consumer countries 
implementing new laws governing imports (by distinguishing legal from illegal products), but would also help 
industry seeking clarity on relevant laws and regulations. The extension of processes such as the VPA legality and 
licensing development to agro-commodities holds perhaps the greatest potential among possible demand-side 
regulatory measures, because they also have the ability to simultaneously improve the supply-side response of 
producer countries (as demonstrated in the case of timber; see Box 10).
All of these potential actions face considerable challenges, but have a model in the case of timber where 
most are already being implemented. Supply chains for many of the commodities concerned are complex, 
but the same is true of timber. In some ways the commodity supply chains are actually simpler, with tracking 
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already established throughout the entire supply chain (to allow product recalls to protect human health, for 
example), less secondary processing and re-export, and a much larger proportion of production handled by a 
small number of major companies. While regulatory arrangements in many producer countries are unclear or 
conflicting, the same is true for timber and this is being gradually addressed, partly under the auspices of VPAs 
and other bilateral agreements. 
One unique challenge for agro-commodities is the delay between the illegal conversion and the commodity 
production and export. It takes time to grow the commodities that are produced at the expense of forests, from 
6 to 12 months for soy to up to 20 years for plantation wood. Assessing the legality of conversion that took place 
some years before is challenging, but not impossible. Many academics and NGOs have successfully compared 
archived satellite imagery with official concession maps in order to identify past illegalities in forest conversion. 
Though no one expects legality of conversion that took place 100 years ago to be assessed, a cut-off date of 
around 10 years is eminently feasible for all of the relevant commodities.
Though making best use of existing measures on conversion timber is an essential first step, not all tropical forests 
converted for agriculture contain much valuable timber. Indeed, most conversion takes place in forests that are already 
degraded to some extent. Where there has been extensive illegal selective logging, and most trees of valuable timber 
species have already been extracted, it is common for conversion wood to simply be burned, buried, or piled up and 
left to rot. Even where profits from conversion timber sales are helping to underwrite plantation development, the 
removal of these profits alone may be insufficient to prevent the forest conversion from taking place. Ultimately 
action is needed to address the demand for commodities produced at the expense of forests that were cleared 
illegally. If these commodities cannot be sold, the economic rationale for the illegal conversion disappears entirely.78
78	 For	further	background	and	detail	on	the	potential	applicability	of	consumer-country	measures	used	to	exclude	illegal	timber	to	
illegal	or	unsustainable	agricultural	products	associated	with	deforestation,	please	see	Brack	and	Bailey.	2013.	“Ending	Global	
Deforestation:	Policy	Options	 for	Consumer	Countries.”	Chatham	House	and	Forest	Trends,	London	and	Washington.	http://
www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/194247
In addressing agro-conversion and associated commodity trade, there are many useful lessons that can be 
learned from decades of experience of trying to reduce illegal and unsustainable logging and the associated 
timber trade. Though it has been a long road, there is increasing evidence that these efforts are paying off, 
with illegal logging falling substantially in three key producer countries, and the amount of illegal wood in 
international trade also falling dramatically. This is estimated to have resulted in the saving of billions of metric 
tons of carbon dioxide emissions and a substantial increase in tax revenues for producer countries (Lawson and 
MacFaul 2010). Previously, illegal logging had likely depressed world timber prices by more than 15 percent 
due to an uneven playing field caused by companies bypassing the law (Seneca Creek Associates 2004).
The experience from timber includes lessons on both what does and what does not work, and on both 
the supply-side, by producers and producer country governments, and the demand-side, by sourcing and 
purchasing companies and government agencies. Adopting lessons from these successful efforts could 
jump-start solutions to tackling illegal agro-conversion. Specific and transferrable lessons include:
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Private Sector:
• Voluntary private sector measures will not be able to address illegality unless they are accompanied by action 
by governments, both in producer and consumer countries. On the one hand, voluntary efforts to improve 
“sustainability” on timber were held back by having to compete with products sourced illegally. On the other, 
a lack of clarity in laws and regulations and poor transparency of relevant government documents made it 
difficult for certification systems to effectively check for compliance.
Producer Countries:
• Laws and regulations must be made clear, consistent, and coherent if they are to be enforceable. 
Where laws are unclear or incomplete, it is difficult to prosecute offenders and may preclude 
responsible companies from investing in a particular country.
• Systems of official independent monitoring of law enforcement and governance should be 
implemented (Lawson and MacFaul, 2010).
• Transparency of relevant government information (such as licenses and concession maps) is 
important, for a number of reasons. It can help prevent corruption, enable enforcement, and 
empower third parties such as NGOs to expose wrongdoing.
Consumer Countries:
• Policies requiring the use of only legal and sustainable timber in government purchases can prove 
to be an important catalyst. Such policies have helped expand the market for and raise standards in 
voluntary verification and certification of legality and sustainability, and forced many companies to 
explore legal supply chains for the first time (from “forest floor” to point of purchase). In doing so 
these policies have (among other things) helped pave the way for broader legislation governing all 
imports and sales of wood products (see next point).
• Regulations governing all imports are needed if the whole market is to be captured, and there are 
advantages to having these regulations focus on legality. Laws that make it an offence to import 
illegally sourced timber and wood products have now been enacted in the US, Australia, and 
the EU, which also requires companies to practice due diligence. These laws are starting to drive 
the broadest changes yet in purchasing, with major effects in producer countries. By focusing 
on legality (as opposed to sustainability) these laws have respected sovereignty and the right of 
producer countries to pursue economic development, while also avoiding WTO compliance issues.
• Bilateral engagement between producer and consumer countries is essential, both to enable 
implementation of demand-side regulations and to support parallel supply-side action. This has been 
most notably demonstrated by the EU’s Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs). These agreements, 
though ostensibly demand-side measures with the purpose of excluding illegal wood through the 
establishment of licensing schemes, are actually having much broader impacts, including on the 
supply side (FERN 2013). In effect, these are government to government trade agreements voluntarily 
entered into by both parties, but once signed are legally binding at the highest level of international 
law. They provide and guarantee consumer market access in exchange for improved forest and land use 
governance, combined with mutually created institutions that monitor partnership or treaty compliance. 
They are distinct from voluntary company-specific or roundtable commitments, which are not legally 
binding. Impacts include clarifications of relevant laws and regulations, improvements in stakeholder 
engagement, increased transparency and the introduction of independent third party monitoring.
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5.3 Conclusion
In summary, the evidence presented in this report indicates that the phenomenon of illegal forest clearing for 
commercial agriculture and associated exports has continued at an alarming rate since at least the start of the 
21st century. Indeed, this problem is worse than previously thought—and is likely occurring to a greater extent 
than the conservative estimates in this analysis show. While rising global incomes and demand for agricultural 
products will continue, we are currently responding with a flawed development model. It is increasingly clear 
that much of the forest land conversion for large-scale agricultural projects is in violation of some of the 
producer countries’ most basic laws and regulations and incurring high social and environmental costs. These 
illegalities will become more pronounced as producer countries encourage agricultural investments as a way 
to catalyze growth. Deforestation will increase in regions such as the Congo Basin where little commercial 
agriculture previously existed, unless we ensure that forest land converted for production is acquired legally 
and sustainably. The following chapter looks forward to how this can be achieved. 
98
6. RECOMMENDATIONS  
  
6.1 The Private Sector
Most companies involved in developing new commercial agriculture and timber plantations in tropical 
forest countries claim their operations abide by all relevant laws and regulations, but complain that legal 
arrangements are unclear or impractical, and that it is difficult and costly to demonstrate legality. Companies 
that produce, consume, or trade in the relevant commodities will likely need to engage in more in-depth due 
diligence to ensure that their products and purchases are not associated with illegality. They should join forces 
with other concerned stakeholders to call upon governments to clarify laws and regulations, and refrain from 
development projects in high-risk situations. While many international banks, private investors, and financial 
services providers have committed to the Equator Principles, many have not been able to develop sufficient due 
diligence to ensure that financing is only provided to responsible companies and projects where legality can be 
demonstrated. However, not many regional and national banks have committed to the Equator Principles. To be 
robust, all these efforts will require third-party monitoring and the publication of relevant information. Without 
these systems in place, investors and lenders risk default and undermining their supply chains when producers 
or traders are forced to confront illegalities within their operations. In other words, when illegalities occur, 
industry actors throughout the supply chain face financial risk. Independent analysis has shown, for example, 
that ignoring both statutory and customary community or land rights presents a significant financial risk to land 
developers and investors in the form of increased operating costs—as much as 29 times over a normal baseline 
scenario (The Munden Project 2012). Thirty-one percent of industrial concessions (including, but not limited to 
commercial agriculture) in emerging economies are estimated to overlap with community lands, equating to $5 
billion in value of agriculture production (The Munden Project 2013).
Knowing that these systems are not yet sufficiently robust to ensure legality, companies should seek to 
strengthen existing certification schemes, or even go above and beyond their standards and due diligence. 
The best way for companies to ensure that they are not involved in the illegal clearance of forests may be to 
ensure that they are not involved in clearance of forests at all, through the implementation of strong “zero 
deforestation” commitments (including commitments relating to rights of affected communities and customary 
landowners), backed with third-party monitoring.
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Companies producing or trading relevant commodities should
• comply with all national laws when developing new commercial agricultural and timber plantation 
projects in forested countries and when purchasing products;
• refrain from engaging in such projects in countries where it is not possible to ensure legality;
• purchase and trade only commodities that are legally produced and traceable back to their source;
• verify that relevant policies such as zero deforestation commitments are properly implemented via 
independent third-party monitoring and by publishing relevant information;
• improve existing certification schemes to ensure that these more effectively preclude commodities 
from illegal conversion;
• conduct comprehensive assessments of past illegalities by existing concessions (i.e., that examine 
the processes by which licenses were issued and that use archived satellite imagery to examine 
whether clearance began in advance of permitting);
• promote and support actions by producer country governments to tackle the problem (see 
Recommendations for producer countries), including the resolution of legal uncertainties, 
conflicting regulations, and unclear tenure;
• promote actions by consumer-country governments to tackle the problem, including through 
demand-side regulation; and
• adopt policies that extend beyond national laws, such as avoiding embedded deforestation entirely 
and requiring the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples and local communities 
(as per established international standards).
Banks, investors, and financial services providers should
• ensure that financing is only provided to relevant companies, shipments, and projects where 
legality can be demonstrated.
Certification bodies and associated roundtables should
• develop or strengthen standards and assessment, monitoring, and compliance mechanisms to 
ensure that they can meaningfully guarantee that no certified products are associated with any of 
the types of illegalities described in this report;
• strengthen monitoring and enforcement of standards, including through independent monitoring, 
transparency of information, and appropriate procedures for handling third-party complaints. These 
mechanisms should have the capacity to conduct a clear assessment of members’ compliance with 
national laws; and
• lobby for regulatory action by consumer country governments to ensure that only legally produced 
products can be imported or sold, thereby creating a level playing field on which companies can 
compete on broader issues of sustainability.
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6.2 Producer Countries
The most important responsibility in tackling illegal agro-conversion lies with producer country governments. 
Actions will need to be country-specific, given the nature, extent, and where a particular country is in the 
process of taking steps to address the problem. However, some broad principles can be outlined: 
a. Improve enforcement: While a lack of resources is often cited as the greatest impediment to effective 
enforcement, greater coordination and data-sharing among the government agencies at the central, 
provincial, and district levels is critical. Government agencies could also make better use of existing 
technologies, such as satellite imagery, to detect illegalities. If necessary, in the worst cases, a full review 
of the legality of all relevant licenses may be necessary to be carried out by an independent body (as 
has recently occurred in Papua New Guinea). In many countries, however, forest law enforcement is 
operating within a national context of weak governance. Anti-corruption efforts, for example, would 
work more effectively if applied across all sectors and complemented by nation-wide judicial reform, the 
establishment of freedom of information processes, uncontrolled media, and the regulation of lobbying. 
b. Clarify and improve laws and regulations: Unclear, inconsistent, or conflicting laws and regulations lead 
to confusion over the responsibilities between different levels of government, unnecessarily complex 
licensing procedures, and lack of clarity regarding land rights and land use planning. Successful efforts 
over the past 15 years to tackle illegal logging and associated trade (see Box 10) have shown how 
processes that clarify, simplify, and streamline relevant laws, regulations, procedures for compliance, 
and rights have brought transparency of relevant government information, helped to implement 
official systems of independent monitoring and reduced corruption. Producer countries can also learn 
from some of the innovative actions already taken to address illegal agro-conversion, particularly those 
taken in Brazil (see Section 4.1). Lessons can also be learned from other countries that fail to create 
a viable set of regulations and a functional governance structure for monitoring and enforcement. 
Improved laws and regulations must also be sensitive to the needs of smallholder forest producers, 
which are often the least able to meet complex requirements. 
c. Address past illegalities: Blanket amnesties to address past illegalities have garnered criticism that 
they uphold impunity and undermine the rule of law. Although it may be impractical to demand that 
established plantations that were developed illegally are returned to native forest, these plantations 
must only be considered legal after genuinely dissuasive penalties are applied to the companies 
involved, impacts mitigated or offset, and damaged parties (such as customary landowners) are 
properly compensated. In the most serious cases, the only appropriate action may be to revoke the 
license and appropriate and auction the land or return it to its rightful owner(s). 
d. Work with consumer countries: Another important lesson to be learned from successes under the 
FLEGT VPAs is that benefits can be gained by working in partnership with consumer countries (see Box 
10). Many producer countries, including those with little or insignificant trade to the EU, see the benefits 
of VPAs extending far beyond that of a trade agreement. They have used the technical assistance and 
political space opened by FLEGT VPA negotiations to support multi-stakeholder processes to clarify 
laws and regulations, draft new legality standards, and create legality assurance systems necessary to 
demonstrate the compliance of their exported products. 
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Where illegality is widespread and it is likely to take a long time to address legal and institutional failings and 
resolve past illegalities, countries may consider instituting broader measures, such as a complete moratorium 
on forest conversion, at least until the governance situation has been substantially improved—as Indonesia has 
done for new licenses. In more comprehensive or extreme cases, such moratoria could be applied retroactively 
to areas already licensed but not yet developed.
Producer countries must also ensure that international commitments regarding the rights of local communities 
and Indigenous Peoples, including customary land ownership, are reflected in national laws that are fully 
implemented and enforced. Aside from directly ensuring legality in this regard, such a step may serve to help 
reduce other forms of illegality, given the mounting evidence that granting local and indigenous communities 
rights to forestland protects forests while simultaneously improving livelihoods (Seymour et al. 2014; Stevens 
et al. 2014).
Producer country governments should
• ensure that the legal and regulatory framework governing the licensing and implementation of 
relevant developments on forest lands is clear, consistent, and non-conflicting;
• improve enforcement of relevant laws and regulations by increasing necessary resources, 
improving inter-agency coordination and information sharing, increasing penalties making best use 
of technology (such as satellite images), using anti-corruption and anti-money laundering bodies 
and laws, and putting in place systems of officially-mandated independent monitoring; 
• consider commissioning a full review of the legality of all relevant licenses, to be carried out by an 
independent body;
• resolve past illegalities in a manner that is practical but which ensures transgressors do not stand to 
gain and that those affected are properly compensated. Resolve any conflicting land rights claims 
arising from regulatory conflicts or inconsistencies through clear legal frameworks;
• collate and publish all relevant information (including licenses and permits, associated maps, and 
land use planning and land ownership maps) and make such publication a legal requirement; 
• request the assistance of donor and consumer countries, supported by bilateral arrangements such 
as the EU FLEGT VPAs (see Box 10);
• consider implementing strict and enforceable moratoria on conversion until regulatory 
arrangements have been clarified, land rights conflicts and past illegalities resolved, and 
enforcement systems improved;
• draft or revise national REDD+ policies that acknowledge the importance of illegal agro-conversion 
as a driver of deforestation and outline specific steps to reduce illegalities; and
• ensure that international commitments regarding rights of local communities and Indigenous 
Peoples are fully reflected in national laws and properly implemented and enforced.
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6.3 Consumer Countries
Refocusing REDD+ and Other Donor Finance: Many of the key consumer countries of relevant commodities 
are also important contributors to multilateral efforts on REDD+ or directly involved on a bilateral level in 
REDD+-related initiatives. If global efforts to reduce climate emissions from deforestation are to be effective, 
it is essential that these countries take action to refocus efforts under the REDD+ banner to ensure that they 
address—as a priority—illegalities and poor governance relating to the clearance of forests for commercial 
agriculture and timber plantations. In addition to re-aligning their own bilateral REDD+ programs, this will 
involve advocating for multilateral and national producer country REDD+ policies and programs to properly 
address these issues.
Donor governments must support relevant efforts by producer countries through both financial and technical 
assistance, but also advocate and require that meaningful steps be taken to tackle these problems as a precondition 
for any broader donor assistance on forests. Such countries must also ensure that they are not inadvertently 
contributing to the problem by investing in or financing, directly or indirectly, the companies involved.
Though there is plentiful evidence to demonstrate that it is a major problem in many countries, this report has 
also shown that there is a shortage of independent, systematic research on the nature and extent of illegalities 
in commercial agricultural development and its role in deforestation. International donors should prioritize 
further research in this area. They should also provide increased financial assistance to civil society groups 
involved in relevant efforts to address the issues raised in this report. 
Creating New Demand-side Measures to Curb Illegal Agro-Conversion: Most of the measures used to block 
market access to illegally-sourced timber (see Box 10) also hold potential for agro-commodities. The UK 
has already implemented a policy requiring that all government purchases of palm oil are legal and sustainable, 
though it is built around the RSPO certification system and needs to be strengthened by requiring higher 
standards over time. Such public procurement policies can be replicated for other forest-risk commodities and 
in other important consumer countries. In doing so, lessons from timber can be applied: good guidance is 
essential for purchasers, systems need to be established to monitor implementation, and alignment of policies 
across countries has greater impact and efficiencies for marketplace actors. However, although these policies 
do have some broader impacts, government purchasing only represents around 12 percent of all trade (OECD 
2011). To address the entire market, consumer countries should consider regulations that govern all imports. 
Such laws, already passed in relation to timber in the US, EU, and Australia, could make it an offense to import 
or sell agricultural commodities that were produced on land illegally cleared of forest, or require that importers 
carry out due diligence in order to minimize the risk of purchasing such products. 
 
ANNEX A  
Detailed Sources And Parameters Used In Analysis 
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Consumer country governments should
Refocus REDD+ and donor financing:
• provide technical and financial assistance for the necessary actions to be taken by producer 
countries to eradicate illegal forest clearing and resolve outstanding issues of illegality (see 
recommendations for producer countries above), including (among other things) reforms to land 
tenure regimes to protect the legal rights of forest communities;
• ensure that donor assistance on forests makes legality and improvements to forest governance a 
priority and precondition for further assistance;
• advocate for producer country REDD+ policies and programs that directly address legality and forest 
governance;
• advocate for relevant multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and UNEP to better address 
this issue in their work on and assistance to producer countries under REDD+ and otherwise;
• advocate for REDD+ monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) standards in international climate 
policy forums such as the UNFCCC that will provide oversight to further prevent illegal clearing of 
natural forests;
• require pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other nationally-governed financial instruments 
to carry out necessary due diligence and refuse to do business with companies found to have a high 
risk of being associated with illegal forest clearance;
• provide technical and financial support to civil society groups tackling these issues; and
• support further research to better understand the nature and extent of relevant illegalities, and 
measures effective at reducing their occurrence;
Create new demand-side measures to curb agro-conversion:
• ensure that existing demand-side measures on timber (including procurement policies, regulations 
governing all imports and bilateral agreements such as VPAs) are revised to ensure that they 
encompass conversion timber to the maximum possible extent;
• in countries where no such timber-related demand-side measures exist, enact these as a matter of 
urgency;
• ensure that these demand-side measures are fully implemented and enforced, with an appropriate 
proportion of attention and resources paid to cases related to conversion and sufficiently dissuasive 
penalties. Implement policies requiring that all government purchases of relevant commodities are 
proven to have been legally and sustainably sourced and ensure that new or existing procurement 
policies include standards that are high enough to ensure that products associated with the kinds of 
illegalities documented in this report are excluded;
• consider passing legislation making it an offense to import or sell agricultural commodities 
produced on land illegally cleared of forests and/or requiring that importers carry out due diligence 
in order to minimize the risk of purchasing such products;
• establish bilateral trade agreements with important supplier countries, following the model of the 
EU’s Voluntary Partnership Agreements; and
• ensure that penalties are sufficiently high and monitoring and enforcement sufficiently robust to 
guarantee compliance with these regulations.
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Area of Tropical Deforestation (A)
The analyses presented here used Hansen et al. (2013) dataset on total gross forest loss of tropical forests with 
canopy cover greater than 51 percent. A sensitivity analysis was conducted using two alternative datasets: 
gross loss of forest with canopy cover greater than 1 percent (Hansen et al. 2013); and net forest loss from 2000 
to 2010 as defined by FAO (FAO 2010). There was no substantial difference in results (Figure 5). 
There are issues with all three datasets. The Hansen et al. analysis measures tree cover only and therefore does not 
distinguish between natural forests and plantation forests, and the research team did not conduct ground verification 
at sample sites. The FAO dataset also has drawbacks, including inconsistent methods between countries, reliance on 
self-reporting, a definition of “forest” based on official land use rather than land cover, forest area changes only 
reported as net values, and forest definitions that changed over time (Hansen et al. 2013).79 
Proportion of Deforestation Driven by Commercial Agriculture (B)
For most of the 17 countries examined in detail in the deforestation analysis, sufficient data was available 
with which to produce either single-point estimates or ranges for the proportion of deforestation driven by 
commercial agriculture. In those countries where commercial agriculture was described in the literature as 
the single “main” or “principal” driver of deforestation, this was assumed to represent between 40 and 80 
percent of total deforestation. For three countries (Mozambique, Tanzania, and Angola) insufficient country-
specific data were available with which to produce either point estimates or ranges. For these countries, the 
overall average regional figure (35 percent) for Africa due to commercial agriculture for 2000 to 2010 estimated 
by Hosonuma et al. (2012) was used as the mid-point, while the sensitivity analysis used zero as the low-end 
estimate and 1.5 times the regional average (53 percent) as the high-end estimate. For the rest of the world, 
the same methodology was applied, using the regional averages from Hosonuma et al. (2012) for the total 
remaining deforestation attributable to each region (68 percent for Latin America and 35 percent for Asia).
All of the final low-end, mid-point, and high-end percentages used for the proportion of deforestation driven 
by commercial agriculture are provided in Table A2. Full justifications for individual countries are provided in 
the country sections in Chapter 4.
79	 Independent	assessments	of	deforestation	in	individual	countries	based	on	satellite	imagery	have	recently	demonstrated	that	
the	official	FAO	deforestation	figures	for	many	countries	are	extremely	inaccurate.	The	area	deforested	in	Indonesia,	Malaysia,	
and	Paraguay,	for	instance,	is	more	than	double	the	official	FAO	figure	for	each	country,	while	the	area	deforested	in	Nigeria	is	
less	than	one	quarter	the	amount	reported	(Hansen	et	al. 2013).
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Proportion of Deforestation for Commercial Agriculture that was Illegal (C)
Quantitative data on levels of illegality in the conversion of tropical forests for commercial agriculture and 
timber plantations was available for five countries (Brazil, Indonesia, Bolivia, Cambodia, and Papua New Guinea 
(PNG)), which in total represent 58 percent of measured deforestation during the reference period. None of 
the available figures for these countries capture all types of illegality, and as such the report almost certainly 
understates the true overall level of illegality. 
For Brazil, there are good data for the Amazon, but no data for the cerrado forests, so a range was created for 
the overall figure whereby the high-end estimate assumes the same level of illegality in the cerrado as in the 
Amazon and the low end estimate assumes zero illegality in the cerrado.
Though there are no quantitative data to produce national-level estimates for other countries, this study has 
collected qualitative evidence from 15 other countries (see Chapter 4). For some of these countries, only single 
case studies are documented, while for others there is a wealth of evidence demonstrating widespread breaches 
across a range of different laws/regulations. For these countries, and for tropical deforestation elsewhere, 
ranges were constructed as follows:
• Low-end: Assumes that there is no illegal deforestation for commercial agriculture.
• Mid-point: Assumes that illegalities are half (50 percent) of the regional or global average. 
• High-end: Assumes that illegalities equal the regional or global average.
The regional/global averages are based on the measured level of illegality of countries for which quantitative 
data exist. The regional average for Latin America was thus produced from the point estimates for Brazil and 
Bolivia, and that for Asia from Cambodia, Indonesia, and PNG. As there were no individual country estimates 
for Africa, the global average (of the five countries) was used. See Table A1 for the full data. 
TABLE A1
Calculations for Mid-Point and High-Point Estimates  
of Illegality for Countries without Specific Data
Region Countries for Which Quantitative 
Evidence Exists Used to Construct 
Average Applied
Average Illegality Proportion 
for Measured Countries 
(Used for High-End for Each 
Region)
50% of Average Illegality for 
Measured Countries (Used for  
Mid-Point For Each Region)
Latin America Brazil (mid-point of range 79%),  
Bolivia (90%)
84.5% 42.3%
Asia Indonesia (80%), Cambodia (90%), 
Papua New Guinea (90%)
86.7% 43.4%
Africa (Brazil, Bolivia, Indonesia, Cambodia, 
Papua New Guinea)
85.8% 42.9%
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All of the final low-end, mid-point, and high-end percentages used for the proportion of deforestation for 
commercial agriculture that was illegal are provided in Table A2. Full justifications for individual countries are 
provided in the country sections in Chapter 4.
Proportion of Products of Commercial Agriculture Exported (D)
Data related to exports were obtained from various sources. For Brazil, the proportion of agro-conversion 
exported was drawn directly from the published literature (Karstensen et al. 2013). For other countries, the 
figure was estimated based on a comparison of production and export data for the most relevant commodities. 
Production and export data were obtained from USDA Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) reports and the UN 
COMTRADE database. Where the data allowed, the analysis weighted individual commodities according to the 
proportion of total estimated agro-conversion attributable to each. The equation (in the example case, assumes 
two key commodities involved) is as follows (Figure A1):
It was generally assumed that the proportion of illegal agro-conversion commodities exported in each country 
was the same as the proportion of overall agro-conversion commodities exported—i.e. that commodities grown 
on illegally deforested land are not disproportionally likely to be consumed domestically. This is considered 
to be a reasonable assumption given that nearly all commodities associated with illegal deforestation are 
nevertheless considered legal by the authorities in the country of origin, and given the small proportion of total 
production and exports of relevant commodities that are independently certified or verified.
For those countries where insufficient data were available, and for the rest of the world, averages were used, 
i.e. for Asia and Latin America the mid-point estimates used the average figures for countries in the same 
region for which estimates had been produced, whereas for Africa, the global average was applied. High-end 
percentages were calculated as 1.5 times the mid-points. The low-end of the sensitivity analysis used zero 
percent in all such instances.
All of the final low-end, mid-point, and high-end percentages used for the proportion of products of commercial 
agriculture exported are provided in Table A2. Full justifications for individual countries are provided in the 
country sections in Chapter 4.
FIGURE A1
=
Proportion of 
deforestation driven 
by commercial 
agriculture for 
export
(Proportion of agro-conversion attributable to commodity A * 
proportion of that commodity exported) 
+
(Proportion of agro-conversion attributable to commodity B * 
proportion of that commodity exported)
122
Consumer Goods and Deforestation
Total Quantity and Value of Relevant Commodity Exports (E)
Data on the total quantity and value of exports of those commodities examined were sourced from USDA FAS 
reports, the UN COMTRADE database, FAO, and other national-level sources. For soy, a simple total of exports 
of whole beans, meal, and soy oil were used. For palm oil, only data on trade in crude and simply refined 
palm oil was assessed. Other palm product exports such as palm kernel oil, palm meal, or secondary products 
fractionated or made from palm oil were not included. For tropical timber, the analysis only examined exports 
of primary timber products (logs, sawn timber, plywood, veneer, and mouldings) from producer countries. For 
plantation-grown solid wood products, the analysis examined logs, sawn timber, veneer, mouldings, plywood, 
other wood panels, joinery, and wood furniture. For both tropical timber and plantation-grown timber, raw 
data were converted into volumes in round wood equivalent, using standard conversion factors.
TABLE A2 
Percentages Used in Tropical Deforestation Analysis (Parameters B, C, and D)
% Due to Comm. Agriculture % Illegal % Exported
Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
Brazil 90% 90% 90% 68% 79% 90% 30% 30% 30%
Indonesia 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 75% 75% 75%
DR Congo 0% 0% 0% 0% 43% 86% 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 87% 87% 87% 0% 43% 87% 86% 86% 86%
Paraguay 79% 79% 79% 0% 42% 85% 80% 80% 80%
Bolivia 75% 75% 75% 90% 90% 90% 56% 66% 75%
Colombia 75% 75% 75% 0% 42% 85% 20% 20% 20%
Mexico 60% 60% 60% 0% 42% 85% 0% 49% 74%
Mozambique 0% 35% 53% 0% 43% 86% 0% 51% 77%
Tanzania 0% 35% 53% 0% 43% 86% 0% 51% 77%
Angola 0% 35% 53% 0% 43% 86% 0% 0% 0%
Peru 66% 66% 66% 0% 42% 85% 0% 49% 74%
Myanmar 33% 33% 33% 0% 43% 87% 10% 10% 10%
Cambodia 40% 60% 80% 90% 90% 90% 0% 72% 100%
Vietnam 40% 60% 80% 0% 43% 87% 90% 90% 90%
Laos 73% 73% 73% 0% 43% 87% 0% 72% 100%
Papua New Guinea 50% 50% 50% 90% 90% 90% 100% 100% 100%
Other—Africa 0% 35% 53% 0% 43% 86% 0% 51% 77%
Other—Asia 0% 35% 53% 0% 43% 87% 0% 72% 100%
Other—Latin Amer. 0% 68% 100% 0% 42% 85% 0% 49% 74%
Notes:	Figures	colored	green	are	estimates	for	which	sufficiently	good	data	was	available	for	a	range	not	to	be	used.	For	figures	
colored	yellow,	data	for	the	relevant	country	was	only	sufficient	to	produce	a	range.	For	figures	colored	orange,	no	quantitative	data	
were	available	and	a	full	range	of	estimates	were	included	in	the	sensitivity	analysis,	with	the	mid	and	high	estimates	drawn	from	
regional	or	global	averages,	according	to	the	methodology	described	in	the	text.
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The countries specifically assessed for each commodity are listed in Table A3. These countries were selected as 
being both important exporters of the relevant commodity and high-risk countries for illegal agro-conversion.
Proportion of Production of Relevant Commodities that Displaced Forests (F)
Various sources were used to populate the data on the proportion of production of relevant commodities in key 
countries that were estimated to have displaced forests. In some cases, direct estimates could be obtained from 
the published literature. Each of the published estimates applies only to part of the reference period (all dates up 
to 2012); unless evidence suggested otherwise, in these cases it was assumed that the same percentages applied 
throughout the reference period. Where evidence did suggest otherwise (such as soy planting in Brazil since 
2006), appropriate adjustments were made. In a number of cases where no direct estimates were available in 
the literature, estimates were calculated using a mixture of deforestation data (from Hansen et al. 2013) and data 
for areas under pasture and planted with specific crops. The latter were obtained from FAOSTAT or other national 
government or industry sources. For those countries and commodities for which insufficient data was available, 
the sensitivity analysis used a mid-point estimate based on an average of those countries within the same region 
for which estimates had been possible, and a high-point estimate based on the highest among those countries.
For soy, beef, and leather, this report is conservative as the analysis assumed that no exports from countries 
other than those specifically examined displaced forest. But this assumption is based on the fact that most of 
the remaining exports are from non-tropical countries. For palm oil, the mid-point estimate for the “rest of the 
world” (61 percent) was based on an average of the estimated figures for Indonesia and Malaysia, while the 
high-end estimate used the highest measured figure (for Malaysia). The use of an average mid-point is justified 
on the basis that other significant producers (e.g. PNG, Colombia) are also tropical forest countries. Changes 
to this assumed figure make very little difference to the global numbers, however, given that 90 percent of 
exports originate from Indonesia and Malaysia. For tropical timber, the “rest of the world” mid-point estimate 
for the proportion from agro-conversion was calculated as the average of the specified countries for which it 
had been possible to produce estimates, while the high-end was the highest estimated proportion among those 
countries. Again, the figure used makes little difference to the global total, because 96 percent of global exports 
are from the specified countries.
TABLE A3
List of Individual Countries Assessed in Commodity Export Analysis
Soy Beef Leather Palm Oil Tropical Timber Pulp & Paper Plantation-Grown  
Solid wood
Brazil
Argentina
Paraguay
Bolivia
Uruguay
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Paraguay
Mexico
Brazil
Argentina
Uruguay
Paraguay
Mexico
Colombia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Malaysia
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
Cameroon
Myanmar
Laos
Solomon Islands
Brazil
Gabon
Côte d’Ivoire 
Republic of Congo
Ghana
Indonesia
Malaysia
Indonesia
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All of the final low-end, mid-point, and high-end percentages used for the proportion of production of relevant 
commodities that displaced forests are provided in Table A5. Full justifications for individual countries are 
provided in the country sections in Chapter 4.
Proportion of Forest Displaced for Each Commodity that Was Illegally Cleared (G)
In most cases, the proportions of forest clearance for specific commodities in specific countries estimated to be 
associated with illegalities were the same as the overall figures for agro-conversion illegality (see “Proportion 
of deforestation for commercial agriculture that was illegal,” above). In the case of Brazil, and were adjusted 
to account for differences in illegality relating to conversion for soy (lower than the average) and for beef and 
tropical timber (higher than the average), these differences relating to the proportion of production of each 
originating in the Amazon as opposed to the cerrado.
For most of those countries not specifically included in the earlier analysis (Uruguay, for soy, beef and leather; 
Cameroon, Solomon Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana for tropical timber) the same methodology of using 
regional (or global, for Africa) averages to calculate mid- (50 percent of regional average) and high-point estimates 
(100 percent of regional average) was applied (with zero used for the low-end). This same methodology (with 
global averages) was also used in the production of figures for the “rest of the world” for palm oil and tropical 
timber. For tropical timber from Cameroon, Gabon, and Republic of Congo, specific estimates of illegalities in 
conversion were produced based on evidence from the sole or main sources of conversion wood.
No illegality estimates were required for the “rest of the world” for soy, beef or leather (because it had already 
been assumed that no exports displaced forest), or for pulp and paper and plantation wood (becasue no global 
analysis was being conducted for those commodities). 
All of the final low-end, mid-point, and high-end percentages used for the proportion of forest displaced for 
each commodity that was illegally cleared are provided in Table A5. Full justifications for individual countries 
are provided in the country sections in Chapter 4.
TABLE A4
Estimates Used for “Rest of the World” for the Proportion of Exports of Each Relevant 
Commodity Displacing Tropical Forest
Soy Beef Leather Palm Oil Tropical Timber
0% 0% 0% 60% 5%
Notes:	For	pulp	&	paper	and	for	plantation-wood,	no	global	estimate	was	produced	and	so	no	“rest	of	the	world”	 
estimate	was	required
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TABLE A5
Percentages Used in Commodity Analysis (Parameters F & G)
% Displacing Forest % Illegal
Low Mid High Low Mid High
Soy
Brazil 59% 60% 61% 49% 69% 90%
Argentina 9% 9% 9% 30% 53% 75%
Paraguay 71% 71% 71% 0% 42% 85%
Bolivia 45% 73% 100% 90% 90% 90%
Uruguay 0% 53% 100% 0% 42% 85%
RoW 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Beef/Leather*
Brazil 79% 79% 79% 73% 82% 90%
Argentina 17% 17% 17% 30% 53% 75%
Uruguay 0% 48% 79% 0% 42% 85%
Paraguay 0% 48% 79% 0% 42% 85%
Mexico 0% 48% 79% 0% 42% 85%
Colombia 0% 48% 79% 0% 42% 85%
RoW 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Palm Oil
Indonesia 69% 69% 69% 80% 80% 80%
Malaysia 55% 55% 55% 0% 43% 87%
RoW 0% 61% 66% 0% 43% 86%
Tropical Timber 
Malaysia 65% 65% 65% 0% 43% 87%
Indonesia 75% 75% 75% 80% 80% 80%
PNG 30% 30% 30% 90% 90% 90%
Cameroon 5% 5% 5% 90% 95% 100%
Myanmar 50% 50% 50% 0% 43% 87%
Laos 0% 55% 75% 0% 43% 87%
Solomon Islands 0% 55% 75% 0% 43% 87%
Brazil 19% 19% 19% 90% 90% 90%
Gabon 6% 10% 13% 0% 0% 0%
Côte d’Ivoire 0% 4% 13% 0% 43% 86%
Congo 2% 2% 2% 80% 90% 100%
Ghana 0% 1% 2% 0% 43% 86%
RoW 0% 29% 75% 0% 43% 86%
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% Displacing Forest % Illegal
Pulp and Paper 
Indonesia 50% 50% 50% 80% 80% 80%
Malaysia 0% 55% 83% 0% 43% 87%
Plantation Wood 
Indonesia 50% 50% 50% 80% 80% 80%
% Conversion Wood % Plantation Grown Wood
Low Mid High Low Mid High
Pulp and Paper (% displacing forest made from conversion vs plantation wood)
Indonesia 37% 37% 37% 63% 63% 63%
Notes:	Figures	colored	green	are	estimates	for	which	sufficiently	good	data	was	available	for	a	range	not	to	be	used.	For	figures	
colored	yellow,	data	for	the	relevant	country	was	only	sufficient	to	produce	a	range.	For	figures	colored	orange,	no	quantitative	
data	were	available	and	a	full	range	of	estimates	were	included	in	the	sensitivity	analysis,	with	the	mid	and	high	estimates	drawn	
from	regional	or	global	averages,	according	to	the	methodology	described	in	the	text.
Note:	RoW=	Rest	of	the	world
*	Colombia	was	only	assessed	individually	for	leather	exports,	and	was	included	in	RoW	for	beef
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(Using	principal	deforestation	dataset	(Hansen	et	al.	2013	>	51%	canopy	gross	forest	loss,	2000	to	2012)
Note: Data	tables	using	alternative	deforestation	datasets	published	separately	as	supporting	information
ANNEX B  
Data Tables for Results of Analysis in Section 3.1 
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TABLE B1 
Mid-Point Calculations for Deforestation Analysis
MID-POINT
Total Gross 
Forest (> 51% 
Canopy) Loss in 
the Tropics 2000 
to 2012 (mha) (A)
% Of All Forest 
(> 51% Canopy) 
Loss in the 
Tropics
% Of 
Deforestation due 
to Commercial 
Agriculture (est) 
(B)
Area of Forest 
Lost For 
Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-AxB (C)
% Of Agro-
Conversion Illegal 
(est) (D)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation 
for Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-CxD (E)
% of Illegal 
Commercial 
Agro-Conversion 
Products 
Exported (F)
Area Ag-def Exported 
(CXF)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Agro-exports (mha) 
ExF (G) 
Illegal Agro-
Conversion as % of 
Total Deforestation—
E/A (H)
Illegal Agro-
Conversion in Each 
Country as % of Total 
Deforestation in the 
Tropics
% Of Total 
Deforestation due 
to Illegal Agro-
Conversion for Export 
G/A (I) 
Brazil 30.6 35% 90% 27.5 79% 21.7 30% 8.3 6.52 71% 20% 21%
Indonesia 15.5 18% 80% 12.4 80% 9.9 75% 9.3 7.42 64% 9% 48%
DR Congo 5.3 6% 0% 0 43% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 4.7 5% 87% 4.1 43% 1.8 86% 3.5 1.52 38% 2% 32%
Paraguay 2.4 3% 79% 1.9 42% 0.8 80% 1.5 0.65 33% 1% 27%
Bolivia 2.8 3% 75% 2.1 90% 1.9 66% 1.4 1.24 68% 2% 44%
Colombia 2.4 3% 75% 1.8 42% 0.8 20% 0.4 0.15 32% 1% 6%
Mexico 2.0 2% 60% 1.2 42% 0.5 49% 0.6 0.25 25% 0% 12%
Mozambique 0.8 1% 35% 0.3 43% 0.1 51% 0.1 0.06 15% 0% 8%
Tanzania 0.7 1% 35% 0.2 43% 0.1 51% 0.1 0.05 15% 0% 8%
Angola 0.8 1% 35% 0.3 43% 0.1 0% 0 0 15% 0% 0%
Peru 1.5 2% 66% 1.0 42% 0.4 49% 0.5 0.21 28% 0% 14%
Myanmar 1.4 2% 33% 0.4 43% 0.2 10% 0 0.02 14% 0% 1%
Cambodia 1.1 1% 60% 0.7 90% 0.6 72% 0.5 0.44 54% 1% 39%
Vietnam 1.1 1% 60% 0.7 43% 0.3 90% 0.6 0.26 26% 0% 23%
Laos 1.1 1% 73% 0.8 43% 0.4 72% 0.6 0.26 32% 0% 23%
Papua New Guinea 0.6 1% 50% 0.3 90% 0.3 100% 0.3 0.28 45% 0% 45%
Other—Africa 5.5 6% 35% 1.9 43% 0.8 51% 1 0.42 15% 1% 8%
Other—Asia 1.8 2% 35% 0.6 43% 0.3 72% 0.4 0.19 15% 0% 11%
Other—Latin America 4.9 6% 68% 3.3 42% 1.4 49% 1.6 0.69 29% 1% 14%
TOTAL 87.0   61.6  42.4 49% 30.7 20.6 49% 39% 24%
% of total tropical 
deforestation
71% 49%  35% 24% 
129
ANNEX B
TABLE B1 
Mid-Point Calculations for Deforestation Analysis
MID-POINT
Total Gross 
Forest (> 51% 
Canopy) Loss in 
the Tropics 2000 
to 2012 (mha) (A)
% Of All Forest 
(> 51% Canopy) 
Loss in the 
Tropics
% Of 
Deforestation due 
to Commercial 
Agriculture (est) 
(B)
Area of Forest 
Lost For 
Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-AxB (C)
% Of Agro-
Conversion Illegal 
(est) (D)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation 
for Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-CxD (E)
% of Illegal 
Commercial 
Agro-Conversion 
Products 
Exported (F)
Area Ag-def Exported 
(CXF)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Agro-exports (mha) 
ExF (G) 
Illegal Agro-
Conversion as % of 
Total Deforestation—
E/A (H)
Illegal Agro-
Conversion in Each 
Country as % of Total 
Deforestation in the 
Tropics
% Of Total 
Deforestation due 
to Illegal Agro-
Conversion for Export 
G/A (I) 
Brazil 30.6 35% 90% 27.5 79% 21.7 30% 8.3 6.52 71% 20% 21%
Indonesia 15.5 18% 80% 12.4 80% 9.9 75% 9.3 7.42 64% 9% 48%
DR Congo 5.3 6% 0% 0 43% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 4.7 5% 87% 4.1 43% 1.8 86% 3.5 1.52 38% 2% 32%
Paraguay 2.4 3% 79% 1.9 42% 0.8 80% 1.5 0.65 33% 1% 27%
Bolivia 2.8 3% 75% 2.1 90% 1.9 66% 1.4 1.24 68% 2% 44%
Colombia 2.4 3% 75% 1.8 42% 0.8 20% 0.4 0.15 32% 1% 6%
Mexico 2.0 2% 60% 1.2 42% 0.5 49% 0.6 0.25 25% 0% 12%
Mozambique 0.8 1% 35% 0.3 43% 0.1 51% 0.1 0.06 15% 0% 8%
Tanzania 0.7 1% 35% 0.2 43% 0.1 51% 0.1 0.05 15% 0% 8%
Angola 0.8 1% 35% 0.3 43% 0.1 0% 0 0 15% 0% 0%
Peru 1.5 2% 66% 1.0 42% 0.4 49% 0.5 0.21 28% 0% 14%
Myanmar 1.4 2% 33% 0.4 43% 0.2 10% 0 0.02 14% 0% 1%
Cambodia 1.1 1% 60% 0.7 90% 0.6 72% 0.5 0.44 54% 1% 39%
Vietnam 1.1 1% 60% 0.7 43% 0.3 90% 0.6 0.26 26% 0% 23%
Laos 1.1 1% 73% 0.8 43% 0.4 72% 0.6 0.26 32% 0% 23%
Papua New Guinea 0.6 1% 50% 0.3 90% 0.3 100% 0.3 0.28 45% 0% 45%
Other—Africa 5.5 6% 35% 1.9 43% 0.8 51% 1 0.42 15% 1% 8%
Other—Asia 1.8 2% 35% 0.6 43% 0.3 72% 0.4 0.19 15% 0% 11%
Other—Latin America 4.9 6% 68% 3.3 42% 1.4 49% 1.6 0.69 29% 1% 14%
TOTAL 87.0   61.6  42.4 49% 30.7 20.6 49% 39% 24%
% of total tropical 
deforestation
71% 49%  35% 24% 
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TABLE B2 
Low-End Calculations for Deforestation Analysis
LOW-END
Total Gross 
Forest (> 51% 
Canopy) Loss in 
the Tropics 2000 
to 2012 (mha) (A)
% Of All Forest 
(> 51% Canopy) 
Loss in the 
Tropics
% Of 
Deforestation due 
to Commercial 
Agriculture (est) 
(B)
Area of Forest 
Lost For 
Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-AxB (C)
% Of Agro-
Conversion Illegal 
(est) (D)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Commercial Agriculture 
(mha) -CxD (E)
% of Illegal 
Commercial 
Agro-
Conversion 
Products 
Exported (F)
Area Ag-def Exported 
(CXF)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Agro-exports (mha) 
ExF (G) 
Illegal Agro-
Conversion as % of 
Total Deforestation—
E/A (H)
Illegal Agro-
Conversion in Each 
Country as % of Total 
Deforestation in the 
Tropics
% Of Total 
Deforestation due 
to Illegal Agro-
Conversion for Export 
G/A (I) 
Brazil 30.6 35% 90% 27.5 68% 18.7 30% 8.3 5.61 61% 17% 18%
Indonesia 15.5 18% 80% 12.4 80% 9.9 75% 9.3 7.42 64% 9% 48%
DR Congo 5.3 6% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 4.7 5% 87% 4.1 0% 0 86% 3.5 0 0% 0% 0%
Paraguay 2.4 3% 79% 1.9 0% 0 80% 1.5 0 0% 0% 0%
Bolivia 2.8 3% 75% 2.1 90% 1.9 56% 1.2 1.06 68% 2% 38%
Colombia 2.4 3% 75% 1.8 0% 0 20% 0.4 0 0% 0% 0%
Mexico 2.0 2% 60% 1.2 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Mozambique 0.8 1% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Tanzania 0.7 1% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Angola 0.8 1% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Peru 1.5 2% 66% 1.0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Myanmar 1.4 2% 33% 0.4 0% 0 10% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Cambodia 1.1 1% 40% 0.5 90% 0.4 0% 0 0 36% 0% 0%
Vietnam 1.1 1% 40% 0.4 0% 0 90% 0.4 0 0% 0% 0%
Laos 1.1 1% 73% 0.8 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Papua New Guinea 0.6 1% 50% 0.3 90% 0.3 100% 0.3 0.28 45% 0% 45%
Other—Africa 5.5 6% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Other—Asia 1.8 2% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Other—Latin 
America
4.9 6% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
TOTAL 87   54.5  31.2 46% 24.9 14.4 36% 28% 17%
% of total tropical 
deforestation
63% 36%  29% 17% 
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TABLE B2 
Low-End Calculations for Deforestation Analysis
LOW-END
Total Gross 
Forest (> 51% 
Canopy) Loss in 
the Tropics 2000 
to 2012 (mha) (A)
% Of All Forest 
(> 51% Canopy) 
Loss in the 
Tropics
% Of 
Deforestation due 
to Commercial 
Agriculture (est) 
(B)
Area of Forest 
Lost For 
Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-AxB (C)
% Of Agro-
Conversion Illegal 
(est) (D)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Commercial Agriculture 
(mha) -CxD (E)
% of Illegal 
Commercial 
Agro-
Conversion 
Products 
Exported (F)
Area Ag-def Exported 
(CXF)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Agro-exports (mha) 
ExF (G) 
Illegal Agro-
Conversion as % of 
Total Deforestation—
E/A (H)
Illegal Agro-
Conversion in Each 
Country as % of Total 
Deforestation in the 
Tropics
% Of Total 
Deforestation due 
to Illegal Agro-
Conversion for Export 
G/A (I) 
Brazil 30.6 35% 90% 27.5 68% 18.7 30% 8.3 5.61 61% 17% 18%
Indonesia 15.5 18% 80% 12.4 80% 9.9 75% 9.3 7.42 64% 9% 48%
DR Congo 5.3 6% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 4.7 5% 87% 4.1 0% 0 86% 3.5 0 0% 0% 0%
Paraguay 2.4 3% 79% 1.9 0% 0 80% 1.5 0 0% 0% 0%
Bolivia 2.8 3% 75% 2.1 90% 1.9 56% 1.2 1.06 68% 2% 38%
Colombia 2.4 3% 75% 1.8 0% 0 20% 0.4 0 0% 0% 0%
Mexico 2.0 2% 60% 1.2 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Mozambique 0.8 1% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Tanzania 0.7 1% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Angola 0.8 1% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Peru 1.5 2% 66% 1.0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Myanmar 1.4 2% 33% 0.4 0% 0 10% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Cambodia 1.1 1% 40% 0.5 90% 0.4 0% 0 0 36% 0% 0%
Vietnam 1.1 1% 40% 0.4 0% 0 90% 0.4 0 0% 0% 0%
Laos 1.1 1% 73% 0.8 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Papua New Guinea 0.6 1% 50% 0.3 90% 0.3 100% 0.3 0.28 45% 0% 45%
Other—Africa 5.5 6% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Other—Asia 1.8 2% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Other—Latin 
America
4.9 6% 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
TOTAL 87   54.5  31.2 46% 24.9 14.4 36% 28% 17%
% of total tropical 
deforestation
63% 36%  29% 17% 
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TABLE B3 
High-End Calculations for Deforestation Analysis
HIGH-END
Total Gross 
Forest (> 51% 
Canopy) Loss in 
the Tropics 2000 
to 2012 (mha) (A)
% Of All Forest 
(> 51% Canopy) 
Loss in the 
Tropics
% Of 
Deforestation due 
to Commercial 
Agriculture (est) 
(B)
Area of Forest 
Lost For 
Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-AxB (C)
% Of Agro-
Conversion Illegal 
(est) (D)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Commercial Agriculture 
(mha) -CxD (E)
% of Illegal 
Commercial 
Agro-
Conversion 
Products 
Exported (F)
Area Ag-def Exported 
(CXF)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Agro-exports (mha) 
ExF (G) 
Illegal Agro-
Conversion as % of 
Total Deforestation—
E/A (H)
Illegal Agro-
Conversion in Each 
Country as % of Total 
Deforestation in the 
Tropics
% Of Total 
Deforestation due 
to Illegal Agro-
Conversion for Export 
G/A (I) 
Brazil 30.6 35% 90% 27.5 90% 24.8 30% 8.3 7.43 81% 23% 24%
Indonesia 15.5 18% 80% 12.4 80% 9.9 75% 9.3 7.42 64% 9% 48%
DR Congo 5.3 6% 0% 0 86% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 4.7 5% 87% 4.1 87% 3.5 86% 3.5 3.03 75% 3% 65%
Paraguay 2.4 3% 79% 1.9 85% 1.6 80% 1.5 1.29 67% 1% 53%
Bolivia 2.8 3% 75% 2.1 90% 1.9 75% 1.6 1.42 68% 2% 51%
Colombia 2.4 3% 75% 1.8 85% 1.5 20% 0.4 0.31 63% 1% 13%
Mexico 2.0 2% 60% 1.2 85% 1.0 74% 0.9 0.75 51% 1% 38%
Mozambique 0.8 1% 53% 0.4 86% 0.4 77% 0.3 0.29 45% 0% 35%
Tanzania 0.7 1% 53% 0.4 86% 0.3 77% 0.3 0.24 45% 0% 35%
Angola 0.8 1% 53% 0.4 86% 0.4 0% 0 0 45% 0% 0%
Peru 1.5 2% 66% 1.0 85% 0.8 74% 0.7 0.62 56% 1% 41%
Myanmar 1.4 2% 33% 0.4 87% 0.4 10% 0 0.04 29% 0% 3%
Cambodia 1.1 1% 80% 0.9 90% 0.8 100% 0.9 0.82 72% 1% 72%
Vietnam 1.1 1% 80% 0.9 87% 0.8 90% 0.8 0.69 69% 1% 62%
Laos 1.1 1% 73% 0.8 87% 0.7 100% 0.8 0.71 63% 1% 63%
Papua New Guinea 0.6 1% 50% 0.3 90% 0.3 100% 0.3 0.28 45% 0% 45%
Other—Africa 5.5 6% 53% 2.9 86% 2.5 77% 2.2 1.91 45% 2% 35%
Other—Asia 1.8 2% 53% 0.9 87% 0.8 100% 0.9 0.82 46% 1% 46%
Other—Latin 
America
4.9 6% 100% 4.9 85% 4.2 74% 3.6 3.07 85% 4% 63%
TOTAL 87.0   65.4  56.6 55% 36.4 31.1 65% 52% 36%
% of total tropical 
deforestation
75% 65%  42% 36% 
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TABLE B3 
High-End Calculations for Deforestation Analysis
HIGH-END
Total Gross 
Forest (> 51% 
Canopy) Loss in 
the Tropics 2000 
to 2012 (mha) (A)
% Of All Forest 
(> 51% Canopy) 
Loss in the 
Tropics
% Of 
Deforestation due 
to Commercial 
Agriculture (est) 
(B)
Area of Forest 
Lost For 
Commercial 
Agriculture (mha) 
-AxB (C)
% Of Agro-
Conversion Illegal 
(est) (D)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Commercial Agriculture 
(mha) -CxD (E)
% of Illegal 
Commercial 
Agro-
Conversion 
Products 
Exported (F)
Area Ag-def Exported 
(CXF)
Area of Illegal 
Deforestation for 
Agro-exports (mha) 
ExF (G) 
Illegal Agro-
Conversion as % of 
Total Deforestation—
E/A (H)
Illegal Agro-
Conversion in Each 
Country as % of Total 
Deforestation in the 
Tropics
% Of Total 
Deforestation due 
to Illegal Agro-
Conversion for Export 
G/A (I) 
Brazil 30.6 35% 90% 27.5 90% 24.8 30% 8.3 7.43 81% 23% 24%
Indonesia 15.5 18% 80% 12.4 80% 9.9 75% 9.3 7.42 64% 9% 48%
DR Congo 5.3 6% 0% 0 86% 0 0% 0 0 0% 0% 0%
Malaysia 4.7 5% 87% 4.1 87% 3.5 86% 3.5 3.03 75% 3% 65%
Paraguay 2.4 3% 79% 1.9 85% 1.6 80% 1.5 1.29 67% 1% 53%
Bolivia 2.8 3% 75% 2.1 90% 1.9 75% 1.6 1.42 68% 2% 51%
Colombia 2.4 3% 75% 1.8 85% 1.5 20% 0.4 0.31 63% 1% 13%
Mexico 2.0 2% 60% 1.2 85% 1.0 74% 0.9 0.75 51% 1% 38%
Mozambique 0.8 1% 53% 0.4 86% 0.4 77% 0.3 0.29 45% 0% 35%
Tanzania 0.7 1% 53% 0.4 86% 0.3 77% 0.3 0.24 45% 0% 35%
Angola 0.8 1% 53% 0.4 86% 0.4 0% 0 0 45% 0% 0%
Peru 1.5 2% 66% 1.0 85% 0.8 74% 0.7 0.62 56% 1% 41%
Myanmar 1.4 2% 33% 0.4 87% 0.4 10% 0 0.04 29% 0% 3%
Cambodia 1.1 1% 80% 0.9 90% 0.8 100% 0.9 0.82 72% 1% 72%
Vietnam 1.1 1% 80% 0.9 87% 0.8 90% 0.8 0.69 69% 1% 62%
Laos 1.1 1% 73% 0.8 87% 0.7 100% 0.8 0.71 63% 1% 63%
Papua New Guinea 0.6 1% 50% 0.3 90% 0.3 100% 0.3 0.28 45% 0% 45%
Other—Africa 5.5 6% 53% 2.9 86% 2.5 77% 2.2 1.91 45% 2% 35%
Other—Asia 1.8 2% 53% 0.9 87% 0.8 100% 0.9 0.82 46% 1% 46%
Other—Latin 
America
4.9 6% 100% 4.9 85% 4.2 74% 3.6 3.07 85% 4% 63%
TOTAL 87.0   65.4  56.6 55% 36.4 31.1 65% 52% 36%
% of total tropical 
deforestation
75% 65%  42% 36% 
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ANNEX C  
Data Tables for Results of Analysis in Section 3.2 
Note: Data	tables	for	low-end	and	high-end	estimates	for	individual	commodities	published	separately	as	supporting	information
TABLE C1
Soy 2012/13 (million metric tons)
 Country Exports 
(mt) (A)
% 
Displacing 
Forest 
(est) (B)
Exports 
Displacing 
Forest (mt) 
-AxB (C)
% Of 
Deforestation 
Illegal (est) 
(D)
Exports 
From illegal 
Deforestation 
(mt) CxD (E)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
as % of Total 
Exports—E/A 
(F) 
Value of 
Exports From 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Value of 
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Brazil 59.2 60% 35.5 69% 24.5 41% 25,574 17,646
Argentina 44.4 9% 4.0 53% 2.1 5% 2,130 1,118
Paraguay 7.9 71% 5.6 42% 2.4 30% 2,833 1,198
Bolivia 1.7 73% 1.2 90% 1.1 65% 667 600
Uruguay 2.9 53% 1.5 42% 0.7 22% 825 349
RoW 50 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0
TOTAL 166.1  47.9  30.7 19% 32,029 20,912
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TABLE C3
Beef 2012 (million metric tons)
TABLE C2
Palm Oil 2012/13 (million metric tons)
 Country Exports 
(mt) (A)
% 
Displacing 
Forest 
(est) (B)
Exports 
Displacing 
Forest (mt) 
-AxB (C)
% Of 
Deforestation 
Illegal (est) 
(D)
Exports 
From illegal 
Deforestation 
(mt) CxD (E)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
as % of Total 
Exports—E/A 
(F) 
Value of 
Exports From 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Value of 
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Brazil 1.5 79% 1.2 82% 1.0 65% 5,899 4,838
Argentina 0.2 17% 0 53% 0 9% 217 114
Uruguay 0.4 48% 0.2 42% 0.1 20% 985 417
Paraguay 0.3 48% 0.1 42% 0.1 20% 506 214
Mexico 0.2 48% 0.1 42% 0 20% 509 215
RoW 5.6 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0
TOTAL 8.1  1.6  1.2 14% 8,117 5,798
 Country Exports 
(mt) (A)
% 
Displacing 
Forest 
(est) (B)
Exports 
Displacing 
Forest (mt) 
-AxB (C)
% Of 
Deforestation 
Illegal (est) 
(D)
Exports 
From illegal 
Deforestation 
(mt) CxD (E)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
as % of Total 
Exports—E/A 
(F) 
Value of 
Exports From 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Value of 
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Indonesia 20.3 66% 13.4 80% 10.7 53% 12,541 10
Malaysia 17.2 55% 9.5 43% 4.1 24% 9,280 4,028
RoW 4.2 61% 2.6 43% 1.1 26% 2,434 1,044
TOTAL 41.7  25.4  15.9 38% 24,255 15,104
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TABLE C4
Leather 2011 (million US$)
Country Exports ($ Mill) 
(A)
% Displacing 
Forest (est) (B)
Exports 
Displacing 
Forest ($ mill) 
-Axb (C)
% Of 
Deforestation 
Illegal (est) (D)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation ($ 
mill) CxD (E)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
as % of Total 
Exports -E/A (F)
Brazil 2,021 79% 1,597 82% 1,309 65%
Argentina 914 17% 155 53% 82 9%
Uruguay 165 48% 79 42% 33 20%
Paraguay 99 48% 48 42% 20 20%
Mexico 310 48% 149 42% 63 20%
Colombia 122 48% 59 42% 25 20%
RoW 19,466 0% 0 0% 0 0%
TOTAL 23,096  2,086  1,532 7%
137
ANNEX C
TABLE C6
Pulp & Paper (Splitting Exports into Salvage and Plantation Wood Sources)
TABLE C5
Tropical Timber 2012 (million m3 RWE)
 Country Exp (Million mt) % Conv Timber % Plant Wood Exp (Conv) Exp (Plant)
Indonesia 20.3 37% 63% 7.5 12.8
Malaysia 17.2 60% 40% 10.3 6.9
TOTAL 37.5   17.8 19.7
 Country Exports 
(mt) (A)
% 
Displacing 
Forest 
(est) (B)
Exports 
Displacing 
Forest (mt) 
-AxB (C)
% Of 
Deforestation 
Illegal (est) 
(D)
Exports 
From illegal 
Deforestation 
(mt) CxD (E)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
as % of Total 
Exports—E/A 
(F) 
Value of 
Exports From 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Value of 
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Malaysia 15.6 65% 10.1 43% 4.4 28% 2,174 943
Indonesia 10.4 75% 7.8 80% 6.2 60% 2,181 1,745
PNG 3.2 30% 1.0 90% 0.9 27% 85 76
Cameroon 1.8 5% 0.1 95% 0.1 5% 21 20
Myanmar 2.6 50% 1.3 43% 0.6 22% 620 269
Laos 1.6 55% 0.9 43% 0.4 24% 338 147
Solomon 
Islands
2.1 55% 1.2 43% 0.5 24% 238 103
Brazil 0.5 19% 0.1 90% 0.1 17% 68 61
Gabon 1.1 10% 0.1 0% 0 0% 36 0
Côte 
d’Ivoire
0.7 4% 0 43% 0 2% 7 3
Congo 0.9 2% 0 90% 0 2% 8 7
Ghana 0.5 1% 0 43% 0 0 1 1
RoW 3.4 29% 1.0 43% 0.4 12% 420 180
TOTAL 44.4 53% 23.6  13.6 31% 6,195 3,555
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TABLE C7
Pulp & Paper (from Conversion Wood)
TABLE C8
Plantation-Grown Timber and Other Wood Products (m3 RWE)
 Country Exports 
(mt) (A)
% 
Displacing 
Forest 
(est) (B)
Exports 
Displacing 
Forest (mt) 
-AxB (C)
% Of 
Deforestation 
Illegal (est) 
(D)
Exports 
From illegal 
Deforestation 
(mt) CxD (E)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
as % of Total 
Exports—E/A 
(F) 
Value of 
Exports From 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Value of 
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Indonesia 7.5 50% 3.8 80% 3.0 40% 2,779 2,223
Malaysia 10.3 55% 5.7 43% 2.4 24% 9,144 3,932
TOTAL 17.8  9.4  5.4 31% 11,923 6,155
 Country Exports 
(mt) (A)
% 
Displacing 
Forest 
(est) (B)
Exports 
Displacing 
Forest (mt) 
-AxB (C)
% Of 
Deforestation 
Illegal (est) 
(D)
Exports 
From illegal 
Deforestation 
(mt) CxD (E)
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
as % of Total 
Exports—E/A 
(F) 
Value of 
Exports From 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Value of 
Exports 
From Illegal 
Deforestation 
($ mill)*
Indonesia 3.4 50% 1.7 80% 1.4 40% 784 627
TOTAL 3.4 1.7  1.4 40% 784 627
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TABLE C9
Summary
Commodity Exports From Illegal 
Deforestation as % of  
Total Exports
Value of Exports From 
Deforestation ($ mil)
Value of Exports From Illegal 
Deforestation ($ mil)
Scenario Low Mid High Low Mid High Low Mid High
Soy 11% 19% 27% 30,524 32,029 33,440 13,334 20,912 29,535
Beef 11% 14% 20% 6,117 8,117 9,408 4,372 5,798 8,254
Leather 5% 7% 9% 1,752 2,086 2,302 1,212 1,532 2,018
Palm Oil 27% 39% 52% 22,391 24,825 25,024 10,488 15,560 20,794
Tropical Timber 16% 31% 49% 5,178 6,195 7,100 1,907 3,555 5,966
Pulp & Paper (from conversation wood) 2,779 11,923 23,353 2,223 6,155 20,123
Pulp & Paper (from plantation wood) 4,732 10,828 7,018 3,786 6,407 5,774
Plantation-grown timber products 784 784 784 627 627 627
Totals	by	country/commodity	(US$	million)
TABLE C9, EXTENSION
Soy Beef Leather Palm Oil Trop 
Timber
Pulp & 
Paper 
(Tropical)
Pulp & 
Paper 
(Plant)
Plantation 
Wood
Total % Of 
Global 
Total
Brazil 17,646 4,838 1,309 61 23,854 40.2%
Indonesia 10,488 1,745 2,223 3,786 627 18,869 31.8%
Malaysia 4,028 943 3,932 2,621 11,524 19.4%
Paraguay 1,198 214 20 1,432 2.4%
Argentina 1,118 114 82 1,314 2.2%
Uruguay 349 417 33 799 1.3%
Bolivia 600 600 1.0%
Mexico 215 63 278 0.5%
Myanmar 269 269 0.5%
Laos 147 147 0.2%
Solomon 
Islands
103 103 0.2%
PNG 76 76 0.1%
Colombia 25 25 0.0%
Cameroon 20 20 0.0%
TOTAL 20,912 5,798 1,532 14,516 3,364 6,155 6,407 627 59,311
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This annex highlights the methodological issues in two major global studies estimating the proportion of recent 
global tropical deforestation due to agriculture that may have led to underestimates of the importance of 
agriculture to tropical deforestation. 
Hosonuma et al. (2012)
•	 Finding: 73 percent of tropical/sub-tropical deforestation during the decade to 2010 was caused by 
agriculture, including 40 percent due to commercial agriculture and the rest to local or subsistence 
agriculture
•	 Why it is likely an underestimate of the current proportion: Firstly, there is strong reason to believe 
that commercial agriculture has grown as a driver over the 10-year period of the study (DeFries et al. 
2013, Cuypers et al. 2013), which would mean it represented somewhat more than 40 percent at the 
end of the period and less at the start. Secondly, the estimate was based on FAO deforestation data self-
reported by countries, which for a number of important countries have been shown to be inaccurate 
(Hansen et al. 2013).80 Thirdly, the reference documents used to attribute proportions of deforestation 
to different drivers in individual countries were often of poor quality and in some cases out of date. 
One key reference document used to establish the importance of different drivers in many countries, 
for instance, claims 20 percent of deforestation in Indonesia is caused by shifting agriculture, but cites 
a study published in 1991, ten years before the study reference period and prior to the massive boom 
in conversion for timber and oil palm plantations.81
Cuypers et al. (2013)
•	 Finding: 65 percent of deforestation in the tropics and sub-tropics between 2000 and 2008 was due to 
agricultural expansion. 
80	 The	 FAO	 data	 are	 based	 on	 self-reporting	 by	 individual	 countries.	 Independent	 assessments	 of	 deforestation	 in	 individual	
countries	based	on	satellite	imagery	(Hansen	et	al.	2013)	have	recently	demonstrated	that	the	official	FAO	deforestation	figures	
for	many	countries	are	extremely	inaccurate.	The	area	deforested	in	Indonesia,	Malaysia,	and	Paraguay,	for	instance,	is	more	than	
double	the	official	FAO	figure,	while	the	area	deforested	in	Nigeria	is	less	than	one	quarter	the	amount	reported	(according	to	
FAO	(2010),	Nigeria	lost	4	Mha	of	forests	from	2000	to	2010—more	than	any	other	tropical	country	except	Brazil	and	Indonesia,	
but recent	satellite	measurements	 suggest	 that	deforestation	 in	Nigeria	during	 this	period	was	actually	0.9	Mha—less	 than	
one	quarter	of	the	reported	amount	(Hansen	et	al.	2013).	Though	some	of	the	difference	might	be	explained	by	variations	in	
methodology	(including	that	the	recent	independent	data	includes	felling	of	non-natural	forest),	it	is	unlikely	that	this	can	explain	
more	than	a	minority	of	the	difference.
81	 The	study	cites	Matthews	R	B	et	al.	2010	Development	and	application	of	methodologies	for	reduced	emissions	from	deforestation	
and	 forest	degradation	 (REDD+)—phase	 I	 Final	 Report	 for	 Project	CEOSA	0803,	Department	of	 Energy	 and	Climate	Change	
(DECC)	as	one	of	the	sources	for	ratio	data	on	drivers	of	deforestation	in	Indonesia.	The	relevant	section	of	that	report	in	turn	
references	Dick,	J.	(1991).	Forest	land	use,	forest	use	zonation	and	deforestation	in	Indonesia:	A	Summary	and	interpretation	of	
existing	information.	Background	paper	to	United	Nations	Conference	on	Environment	and	Development	(UNCED)	for	the	State	
Ministry	for	Population	and	Environment	(KLH)	and	the	Environmental	Impact	Management	Agency	(BAPEDAL).
ANNEX D  
Previous Global Estimates of the Proportion of 
Tropical Deforestation due to Agriculture 
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•	 Why it is likely an underestimate of the current proportion: This study also understates the present 
importance of agriculture, for the first two reasons as for Hosonuma et al. (see above), but also 
because it is likely that a large proportion of the deforestation classified by the study as due to “natural 
hazards” (mostly fire) (17 percent of global deforestation during 2000 to 2008) or “unexplained” (19 
percent) were actually due to agriculture. This is because the study only attributed deforestation to 
land currently used for agriculture, as recorded in official FAO statistics. Firstly (as the authors admit), 
it is possible that those FAO statistics understate the actual area currently being used for agriculture, 
particularly for subsistence agriculture. A second and likely more important flaw is that this method 
fails to account for areas of forest which were cleared for or as a result of agriculture, but which are 
not currently used for that purpose. Evidence from Brazil and Indonesia (the two countries responsible 
for most of total worldwide tropical deforestation) shows that the proportion this represents of global 
deforestation is substantial. Most forest fires in Indonesia are associated with commercial oil palm and 
timber plantation development (FWI/GFW 2002); fires started for the purpose of clearing land for this 
purpose likely extend far beyond the areas intended. Within concessions, fire may also be one reason 
that the speed with which forests are cleared for oil palm has outstripped actual planting, creating a 
backlog of under-utilized land (Boucher et al. 2011). In Brazil, much of the land deforested for cattle 
pasture in the Amazon has since been abandoned (INPE 2011a), while large areas of steep slopes in 
the Atlantic forest biome are also now under secondary vegetation, having been abandoned due to 
increasing mechanization of agricultural production (Lapola et al. 2013). In all these cases, such land 
would not be attributed to commercial agriculture using the Cuypers et al. 2013 study methodology.
•	 There are also reasons to believe the study may have understated the proportion of deforestation 
exported. For instance, the study attributed a great deal of deforestation to crops such as rice, maize, 
and cassava which are much less likely to be exported than beef, soy, and palm oil. However, for some 
key countries (such as Nigeria) where large areas of deforestation were attributed to these crops, recent 
evidence suggests that the real level of deforestation during the relevant period was dramatically lower 
than the figures reported by the country concerned and used in the study.82
82	 The	new	maps	of	deforestation	also	show	real	deforestation	to	have	been	much	less	extensive	than	previously	thought	 in	a	
number	of	other	countries	where	the	increased	areas	of	rice,	maize	or	cassava	were	attributed	to	deforestation	by	Cuypers	et	
al.	2013	and	which	have	few	agricultural	exports,	such	as	Tanzania	and	Myanmar.
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